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CIRCLING BACK TO THE OBVIOUS
INTRODUCTION
In a recent article in the Harvard Law Review, Professor Richard
Primus suggests that the next great equal protection battle on the
race front will be fought over whether limiting Title VII's disparate
impact theory to racial minorities is constitutional.' Although I
have responded in the Northwestern University Law Review that
the constitutional question can-and under normal principles of
statutory interpretation and constitutional adjudication should-be
avoided by the counterintuitive expedient of extending the disparate
impact theory to whites,2 this Article takes issue with Professor
Primus on another ground. That is, the next great equal protection
battle on the race front may be fought not over disparate impact but
instead over disparate treatment discrimination: whether Title VII's
foundational proof structure for individual disparate treatment
cases 3-the "McDonnell Douglas" prescription-is constitutional.4
The McDonnell Douglas approach, which has been refined by a
dozen Supreme Court cases and invoked in literally tens of thou-
sands of lower court decisions in the thirty years since its announce-
ment, was called into question by the Supreme Court's 2003 decision
in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.' This Article considers the implica-
tions of Desert Palace for the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme, but
adds an unusual perspective-the rising dissatisfaction in the lower
1. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARv. L. REv. 493 (2003).
2. See Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down? Disparate Impact Claims
by White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1505 (2004).
3. Individual disparate treatment is to be distinguished from systemic disparate
treatment, sometimes called pattern and practice cases. Systemic cases focus on either a
policy alleged to be discriminatory, see, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), or a pattern of discrimination usually evidenced by statistics,
see, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). By contrast, individual
disparate treatment cases involve challenges to discrete employment decisions. Both kinds
of intentional discrimination are to be distinguished from claims of disparate impact
discrimination. Under that theory, which is developed in more detail in the Primus and
Sullivan articles, supra notes 1-2, an employment practice that is shown to have an adverse
disparate impact on protected groups will be found illegal unless the defendant demonstrates
that it is justified by business necessity and related to the job in question.
4. The structure originated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5. 539 U.S. 90 (2003); see infra notes 372-83 and accompanying text.
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courts with the application of formalized proof structures to reverse
discrimination claims.
My central message is that the increasing judicial concern about
the constitutionality of developing race-specific proof structures can
be avoided by treating claims of discrimination by whites the same
as claims by African Americans, and by freeing both from the
McDonnell Douglas framework. Plaintiffs of any race should need
merely to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find race discrimination. This circling back to the obvious will
permit severing the thick encrustation of precedents in both the
traditional and reverse discrimination areas that comprise the
Gordian knot of Title VII law. In addition, this is a kind of harmonic
convergence of the increasing dissatisfaction with both McDonnell
Douglas in traditional discrimination cases, and with the law's
approach to reverse discrimination. I caution, however, that a
return to the obvious will require developing new methods of proof
if the new regime is to permit meaningful attacks on the endemic
problem of discrimination.
The core question for reverse discrimination arises from the
understandable reluctance of courts to infer racial discrimination
against whites in circumstances in which they will readily infer
racial discrimination against African Americans and other racial
minorities. Indeed, lurking under the question of proof structures is
the question, under the retrospective lens of present equal protec-
tion doctrine, of whether Title VII is constitutional, or at least how
its constitutionality may be justified.
The last great equal protection battle recently ended with the
defenders of affirmative action in education narrowly preserving the
ability, under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, to accord limited racial preferences in the
pursuit of diversity. As anyone not on a desert island knows, the
Supreme Court, in 5-4 votes in Grutter v. Bollinger6 and Gratz v.
Bollinger,7 struck down the University of Michigan's admissions
plan for the undergraduate program,' but upheld Michigan Law
6. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
7. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
8. See id. at 275-76.
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School's more individualized program.9 Although the nation's
colleges must scurry to revise their admissions policies to conform
to the new dispensation,10 Grutter marked the first majority in favor
of affirmative action in decades. Yet, however important, Grutter is
a very circumscribed opinion, and affirmative action remains
constitutionally suspect in most areas other than education.
Lost in the massive national debate that crystallized in Grutter
over the constitutionality of racial preferences in higher education
is the parallel question of "reverse discrimination" in employment
under Title VII. That topic is of increasing practical importance.
Last year, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a judgment of $17,000,000
to seven white librarians in their Title VII suit against the Atlanta
Fulton Public Library System," and EEOC filings increasingly
challenge reverse discrimination 2 as opposed to traditional
discrimination."a Like the dispute over affirmative action/reverse
9. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. In a startling passage in Grutter, Justice O'Connor, the
swing vote, suggested that the decision had a shelf-life of only twenty-five years. See id. ("We
expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest approved today."). That expectation, however, might prove optimistic as
the Court remains poised (as admittedly it has been for a while) on the verge of several
changes in personnel.
10. See Peter Schmidt, Affirmative Action Remains a Minefield, Mostly Unmapped,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 24, 2003, at A22.
11. See Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2003). The white plaintiffs had been
transferred from the central library to various branches but had suffered no diminution in
pay. Id. at 1354. More surprising than the verdict was the fact that it was founded entirely
on claims of emotional harm resulting from "being transferred from meaningful, supervisory
positions to dead-end, nonmangerial jobs" for racial reasons. Id. at 1358. The jury awarded
each plaintiff$1 million, but the court cut the award in half. Id. at 1359. The remainder of the
judgment was punitive damages, which the court substantially upheld. See id. at 1359-60.
12. See Timothy K. Giordano, Comment, Different Treatment for Non-Minority Plaintiffs
Under Title VII: A Call for Modification of the Background Circumstances Test to Ensure that
Separate Is Equal, 49 EMORY L.J. 993, 993 n.2 (2000) (noting that "allegations of reverse
discrimination have blossomed in various sub-cultures of our society").
13. This Article uses the adjective "traditional" to describe discrimination claims of
African Americans, other racial minorities, and women (certainly the primary intended
beneficiaries of Title VII), as well as to distinguish these claims from "reverse discrimination"
claims of whites and males.
As with many "back formations" (think analog clock), the alternatives to "reverse
discrimination" seem problematic. For example, using "regular" or "normal" to describe what
this Article calls traditional discrimination seems to validate that discrimination. Some
writers use terms like "invidious" to describe traditional discrimination (with "benign" for
reverse discrimination), but this phrasing suggests that reverse discrimination ought not to
be impermissible, which is simply not the law. Although the use of "traditional" and "reverse"
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discrimination for public entities under the Constitution, the
question of reverse discrimination/affirmative action under Title VII
has generated enormous controversy but has evolved very differ-
ently. Simply summarized, although Title VII in theory bars race
discrimination against any race, it allows affirmative action racial
preferences to a greater extent than does the Equal Protection
Clause."'
This results from the confluence of two phenomena. The first, and
better known, is the Supreme Court's more permissive test for the
validity of affirmative action plans under Title VII than under the
Equal Protection Clause. Thus, although showing that an employer
consciously uses race or gender to advance the employment
opportunities of minorities and women may establish a prima facie
case of disparate treatment discrimination, a valid affirmative
action plan is a legitimate reason for the use of race or sex in
employment decisions, and the standards for validity are relatively
relaxed.15 If the plan is valid, decisions taken pursuant to it are not
discriminatory within the meaning of the statute. Accordingly, a
discrimination is scarcely value-free, see Joyce A. Hughes, "Reverse Discrimination" and
Higher Education Faculty, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 414 (1998) ('The term (reverse
discrimination] is 'covert[ly] ... [sic] political [and] ... should be removed from the vocabulary
of any serious academician .... As it is currently used, it should be identified as an appeal to
a particular political ideology or policy preference, rather than accepted as an expression
which is neutral in tone....') (quoting Philip L. Fetzer, 'Reverse Discrimination. The Political
Use of Language, 12 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 212, 212-13 (1993)), it has the advantage of clarity and,
on balance, seems the best choice available.
Some discrimination is not so easy to classify in either category. See Trina Jones, Shades
of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000) (discussing discrimination in favor
of lighter-skinned African Americans both by whites and by blacks).
14. This Article focuses on the governing legal principles, leaving more theoretical
perspectives to another time. Such perspectives, particularly antisubordination theory, view
discrimination against racial minorities and women as radically different than discrimination
against white males. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1009 (1986) ("It is more invidious for women or
blacks to be treated worse than white men than for men or whites to be treated worse than
black women ... because of the differing histories and contexts of subordination faced by these
groups."); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race": The
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 615 (arguing that the Court should adhere to an anti-subordination theory of equality,
such that the Court bases its constitutional rulings on the extent to which historically
subordinated classes of people are affected). The law has nevertheless developed differently.
See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part I.B.
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reverse discrimination plaintiff making a systemic attack must
prove both that she was disadvantaged by an affirmative action plan
and that the plan is invalid. 6
The second phenomenon is less well recognized. In the past, lower
courts had been reluctant to recognize discrete cases of racial
preferences, i.e., individual cases where the employer did not seek
to shield its action behind an affirmative action plan. A typical
formulation was that a reverse discrimination plaintiff must have
had "direct evidence" of discrimination against whites or, for a
plaintiff forced to use circumstantial evidence, must have shown as
part of her prima facie case "background circumstances" demon-
strating that the employer was the "unusual employer" who so
discriminates." Whether more demanding requirements for proving
actionable reverse discrimination under Title VII as opposed to the
Equal Protection Clause are a cause for celebration or consternation
depends on the observer, but that courts were imposing these
requirements was both clear and yet largely unnoticed.
More recently, however, there has been a shift toward making
reverse discrimination attacks under the statute easier to mount.
This has occurred on two fronts. First, the intersection of the
Supreme Court's approval of voluntary affirmative action plans with
individual cases claiming reverse discrimination has become more
complicated. In "first generation" cases, the plaintiff challenged a
particular decision and the employer justified its action by reliance
on an affirmative action plan. The litigation then proceeded on
familiar grounds to determine if the plan was valid under criteria
the Court had announced. In current second generation cases,
however, typically neither side invokes the affirmative action plan. 8
Rather, the plaintiff claims the plan is a sufficient "background
circumstance"; by not claiming that she was denied an opportunity
pursuant to the plan, plaintiff avoids having also to prove the plan
was invalid. To prove racial discrimination in the first place,
however, she argues that the existence of a plan (or, less concretely,
a commitment to "diversity" or "equal employment opportunity") is
a "background circumstance" permitting her to establish more
16. See id.
17. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
18. See infra p. 24.
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readily her prima facie case of reverse discrimination. To what
extent such a showing will be permitted needs to be addressed,
especially in light of the possible concomitant disincentive for
affirmative action plans. More surprising than plaintiffs avoiding
challenges to affirmative action plans is that defendants, for reasons
we will explore, rarely seek shelter behind such plans. 9 Rather,
they simply deny any racial preference in the first place.
The second front concerns the increasingly common challenges by
reverse discrimination plaintiffs to the requirement that, absent
direct evidence, they must show "background circumstances" that
the employer discriminates against whites. They claim both that the
requirement is incoherent and that the requirement itself consti-
tutes reverse discrimination. That is, plaintiffs contend that they
are being disadvantaged compared to minorities: whereas a
minority bringing a "traditional" discrimination case makes out one
element of her prima facie case by showing merely that she is a
minority, a white plaintiff must satisfy the "additional" requirement
of "background circumstances."
This Article explores these themes as follows. Part I first sketches
the law's approach to reverse discrimination, that is, its position on
both the validity of affirmative action plans and its approach to
individual claims outside of the context of such plans. Part II turns
to a more detailed treatment of individual disparate treatment
reverse discrimination claims, seeking to ascertain what stan-
dards the lower courts have developed. The focus of this Part is on
the background circumstances test, including whether an affirma-
tive action plan is a background circumstance. Part III analyzes
the emerging question of whether a requirement of background
circumstances, or a similar test, is itself in some sense reverse
discrimination. Part IV investigates the question of whether the
background circumstances test is constitutional. Part V explores the
alternatives to background circumstances in proving individual
cases of reverse discrimination. In this setting, the Article considers
the recent erosion of the McDonnell Douglas test by Desert Palace
and explores whether a unified approach to all discrimination
claims using the Desert Palace approach resolves a host of problems
19. See id.
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for Title VII litigation. Finally, Part VI considers the implications
of this new world of proof for both traditional and reverse discrimi-
nation claimants.
I. TITLE VII DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIMS BY WHITES AND MALES
A. The Rule. Title VII Prohibits Race Discrimination
Early in its history, the Supreme Court held that Title VII barred
discrimination against whites, not merely discrimination against
African Americans and other racial minorities. In McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,2" white plaintiffs claimed they
had been disciplined more severely than African American employ-
ees involved in the same incident of theft from their employer.
Although the district court had found no claim stated because the
discrimination was against whites, the Supreme Court held that
Title VII protects everyone, without regard to race, from employ-
ment discrimination because of race:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the discharge
of "any individual" because of "such individual's race." Its terms
are not limited to discrimination against members of any
particular race.... We therefore hold today that Title VII
prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in
this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were
they Negroes and Jackson white.2"
Based on the reasoning of Santa Fe, men are protected by Title
VII against sex discrimination because the statute was not drafted
to protect merely the historic victims of discrimination." Further,
20. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
21. Santa Fe, 427 U.S. at 278, 280 (citation omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(2000)). The Court dismissed language from an earlier case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802(1973), describing a plaintiff's proof as requiring that "he belongs to
a racial minority." The Santa Fe Court stated that the requirement "of this sample pattern
of proof was set out only to demonstrate how the racial character of the discrimination could
be established in the most common sort of case, and not as an indication of any substantive
limitation of Title VII's prohibition of racial discrimination." Santa Fe, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6.
22. See, e.g., Maitland v. Univ. of Minn., 260 F.3d 959, 964-65 (8th Cir. 2001); Quick v.
Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1377 (8thCir. 1996).
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despite language in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 that was more susceptible of
being construed to protect minorities only, the Court held that the
statute also precludes discrimination against whites .23 The language
guaranteeing rights "enjoyed by white citizens" 24 emphasizes the
racial nature of the discrimination prohibited and does not limit
those who can invoke its protections.25 In sum, all employees are
protected from race discrimination under Title VII and § 1981, and
from sex discrimination under Title VII.
B. The Exception: Racial or Gender Preferences Are Permissible
Under Valid Affirmative Action Plans
This reasoning suggests, of course, a pure color- (and sex-) blind
model under the statute, but things were not to be so simple. A
footnote in Santa Fe stated that the defendant "disclaims that the
23. Sante Fe, 427 U.S. at 295-96. The main thrust of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) is to prohibit race
discrimination in contracts: "All persons ... shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws ... as
is enjoyed by white citizens...." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). This has generally been interpreted
to include all employment, although some lower courts have viewed at-will employment, at
least in some states, 'as not contractual, and, therefore, not within § 1981. See generally
Joanna L. Grossman, Making a Federal Case out of It: Section 1981 and At-Will Employment,
67 BROOK. L. REv. 329, 341-45 (2001) (reviewing cases); Harry Hutchison, The Collision of
Employment-At-Will, Section 1981 & Gonzalez: Discharge, Consent and Contract Sufficiency,
3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 207 (2001) (same).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
25. Santa Fe, 427 U.S. at 287. Although § 1981 prohibits "race" discrimination, what
constitutes racial discrimination may be different under that statute than under Title VII.
Some cases that, under Title VII, would be treated as national origin discrimination, will be
treated as racial discrimination under § 1981. In Saint Francis College v. At-Khazraji, 481
U.S. 604 (1987), the Court held that an Arab, who would now be considered a Caucasian,
could challenge actions by his white-dominated employer as race discrimination because he
would have been considered a member of a separate race when § 1981 was enacted shortly
after the Civil War. See id. at 612-13. The Court stated:
Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons
who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry
or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is racial discrimination that
Congress intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as
racial in terms of modem scientific theory.... If respondent on remand can prove
that he was subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he was
born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin [Iraq], or his
religion, he will have made out a case under § 1981.
Id. at 613 (footnote omitted). Thus, § 1981 prohibits race discrimination in contracts,
including employment contracts, with race defined according to the understanding of the
Congress that enacted it in 1866.
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actions challenged here were any part of an affirmative action
program," and the Court emphasized that "we do not consider here
the permissibility of such a program, whether judicially required
or otherwise prompted."26 This suggested the possibility of a
gaping hole in the color-blind model, which became a reality when
the Supreme Court upheld voluntary affirmative action plans27
under Title VII.25 It approved limited racial preferences in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber29 and limited gender
preferences in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
26. Santa Fe, 427 U.S. at 281 n.8 (citations omitted).
27. Where an affirmative action plan is imposed by a state actor, it will be subject to both
Title VII analysis and constitutional review. Because equal protection analysis is far more
stringent, see infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text, an affirmative action plan that
satisfies the Equal Protection Clause is likely to satisfy Title VII. One exception is diversity,
which has recently been found to be a compelling interest under the Constitution, see infra
notes 307-14 and accompanying text, but may not suffice under Title VII. See infra notes 84-
89 and accompanying text.
There can also be complications when a consent decree (or, for that matter, a litigated
decree) is involved. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), as modified by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (2000), permits nonparties to attack employment decisions
taken pursuant to prior decrees because they are not bound by them. See generally CHARLES
A. SULLIVAN, MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, 2 EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.20[E] (3d ed. 2002); Andrea Catania & Charles A.
Sullivan, Judging Judgments: The 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Lingering Ghost of Martin
v. Wilks, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 995 (1992); Cynthia L. Fountaine, Due Process and the
Impermissible Collateral Attack Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases: An Analysis of
Section 108 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 435 (1997). For example, in
Donaghy v. City of Omaha, 933 F.2d 1448 (8th Cir. 1991), the employer had an affirmative
action plan and was also bound by a consent decree. See id. at 1456. The court found that the
affirmative action plan "did not dictate the employment decision that Donaghy, [the
employee], ha[d] standing to challenge." Id. Rather, that decision was taken pursuant to the
consent decree. Id. Although Donaghy could "challenge the validity of employment decisions
made pursuant to a consent decree," id. at 1457, he was unable "to prove that the race-
conscious measures taken pursuant to the consent decree were invalid because the consent
decree (1) did not serve a remedial purpose, or (2) was not tailored narrowly enough." Id. at
1458.
28. Affirmative action concepts developed under Title VII apply to § 1981 claims alleging
reverse discrimination. If an affirmative action plan is valid under Title VII, therefore, actions
based upon it will not violate § 1981. A plan that is invalid under Title VII, however, will not
excuse racially motivated decisions challenged under § 1981. See Schurr v. Resorts Int'l Hotel,
Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 498-99 (3d Cir. 1999); Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop
Estate, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1165 (D. Haw. 2003).
29. 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
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County, California,'° cases that continue to define the legality of
affirmative action plans under the statute.31
In Weber, the Court broadly upheld "affirmative action plans
designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally
segregated job categories."32 In that case, the private employer and
the union representing its workers reached a national collective
bargaining agreement that included a special provision for on-the-
job training for craft jobs.33 Before this plan, incumbent employees
had not been considered for skilled craft jobs unless they had
previous craft experience.' Because the unions representing those
crafts historically had excluded blacks, few had the requisite craft
30. 480 U.S. 616, 641-42 (1987).
31. It has been argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1991, enacted after both Weber and
Johnson, precludes voluntary affirmative action plans altogether. The new statute amended
Title VII by adding section 703(m), which provides "[eixcept as otherwise provided in this
subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(m) (2000). Given that this provision makes no exception-for affirmative action, some
contend that the statutory language categorically precludes any employment action for which
race, sex, etc., was a motivating factor, whether or not characterized as affirmative or benign.
David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 8 LAB. LAW. 849, 876-80
(1992).
Reading the statute in that manner, however, is unjustified, Another provision of the 1991
Act makes clear that Congress did not intend it to prohibit affirmative action. Section 116 of
the Act provides: "Nothing in the amendments made by this title shall be construed to affect
court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements, that are in accordance
with the law." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2000). Although the 1991 Act does not directly adopt the
then-existing law of affirmative action, the clear suggestion is that. existing precedents are
valid. At the least, the statute envisions that some affirmative action plans are consistent
with Title VII.
32. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209.
33. See id. at 197. The agreement was the result of the affirmative action duty imposed
on government contractors. See generally James E. Jones, Jr., The Genesis and Present Status
of Affirmative Action in Employment: Economic, Legal, and Political Realities, 70 IoWA L. REV.
901 (1985) (examining Executive Order 11,246 as the genesis of modern affirmative action
plans); James E. Jones, Jr., Twenty-One Years of Affirmative Action: The Maturation of the
Administrative Enforcement Process Under the Executive Order 11,246 as Amended, 59 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 67 (1982) (examining the evolution of the executive order enforcement process
with regard to affirmative action); Debra A. Millenson, W(h)ither Affirmative Action: The
Future of Executive Order 11,246, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 679 (1999) (discussing constitutional
challenges to Executive Order 11,246 and examining the viability of government-mandated
affirmative action programs in the twenty-first century). Yet, the Weber Court did not seem
to consider this relevant.
34. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198.
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experience.3" The new labor contract required each plant to set a
goal of minority representation in each craft matching the minority
population in the surrounding labor market.36 Participants in the
training program were selected by seniority from among those
qualified incumbent employees, with one minority employee to be
selected for each white employee until the goal of minority represen-
tation was met.37 At the Louisiana plant in question in Weber, the
minority goal in craft jobs was thirty-nine percent because the black
work force in the area represented thirty-nine percent of the
surrounding labor market.3" As few black incumbent employees had
high seniority, the one-for-one selection system meant that the
blacks selected for training had less seniority than some whites not
selected.39 The plaintiff, Brian Weber, was one of those whites.4 °
The majority examined the legislative history and the historical
context leading to enactment of Title VII41 and concluded that the
term "discrimination" as used in Title VII did not apply to race-
conscious decision making pursuant to a valid affirmative action
plan.42 First, the primary purpose in enacting the prohibition
against discrimination in Title VII was "to open employment
opportunities for [blacks] in occupations ... traditionally closed to
them."43 To employ Title VII to foreclose voluntary efforts to provide
such opportunities would frustrate that purpose." Second, because
Congress expected that passage of Title VII would lead to voluntary
compliance, the Act could not be interpreted to proscribe voluntary
affirmative action.45 Third, section 703(), which provides that
employers with racially imbalanced workforces are not required
to grant preferential treatment,46 was the product of legislative
35. Id.
36. See id. at 199.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 198-99.
39. Id. at 199.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 201-07.
42. Id. at 208.
43. Id. at 203 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
44. See id.
45. Id. at 204.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(0) (2000).
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compromise 47 that made it clear that Congress intended to permit,
but not require, voluntary affirmative action.48
The Court reaffirmed Weber in Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara County, California,49 and extended it to affirmative
action on behalf of women.5" The employer promoted a woman to the
position of road dispatcher,"1 making her the first woman in the 238
skilled craft worker jobs." Although Diane Joyce was qualified for
the job, the district court found that her sex was the determining
factor in her selection.5" A male, who scored two points higher on an
interview, sued, claiming reverse discrimination. 4 The Court
rejected that claim after finding the affirmative action plan valid.55
The Johnson opinion developed the standards for validity in more
detail and even more permissively than had Weber; however, it laid
down a counterintuitive litigation structure to address these cases.
In the wake of Weber, many had viewed an affirmative action plan
as an affirmative defense much like the bona fide occupational
qualification defense (BFOQ)56 under Title VII.5 v In BFOQ cases, the
47. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 205-06.
48. Id. at 206-07.
49. 480 U.S. 616, 627 (1987).
50. See id. at 641-42.
51. Id. at 624-25.
52. Id. at 621.
53. Id. at 625.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 641-42.
56. Section 703(e) of Title VII provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter ... it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ...
on the basis of ... religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000). There is a similar defense in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (2000).
57. The BFOQ has been interpreted as a very narrow exception to the statute's basic
nondiscrimination command. See Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,
201 (1991) ('The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it narrowly.");
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (stating that BFOQ is "an extremely narrow
exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex"); see also W. Air
Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985) (stating the same for BFOQ in context of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act). See generally SULLIVAN, ZIMMER, & WHITE, 1
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAWAND PRACTICE, supra note 27, § 3.05. There is no statutory
BFOQ for race. See generally William R. Bryant, Note, Justifiable Discrimination: The Need
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plaintiff has the burden of persuasion of proving discrimination, and
the defendant then has the burden of persuasion as to the elements
of the BFOQ defense.5" The BFOQ, therefore, is not a denial of
discrimination; rather, it permits employers to justify conduct that
is discriminatory.
In stark contrast to this approach, Johnson placed on plaintiffs
the burden of persuasion of the invalidity of the employer's affirma-
tive action plan.59 A valid plan, therefore, is not an affirmative
defense to a charge of discrimination; rather, any preferences
provided pursuant to a valid plan do not constitute discrimination
in the first place, at least not "discrimination" within the meaning
of Title VII. The justification for this is the triumph of history over
logic: the Court perceived that Congress would not have wanted the
statute to reach such conduct."°
for a Statutory Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense for Race Discrimination, 33 GA.
L. REV. 211 (1998).
58. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 200 ("We hold that Johnson Controls' fetal-
protection policy is sex discrimination forbidden under Title VII unless respondent can
establish that sex is a 'bona fide occupational qualification."').
59. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626-27:
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that race or sex has been taken
into account in an employer's employment decision, the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision. The
existence of an affirmative action plan provides such a rationale. If such a plan
is articulated as the basis for the employer's decision, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to prove that the employer's justification is pretextual and the plan is
invalid. As a practical matter, of course, an employer will generally seek to avoid
a charge of pretext by presenting evidence in support of its plan. That does not
mean, however, ... that reliance on an affirmative action plan is to be treated as
an affirmative defense requiring the employer to carry the burden of proving the
validity of the plan. The burden of proving its invalidity remains on the plaintiff.
Id.; see, e.g., Plott v. Gen. Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1193 (6th Cir. 1995); Cerrato v. S.F.
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 1994).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48. This is not unknown even in the traditional
discrimination context. No one seems to doubt that sex-differentiated dress and grooming
codes constitute sex discrimination in an analytic sense, but the courts have resolutely
refused to view such rules as discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII. See, e.g., Harper
v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (holding that different hair
length standards for men and women do not violate Title VII); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile
Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1997) (same); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d
1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (same). See generally SULLIVAN, ZIMMER, & WHITE, 2 EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, § 7.05; Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls
Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace
Equality, 92 MICH. L. Rev. 2541 (1994) (arguing that community norms are too discriminatory
to define workplace equality); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and
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A more complicated rationale might be that an intent to help
traditionally excluded classes does not constitute the kind of intent
that Title VII prohibits. There are other hints of such an approach
in Supreme Court cases, 1 even if judges, such as Posner, claim that
an intent to favor X over. Y -necessarily embraces an intent to
disfavor Y relative to X.62 An approach that looks to the motivation
of the decision maker, however, rather than to whether he intended
to treat differently on account of the prohibited characteristic, cuts
against strong Court precedent that the intent that matters for
.statutory purposes is not animus but merely the intent to treat
individuals differently on the basis of a prohibited trait.'
Obviously, this paradigm benefits employers and disadvantages
reverse discrimination plaintiffs because of the placement of the
burden of proof. Perhaps as significant, however, it permits a court
to acknowledge racial and gender preference without describing
them as discriminatory. This might explain another puzzling aspect
of Johnson. In assessing the case, the Court used the inferential
method of proof established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,'
even though Johnson adduced what would probably qualify under
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE
L.J. 1 (1995) (arguing.for a reconceptualization of sexual discrimination law to properly
account for gender).
61. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 788 (1989) (5-4 decision) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe fact that an employer is acting under court compulsion may be evidence that the
employer is acting in good faith and without discriminatory intent.") (citations omitted).
62. See infra text accompanying note 188.
63. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
Despite admitting that an employer's policy of requiring greater pension contributions from
women than from men Was rational and not motivated by animus but was based on the reality
that women live longer than men, the Court wrote:
An employment practice that requires 2,000 individuals to contribute more
money into a fund than 10,000 other employees simply because each of them is
a woman, rather than a man, is in direct conflict with both the language and the
policy of the Act. Such a practice does not pass the simple test of whether the
evidence shows "treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person's
sex would be different" It constitutes discrimination ....
Id. at 711 (quoting Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,.84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1170 (1971)); see also Johnson Controls, 499
U.S. at 199-200 ("[Tihe absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially
discriminatory policy [(a "fetal protection policy")] into.a neutral policy with a discriminatory
effect.... The beneficence of an employer's purpose does not undermine the conclusion that an
explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination under § 703(a) and thus may be defended
only as a BFOQ.").
64. See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
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later precedents as "direct evidence" from the decision maker that
the woman's sex had influenced the selection decision.s5 Under the
McDonnell Douglas analysis, the Court- viewed the employer's
explanation that the employer had relied upon its affirmative action
plan as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." At that point, the
focus of the litigation shifted not to the basis of the challenged
action (admittedly sex), but to whether the plan justifying that
action was valid.67 On that issue, the reverse discrimination plaintiff
had the burden of persuasion that the plan is invalid.'
Given that this litigation structure presumably continues intact, 9
a reverse discrimination plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion in
65. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 625 (1987).
The successful female candidate had contacted the agency's affirmative action coordinator,
who in turn recommended to the decision maker that she be hired. That decision maker
testified, "I tried to look at the whole picture, the combination of her qualifications and Mr.
Johnson's qualifications, their test scores, their expertise, their background, affirmative action
matters, things like that.... I believe it was a combination of all those." Id.
66. Id. at 626.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 627.
69. The continuing application 'of this proof structure is not free from doubt. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989), altered the proof structure for traditional
discrimination claims. See infra text accompanying notes 355-71. In her concurring opinion,
Justice O'Connor asserted that the affirmative action proof structure should mirror that used
for other disparate treatment claims. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 279 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). She explained that
the evidentiary frmework I propose should be available to all disparate
treatment plaintiffs where an illegitimate consideration played a substantial
role in an adverse employment decision. The Court's allocation of the burden of
proof in [Johnson] rested squarely on "the analytical framework set forth in
McDonnell Douglas," which we alter today.
Id. (citation omitted). Thus, for Justice O'Connor, when a plaintiff (whether in a traditional
or reverse discrimination case) has proven, by direct evidence that sex was a substantial
factor for an employment decision, the burden of persuasion should shift to the defendant to
prove it would have taken the same action in any event. See id.
The three dissenting members agreed that the burden shifting approach developed in Price
Waterhouse should apply in affirmative action cases. See id. at 293 n.4 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("Tioday's decision suggests that plaintiffs should no longer bear the burden of
showing that affirmative-action plans are illegal."). The Price Waterhouse plurality, however,
reserved the question. See id. at 239 n.3 ("We disregard, for purposes of this discussion, the
special context of affirmative action."). In the wake of Price Waterhouse, lower courts have
reluctantly refused to reject the Johnson proof structure, although they have criticized it. See,
e.g., Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1114-15 (11th Cir.
2001). This whole question, however, may have to be reconsidered in light of the Supreme
Court's most recent encounter with the direct evidence question. See infra notes 372-83 and
accompanying text.
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proving that a particular decision was either: (1) motivated by
race and not taken pursuant to an affirmative action plan, or (2)
motivated by race pursuant to an invalid plan.
Taken together, Weber and Johnson established two requirements
that would validate an affirmative action plan, but did not explicitly
rule out other justifications. First, the plan's use of race or sex must
be aimed at remedying a "manifest imbalance" in a "traditionally
segregated job categor[y]."70 Such an imbalance brings the affirma-
tive action plan into alignment with the purposes of Title VII, which
include breaking down historic patterns of discrimination. As the
Court said in Weber, "[b] oth [Title VII and the challenged plan] were
designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy. Both were structured to 'open employment opportunities
for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to
them."'' Weber did not focus on whether Kaiser itself had been
implicated in discrimination in the past, thereby suggesting that
past employer discrimination was not a necessary predicate for a
valid plan.72
Johnson went further in two respects. While Weber involved an
affirmative action plan to aid black workers, Johnson extended the
defense to plans that advance the employment opportunities of
women.73 Further, over the strenuous objection of Justice Scalia,
the majority explicitly rejected any requirement of prior discrimi-
nation by the employer as a basis for limiting voluntary affirmative
action.74 An employer may adopt an affirmative action plan in the
70. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
197 (1979)).
71. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey)).
72. The Court stated that the authority of an employer to undertake race-conscious
affirmative action efforts did not depend on the threat of Title VII liability. Id. at 208 n.8.
Justice Blackmun's concurrence was more direct in asserting that the employer's own past
wrongful conduct was not necessary:
The sources cited suggest that the Court considers a job category to be
"traditionally segregated" when there has been a societal history of purposeful
exclusion of blacks from the job category, resulting in a persistent disparity
between the proportion of blacks in the labor force and the proportion of blacks
among those who hold jobs within the category.
Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Thus, an employer may redress
societal "discrimination that lies wholly outside the bounds of Title VII." Id. at 214.
73. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 642.
74. Id. at 630; see id. at 629 n.7.
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absence of any prior discrimination on its own part; remedying the
effects of societal discrimination will suffice. Both the language and
the setting made this clear. Although there is a long and dishonor-
able history of racial discrimination by craft unions75-the problem
addressed in Weber-the exclusion of women from roadwork jobs at
issue in Johnson is the result of deeper, embedded societal expecta-
tions about women's proper role. This expansion of the sweep of
affirmative action plans under Title VII is a major departure from
equal protection doctrine.7"
As for the requisites of a valid plan, the Johnson Court observed
that, when determining whether a manifest imbalance exists in a
traditionally segregated job category, the proper comparison is
between the percentage of minorities or women in the job category
in the employer's workforce and the percentage of those workers in
the relevant labor pool. A comparison with general population
figures is appropriate only when the job involves skills found in or
easily acquired by the general population." The Court regarded
Weber as such a case. For skilled jobs, the appropriate comparison
is to the relevant skilled labor pool.78 As Johnson involved skilled
trade positions, the Court viewed the appropriate comparison to be
that between the percentage of skilled craft workers in the em-
ployer's workforce (zero) and the percentage of women in the
relevant labor market having the requisite skills.79 A valid plan,
75. See Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving and Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 BROOK.
L. REv. 779, 795 (1992) ("[IThe discriminatory purpose and effect of craft unionism is so well
established that courts have taken judicial notice of it. Since slavery had for the most part
only equipped blacks for menial jobs, organizing along craft lines effectively destroyed their
eligibility for unionized employment opportunities.") (footnotes omitted).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 303-14.
77. See Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (permitting a
statistically-based disparate treatment attack on a pattern of discrimination, with the
necessary intent inferred from the statistically significant discrepancy between the percentage
of African Americans and Latinos employed as line drivers and various measures of their
availability); see also SULLIVAN, ZIMMER, & WHITE, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 27, §§ 3.03-3.04 (discussing statistical proof).
78. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (permitting a
statistically-based disparate treatment attack on a pattern of discrimination, with the
necessary intent inferred from the statistically significant discrepancy between the percentage
of African Americans employed as teachers in the defendant school district and the percentage
of African American teachers in the relevant labor market).
79. This focus has been criticized. Although looking at the disparity between
representation of women or minorities in the employer's workforce and in the skilled labor
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therefore; may not seek merely to match general population
distributions without regard to possibly racially skewed distribu-
tions of skills.'
It is not clear, however, what level of disparity constitutes a
"manifest imbalance." Although the imbalance need not be great
enough to support a prima facie case of systemic disparate treat-
ment under the Court's precedents, such proof will suffice."1 What
lesser imbalance is necessary to satisfy Weber and Johnson's first
prong has yet to be clarified, although some lower courts have been
restrictive. 2 Yet, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions, a
number of affirmative action plans have been approved as consis-
tent with Title VII.8
3
pool makes sense when the question is one of intentional discrimination against that group,
it is less obviously relevant when determining the legality of an affirmative action plan based
on societal discrimination. Societal discrimination may well have resulted in a relatively low
number of women or minorities in the skilled pool; thus, permitting affirmative action only
when an imbalance exists between the employer's workforce and the skilled pool will narrow
the situations in which affirmative action may voluntarily be used, even when the percentage
of women or minorities in the particular jobs is low when compared to overall population
figures. In short, permitting a comparison to general population figures seems more congruent
with the theory endorsed in Weber and Johnson. See David D. Meyer, Note, Finding a
"Manifest Imbalance'" The Case for a Unified Statistical Test for Voluntary Affirmative Action
Under Title VII, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 1986, 2021-22 (1989).
80. The key to Johnson in this regard was the gradual nature of the employer's goals.
There were relatively few women with the requisite skills at the time the plan was created,
but the plan envisioned female representation rising as more skilled women entered the labor
market. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1987).
81. See Van Aken v. Young, 750 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that Title VII was not
violated by the City of Detroit's adoption of a voluntary affirmative action hiring program
involving out-of-rank order hiring of females in preference to male applicants, where the
record contained ample evidence of decades of intentionally discriminatory hiring practices
by the city's fire department).
82. Several decisions have applied the "manifest imbalance" test to efforts by universities
to achieve gender pay equity by providing raises to underpaid female faculty, although it is
not clear that "manifest imbalance" has much relevance in this context. The decisions,
however, have often found that the statistical studies used by the defendants did not establish
the requisite imbalance to a sufficient degree of certainty to justify summary judgment for the
employer. See Maitland v. Univ. of Minn., 155 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Va.
Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672 (4th Cir. 1996). In Hill v. Ross, 183 F.3d 586 (7th Cir.
1999), the court was especially pointed in finding the university's statistical analysis of
manifest imbalance flawed: "What the University appears to have in mind is a world in which
the absence of discrimination means that every department would exactly mirror the
population from which its members are hired. But that is statistical nonsense." Id. at 591; see
also Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 521 (9th Cir. 2002) (considering only unnecessary
trammeling because the plaintiffs did not attack the manifest imbalance jury finding).
83. See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of S.F., 979 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.
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An important, and as yet unresolved, issue is whether a voluntary
affirmative action plan must be "remedial" to be lawful under Title
VII. The plans in both Weber and Johnson were aimed at remedy-
ing a manifest imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category,
and the Court's decisions in those cases addressed when such a
remedial interest would support such a plan.8" The lower courts
have not yet recognized other validating interests, such as
diversitys' or prevention,' but the Supreme Court's recent approval
of diversity as a compelling state interest under the Equal Protec-
1992); Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394 (1 lth Cir. 1991) (upholding affirmative
action plan under Title VII but remanding for determination of its validity under the Equal
Protection Clause); Enright v. Cal. State Univ., No. 89-16391, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 8455
(9th Cir. Feb. 12, 1991) (upholding university's plan with respect to women). But see Schurr
v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding an affirmative action plan
failed because it was not designed to correct a manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated
job categories); Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding an affirmative action
plan invalid because there was no showing of past discrimination); Hammon v. Barry, 826
F.2d 73 (D.C, Cir. 1987) (finding no manifest imbalance when department had been officially
segregated for years in the past and statistical data did not address metropolitan area but
only embraced Washington, D.C.). See also Bennett v. Arrington, 20 F.3d 1525 (1 lth Cir. 1994)
(finding promotion plan was designed to redress manifest imbalances but was invalid as
unnecessarily trammeling the interests of majority workers).
84. See Hill v. Ross, 183 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting this issue is unresolved).
85. See Ann C. McGinley, Affirmative Action Awash in Confusion: Backward-Looking-
Future-Oriented Justifications for Race-Conscious Measures, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 209
(1998); Ann C. McGinley & Michael J. Yelnosky, Board of Education v. Taxman: The
Unpublished Opinions, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 205 (1998); Michael J. Yelnosky,
Whither Weber?, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. Rev. 257 (1998).
86. The Third Circuit rejected a voluntary affirmative action plan not supported by a
remedial interest in Taxman v. Board of Education of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996),
cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997). The case arose from a decision of the school board,
which needed to eliminate one teaching position in the high school's business department
when two teachers had identical seniority. The board determined the two teachers were
"equally qualified," and used race, in accordance with the district's affirmative action plan,
to break the tie. Id. at 1551. That plan provided that, when candidates were equally qualified,
the minority candidate was to be retained. Id. at 1550. At the time of the layoff, there was no
under-representation of blacks in the Piscataway school system, and the board did not assert
a remedial purpose for the plan. Id. Instead, the board relied upon a diversity rationale,
reasoning that students would benefit from a racially diverse teaching staff. See id. at 1551-
52.
The Third Circuit held that a nonremedial interest would not support an affirmative action
plan under Title VII. Id. at 1550. The court read Weber and Johnson as permitting voluntary
affirmative action only when a remedial interest is present. Id. at 1558. The Supreme Court
agreed to hear Taxman, but the case settled after certiorari had been granted.
87. See Michael J. Yelnosky, The Prevention Justification for Affirmative Action, 64 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1385, 1388 (2003).
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tion Clause may lead to recognizing justifications other than
remedying manifest imbalances.8 Whether Title VII permits a
voluntary affirmative action plan lacking a remedial purpose,
therefore, remains an open, and important, question. 9
The second prong determining the legitimacy of an affirmative
action plan under Weber and Johnson is that the plan not unduly
trammel the interests of majority group members. The Court
described three concerns of white workers, none of which was at
stake in the Weber plan:
The plan does not require the discharge of white workers and
their replacement with new black hirees. Nor does the plan
create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees;
half of those trained in the program will be white. Moreover, the
plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain
racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbal-
ance.
90
These three factors have become the litmus test for satisfying the
second prong of not unduly trammeling the interests of white
workers.91 Consequently, when a plan does not deprive an employee
of a vested right, when it is not an absolute bar to majority workers'
advancement, and when it is aimed at attaining, not maintaining,
racial balance, it is likely to be held valid.
88. See infra notes 307-14 and accompanying text.
89. See David S. Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing Protected Class: Reflections on
Reverse Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Racial Balancing, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 657;
Michael J. Zimmer, Taxman: Affirmative Action Dodges Five Bullets, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 229, 235 (1998).
After Grutter, it would be possible for an affirmative action employment plan at Michigan
designed to ensure diversity in the teaching cadre to pass muster under the Equal Protection
Clause (assuming that it was narrowly tailored) yet to be struck down under Taxman's view
of Title VII. Of course, it would also be possible for a plan to pass equal protection scrutiny
under a diversity rationale and Title VII review under a manifest imbalance approach.
90. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (citation omitted). The
plan will be perceived as operating toward a goal of racial balancing if it is permanent.
91. See Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding an affirmative
action plan in a police department promotional plan because it did not unduly trammel the
rights of white police officers); Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438, 1448
(9th Cir. 1989) (affirming a consent decree settling a class action against the fire department
for discriminatory hiring practices).
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Most affirmative action plans focus on hiring and promotion,
making them more easily defensible under the second prong of
Weber and Johnson.2 Weber itself involved a training program that
would not have existed except for a desire to address a manifest
imbalance. Obviously, no one had automatic entitlement to it.
Similarly, in Johnson, the plaintiff had no entitlement to the
position but was one of several qualified applicants for the job.
Moreover, the plan did not block the plaintiff from being promoted
in the future, and he in fact received a promotion when another
opening arose.93 The Court emphasized that no rigid quotas had
been set but instead that sex was only one of several factors
considered by the employer in deciding whom to promote.
An affirmative action plan used to determine layoffs, as opposed
to hiring or promotion, is more difficult to justify under this prong.
In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,94 the Court rejected
a district court's attempt to modify a consent decree to protect
minority workers from layoffs, a modification that would have
conflicted with the collectively bargained seniority rights of white
workers.95 Although Stotts was not a voluntary affirmative action
case, it suggests that the Supreme Court will look skeptically upon
an affirmative action plan that adversely affects the seniority rights
of incumbent majority group members.9
In sum, the Title VII doctrine is easy to state: racial disparate
treatment is illegal but racial preferences pursuant to a valid
92. But see Hill v. Ross, 183 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that when a male's sex
was the only reason he was not hired, the plan did not use "sex in a way that is narrowly
tailored to the justification").
93. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 639 n.15 (1987).
94. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
95. See id. at 572-73.
96. The Taxman case, discussed supra note 86, provides a useful comparison. The Third
Circuit viewed using race as a tiebreaker to decide which teacher to layoff when seniority and
qualifications were equal as unnecessarily trammeling the interests of the white plaintiff. See
Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1654-65 (3d Cir. 1996). The burden of
achieving the plan's goals fell on the shoulders of a tenured teacher. See id. at 1551. That
situation is distinct from those before the Court in Weber and Johnson, in which no one lost
a job or any position to which he was otherwise entitled.
Upholding a layoff for affirmative action purposes is particularly unlikely when the interest
asserted for the plan is not a remedial one, as in Taxman. Approval of layoffs is uncertain
even in the context of a plan adopted for remedial purposes. Even if the Court were to approve
adoption of voluntary affirmative action plans for nonremedial purposes, upholding the
application of such plans in a layoff context seems unlikely.
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affirmative action plan do not constitute discrimination. Such a plan
is valid if it addresses a manifest racial imbalance in an employer's
workforce and does not unduly trammel the interests of whites, and
perhaps on other grounds. The application of this doctrine through
the proof process is another question entirely, a matter addressed
in the next section.
II. PROVING AN INDIVIDUAL CASE OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
The preceding discussion focuses on systemic cases of reverse
discrimination; that is, claims where the parties agree that the
challenged preference is pursuant to an affirmative action plan. The
proof structure of such claims is relatively straightforward. First,
the plaintiff claims discrimination, and may or may not adduce the
employer's plan as proof. Second, the employer either agrees, if the
plaintiff has implicated the plan, or, if the plaintiffs proof has not
put the plan in issue, the defendant itself satisfies a burden of
pleading, or at most production, by justifying its actions as being
pursuant to the plan. Third, the plaintiff carries the burden of
persuasion by challenging the validity of that plan under the
Supreme Court's structure.97
A variation occurs when the plaintiff claims that the employer
acted pursuant to an affirmative action plan, but the employer
denies so doing. A plaintiff might invoke the plan for fear that he
will not be able to make out a prima facie case of discrimination
without putting it into evidence. If this is the path taken, the first
step is to decide whether the challenged decision was taken
pursuant to a plan, as the law does not permit an employer to shield
its plan from review merely by denying its applicability. For
example, Bass v. Board of County Commissioners, Orange County,
Florida8 found that an invalid affirmative action plan may
constitute reverse discrimination, even when the employer "has
97. Taxman is precisely such a case. See supra note 86
98. 256 F.3d 1095, 1110 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[A) defendant who in fact acts pursuant to an
affirmative action plan cannot avoid judicial review of the plan by disavowing reliance upon
it .....); see also McQuillen v. Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 1987) ("If,
as in the present case, the employer claims that its hiring decision was based on the
applicants' relative qualifications, not an affirmative action program, a plaintiff must first
establish that the employer was acting pursuant to an affirmative action plan before the
plan's validity is placed into issue.").
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sought no cover from its affirmative action plans (and, in fact, seems
to distance itself from them)."' Accordingly, the first inquiry in such
a case is whether the challenged action was taken pursuant to the
plan in the sense that the plan "played a part in the employment
decision.""° Such a conclusion presumably shifts the question to
whether the plan itself was valid-the traditional arena of conten-
tion.10'
The vast majority of reverse discrimination claims, however, are
not framed to implicate the validity of affirmative action plans at
all. They might be described as individual, rather than systemic,
claims. The defendant does not attempt to justify its decision
pursuant to any affirmative action plan; rather, it simply denies
discriminating in the first place. The white (or male) plaintiff,
furthermore, does not claim that the challenged action was taken
pursuant to a plan. Santa Fe is the paradigm here-no affirmative
action plan was invoked by either side.
It is somewhat surprising that the vast majority of reverse
discrimination cases are brought outside of the Weber/Johnson
framework. Obviously, a plaintiff would, if she could otherwise show
discrimination, prefer to litigate free of the burden of proving an
affirmative action plan invalid. Employers have a "safe harbor,"
however, when they act pursuant to a valid plan and might be
expected to seek its shelter more readily. Of course, many employers
may not have affirmative action plans or may have plans that do not
contain the kinds of preferences approved by the Court. Yet, even
employers with structured plans rarely seek to invoke. them when
facing a reverse discrimination suit. This might result from lack of
confidence in the legality of such plans, skepticism about whether
Title VII law will continue on the path marked out by Weber and
99. Bass, 256 F.3d at 1109.
100. Id. at 1110. Bass was framed as a Price Waterhouse case: "Mhe existence of an
affirmative action plan, when combined with evidence that the plan was followed in an
employment decision, is sufficient to constitute direct evidence of unlawful discrimination
unless the plan is valid." Id.
101. One could argue that, should the employer not rely on the plan in the first place, the
court should not consider the plan's validity under Weber and Johnson. Yet this would be
correct only if the plan were an affirmative defense and thus waivable. Under the current
structure, the plaintiff who chooses to challenge a decision as made pursuant to an affirmative
action plan has the burden of proving the plan invalid. See supra note 59 and accompanying
text.
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Johnson, an unwillingness to up the ante in any individual case by
putting the employer's broader workforce policies at issue, concern
for employee morale, or simple public relations reasons. It is also
possible that such plans are largely window dressing, and employers
are reluctant to raise them as a shield to reverse discrimination
claims for fear of exposing that reality. In any event, rarely is the
systemic Weber/Johnson framework litigated at the insistence of
either side. Rather, the vast majority of cases challenging reverse
discrimination have been individual disparate treatment claims.
A. The Parameters of the Debate
Although the illegality of traditional discrimination has been
clear since the enactment of Title VII, the ensuing jurisprudence
has largely been devoted to the meaning of "discriminate" and its
proof structures. This has resulted in the development of two
distinct theories of discrimination: disparate treatment and
disparate impact.'02 With respect to disparate treatment, the greater
attention of the courts has focused not on what constitutes discrimi-
nation, but rather on how to prove that a particular employment
action was discriminatory. 13 Most of the Supreme Court decisions
involve the question of how to prove individual disparate treatment,
including McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green"°4 and its "circumstan-
tial evidence" progeny, 105 and the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins °6
"direct evidence" line of authority.
0 7
The extensive judicial development of proof structures in the
context of traditional discrimination has not been matched in the
102. See generally SULLIVAN, ZIMMER, & WHITE, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 27, chs. 2-5.
103. But see, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (age discrimination);
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (sexual harassment); City of Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (sex discrimination in fringe
benefits).
104. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
105. There is a long line of Supreme Court cases elaborating on the McDonnell Douglas
approach. The most significant are: Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S.
133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
106. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
107. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); see also infra text accompanying
notes 372-83.
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reverse discrimination context, but there is increasing concern with
this issue in the lower courts. The question of whether all races and
both genders are protected by the statute, long resolved by the
Supreme Court as we have seen,'10 is analytically distinct from the
question of how to prove that a particular action against a white or
a male was discriminatory.
The lower courts are in agreement on only one point: a reverse
discrimination plaintiff may prove her case by the "direct evidence"
approach. 109 For example, one court overturned summary judgment
against the plaintiff, who had been denied a raise; the proffered
statements by a decision maker sufficed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to the motive. Those statements included, "I'm not
going to pay him that, he's a white guy, isn't he?" and "If he were a
woman or a minority, I would have to pay him, but I don't have to
pay him.""0 The decision maker refused to discuss the raise further,
concluding, "I'm not going to pay him. He's just a white guy."'
Similarly, another court'12 upheld a jury verdict for a male plaintiff
in light of statements that the employer treated men differently
from women." 3 Such decisions parallel first generation traditional
discrimination cases where admissions of discriminatory intent
108. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
109. E.g., Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Schoenfeld
v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1268 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (holding that a male applicant may establish
a prima facie Title VII claim by evidence of discriminatory animus tainting the hiring process,
including a statement by a human resources official that could be construed as "tacit
admission" that gender was a factor in the decision not to hire).
110. Gagnon v. Sprint Corp., 284 F.3d 839, 846 (8th Cir. 2002).
111. Id.; see also Justice v. Saint Augustine's Coll., No. 5:94-CV-792-BR(2), 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6090 (E.D. N.C. April 4, 1996) (holding that a white librarian made a prima facie case
of reverse discrimination when the interviewer for a position he sought at a black college
stated that he would allow the position to go unfilled rather than fill it with a white
individual).
112. See Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hosp., 156 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1998).
113. These statements included: (1) a female member of the management committee saying
"we live in a patriarchal society, and men shirk their duties toward child raising. And because
men have money, power and position, because they have penises, then this is the type of thing
that happens as a result"; (2) the steering committee for employer's new women's health
center preparing a draft mission statement that barred the employment of men, including
male physicians; and (3) another male testifying that, when he complained about another
employee's having thrown water in his face, he was told not to worry about it. When he asked
what she would do in the event water was thrown at a female employee, he was told the
person would probably be fired: "[W]e have different standards for men and women." Id. at
37 (quoting trial record).
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made by unsophisticated employers were the primary means of
proof.114
Ironically, even this point of agreement raises serious questions
(to which we will return) of what suffices as "direct evidence,""' 5 and
whether the whole "direct vs. circumstantial" evidence debate,
which originated with respect to claims of traditional discrimination
in Price Waterhouse,"6 has been undercut by the Court's recent
decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa."7
Where "direct evidence" is not involved, the lower courts have
been inconsistent, most having articulated different requirements
for proof for plaintiffs prima facie case in reverse discrimination
cases than in traditional discrimination claims."' Where whites or
men are "minorities" in the institution or occupation in which they
work, the structure appears to work the same way as in the more
typical situation when African Americans or women are the
plaintiffs." 9 Where a white worker sues a predominately white
114. See Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1975). Both social norms and
fear of liability may have contributed to reduce dramatically the number of instances in which
explicit racist comments are available to establish discrimination.
115. This has been a major source of confusion with respect to traditional discrimination
claims. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate
Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107 (1991); Robert A. Kearney, The High Price
of Price Waterhouse: Dealing with Direct Evidence of Discrimination, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 303 (2003); Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to
Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REV. 495 (1990). It has also arisen in reverse
discrimination cases. See e.g., Langley v. Jackson State Univ., 14 F.3d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994) (offering no direct evidence: "At most, the record shows that Dr. Langley's supervisors
were race-conscious to the extent that some felt uncomfortable with, and possibly even
resented, Dr. Langley's presence at JSU, an historically black institution."); Young v.
Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1990) (avoiding deciding whether plaintiff's being
referred to as a "white token" and "white faggot" constituted direct evidence of race
discrimination).
116. See infra text accompanying note 365.
117. 539 U.S. 90 (2003); see infra text accompanying notes 372-83.
118. Some cases have applied usual Title VII analysis without noting any difference in
reverse discrimination cases. See, e.g., Loeffler v. Carlin, 780 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 (1988).
119. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Bd. of Regents, 697 F.2d 928 (llthCir. 1983) (affirming judgment
against a predominately black university in action by white faculty member); Whiting v.
Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 123 (5th Cir. 1980) (making out a prima facie case since
"he was in a racial minority at JSU"); Carter v. Cmty. Action Agency, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 199,
204 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (establishing a prima facie case when the "scenario ... was ... that of a
white employee in a work environment populated and controlled, for the most part, by black
persons"); Turgeon v. Howard Univ., 571 F. Supp. 679, 686 (D.D.C. 1983) (noting that in a
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institution, however, several circuits require different proof than
would be required for an African American or a woman. A typical
formulation is that, to establish a prima facie case, a reverse
discrimination plaintiff must "present evidence of 'background
circumstances' that establish that the defendant is 'that unusual
employer who discriminates against the majority.""2
This modification stemmed from the theoretic underpinnings
of the traditional Title VII individual disparate treatment case.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 2 ' established a three-step
analytical structure for what have come to be known as "indirect" or
black institution, "a racially discriminatory environment will substitute for the first prong of
the McDonnell Douglas criteria, membership in a racial minority"); Planells v. Howard Univ.,
No. 82-1173, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15895, at *26 (D.D.C. June 28, 1983) (allowing the
plaintiff to make out a prima facie case by showing "although he is white, he was cast in the
position of a racial minority in his employment relationship with Howard University. In these
circumstances, a racially discriminatory environment will substitute for the first of the
McDonnell Douglas criteria, membership in a racial minority."). But see Boggs v. Kentucky,
No. 95-6452, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30332 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 1996):
In cases such as this our circuit imposes a higher threshold of proof on a white
plaintiff than on a plaintiff who belongs to a racial minority. The plaintiff in a
reverse discrimination case must show that "background circumstances support
the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates
against the majority." The reverse discrimination plaintiff must also
demonstrate that he was treated differently from a similarly-situated member
of a racial minority.
Id. at *9 (citations omitted).
120. ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that most courts of
appeals have followed this formulation) (quoting Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d
1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text. See generally
Hughes, supra note 13; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When Different Means the Same: Applying
a Different Standard of Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie
Case Test, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 53 (1999); Peter Gene Baroni, Note, Background
Circumstances: An Elevated Standard of Necessity in Reverse Discrimination Claims Under
Title VII, 39 HOW. L.J. 797, 803 (1996); Maria A. Citeroni, Note, ladimarco v. Runyon and
Reverse Discrimination: Gaining Majority Support for Majority Plaintiffs, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
579 (2000); Brenda D. DiLuigi, Note, The Notari Alternative: A Better Approach to the Square-
Peg-Round-Hole Problem Found in Reverse Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 353
(1998); Giordano, supra note 12; Darren D. McClain, Comment, Racial Discrimination Against
the Majority in Hiring Practices: Courts' Misguided Attempts to Make Race-Conscious Law
Color Blind, 30 STETSON L. REV. 755 (2000); Susan C. Thies, Comment, Mills v. Health Care
Service Corporation: Are "Background Circumstances" Too Much to Ask of a Plaintiff Alleging
Reverse Discrimination in Employment?, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 537 (2000); Janice C.
Whiteside, Note, Title VII and Reverse Discrimination: The Prima Facie Case, 31 IND. L. REV.
413 (1998).
121. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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"circumstantial" evidence cases.122 The first step is for the plaintiff
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, that is, to put in
evidence that creates a presumption that the employer discrimi-
nated.123 When the plaintiff establishes such a case, the employer,
at the second step, has the burden of putting into evidence a
nondiscriminatory reason for the decision. Finally, the plaintiff will
have the opportunity to prove that the reason provided by the
employer was really a pretext for an underlying discriminatory
motivation.
The significance of this structure has evolved over the years.
McDonnell Douglas itself, therefore, not only detailed a four-
pronged prima facie case for failures to hire, but also made clear
that a prima facie case might be stated differently in other contexts.
Furthermore, in a series of subsequent decisions, the Court held
that the defendant has only a burden of production, and the plaintiff
122. For more than a decade after it was decided, McDonnell Douglas was the only game
in town for individual disparate treatment cases. It was not until Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), that McDonnell Douglas or indirect, circumstantial evidence
cases had to be distinguished from direct evidence, Price Waterhouse cases. See infra notes
355-71 and accompanying text. That distinction may have been eroded in the Court's last
Term. See infra notes 372-83 and accompanying text.
123. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court noted:
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact
believes the plaintiffs evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the
presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue
of fact remains in the case.
450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). The Court repeated this theme in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks:
At the close of the defendant's case, the court is asked to decide whether an issue
of fact remains for the trier of fact to determine. None does if, on the evidence
presented, (1) any rational person would have to find the existence of facts
constituting a prima facie case, and (2) the defendant has failed to meet its
burden of production-i.e., has failed to introduce evidence which, taken as true,
would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse action. In that event, the court must award judgment to the plaintiff as
a matter of law....
509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993).
Professor Risinger believes it would be more accurate to describe this as a fixed standard
of sufficiency rather than a "presumption." Although, as we will see, McDonnell Douglas has
evolved over the years, it remains true that the prima facie case, if accepted by the factfinder,
mandates judgment for the plaintiff if the defendant does not meet its burden of production.
McDonnell Douglas, in essence, therefore, establishes that certain proof is sufficient for a
judgment for plaintiff, whether or not the proof would permit inferring the underlying
fact-that the defendant intended to discriminate.
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at all times retains the burden of persuasion.'24 The plaintiffs
ultimate burden is to persuade the factfinder that the challenged
decision was the result of discriminatory motivation.125 It is not
enough for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's asserted
nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual (in the sense it is not the
true reason), but the plaintiff must also show that it is a pretext
concealing a discriminatory motivation126 -- although the factfinder's
disbelief of the asserted reason may be a basis for concluding that
it disguised such a discriminatory motivation.
1 27
The first step of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case required
very little proof. Although the Court framed this step as a four-
pronged test,128 it also recognized that its formulation would have to
be modified for other situations.'29 As it has since been generalized,
the prima facie case requires merely that a minority or woman has
been denied an employment opportunity in circumstances where the
most obvious innocent explanations-e.g., plaintiffs lack of qualifi-
cations or the absence of an opening-are inapplicable. As the Court
explained in a later case, "[a] prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors."'3 ° It is not
124. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
125. Id.
126. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515 (1993) ("[A] reason cannot be proved to be
'a pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason.").
127. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) ("Proof that
the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial
evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.").
128. The plaintiff must establish:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
129. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
130. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (citation omitted). The Court
has not retreated from this view although it is important more as a heuristic than as a
litigation principle. Once the defendant has put in evidence of its nondiscriminatory reason,
the presumption disappears. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 524. It might still be possible
for the factfinder to decide for the plaintiff but, if so, it will do so because of inferences drawn
from the evidence that supports the prima facie case and the implausibility of the defendant's
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necessary for the plaintiff at the prima facie stage to negate all the
possible, or even all the probable, legitimate reasons, much less is
it necessary to adduce any more direct evidence.
This low threshold for the plaintiffs prima facie case rested on
the proposition-unremarkable when the case was decided-that
employers frequently discriminate against blacks (or other minori-
ties or women). 131 Accordingly, a minority plaintiff was required to
demonstrate only that the most common reasons for not being hired
(or being fired) were not applicable in her case. Once the plaintiffs
proof ruled out those most common reasons, it was appropriate to
infer that race was the reason for the employer's action. Indeed,
should it believe plaintiffs proof, the factfinder was required to infer
discrimination 12-unless the employer put into evidence other
reasons ("legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons") for its actions. 133
At that point, the employer would prevail unless the plaintiff could
establish that those other reasons were not the actual reasons for
the employer's actions-that is, that they were pretexts for the
actual race-related reason.
In most cases, the plaintiffs proof that the reason put into
evidence by the defendant was not the true reason is sufficient for
(though it does not require) the factfinder to draw the inference that
the true reason was the plaintiffs race.33 This is partly because the
failure of the defendant to put into evidence a credible nondiscrimi-
natory reason may suggest that the real reason is discrimination,'35
reason, not because of any "presumption" (or fixed rule of sufficiency) that arises from that
prima facie case.
131. See generally Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the
Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997 (1994) (pointing out the pervasiveness of
discrimination in today's society, which undermines the notion that discrimination has or is
being eliminated). But see infra Part III.B (discussing how the basic assumption originally
underlying McDonnell Douglas has deteriorated in recent years).
132. See supra note 123.
133. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
134. "Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of
circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite
persuasive." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000).
135.
In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the
falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a
discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general
principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's
dishonesty about a material fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt." Moreover,
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and partly because the continued prevalence of discrimination in
our society that suggests that, when other reasons are ruled out,
prejudice is a natural inference,' 6 although perhaps not the only
possible inference.137 Professor Zimmer, therefore, describes the
McDonnell Douglas approach as a process of elimination: as
progressively more nondiscriminatory reasons are eliminated,
discrimination becomes progressively more likely. '38
In contrast, where a white plaintiff challenges an employment
decision against the typical white-dominated employer, it is more
difficult to draw the inference that the employer acted because of
discrimination against whites, even where the most common,
legitimate reasons for the decision are negated. This reality
underlies the notion that such a plaintiff must show something
once the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well
be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the
best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision.
Id. (citations omitted).
136. Of course, the fact that the employer's supposed reason is found not to be its real
reason suggests that the real reason is embarrassing and/or illegal-for example, racism.
137. Indeed, in extreme cases it may not be even a permissible inference:
This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate
to sustain a jury's finding of liability. Certainly there will be instances where,
although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient
evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could
conclude that the action was discriminatory.
Id. at 148.
138. See Michael J. Zimmer, Leading by Example: An Holistic Approach to Individual
Disparate Treatment Law, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 177 (2001); Michael J. Zimmer, The
New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas? 16-19
(2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) [hereinafter Zimmer, The New
Discrimination Law]. This may be a kind of Bayesian analysis. There are, of course, an
infinite number of possible reasons for a particular decision, but there are relatively few likely
reasons. The McDonnell Douglas proof structure can be seen as requiring the plaintiff to rule
out the most likely reasons as part of her prima facie case. Because these reasons are only a
small subset of the possible reasons, although a larger subset of the possible likely reasons,
the employer is required to set forth other reasons. If these are in turn ruled out, it may be
fair to allow the trier of fact to conclude that probability favors an impermissible reason.
Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra, at 19 n.40. See generally D. Michael Risinger
& Jeffrey L. Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and "Offender Profiling"
Some Lessons of Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence, 24 CARDOzO L. REV. 193,
200 n.15 (2002) ("Bayes' Theorem deals with the sequential revision of probabilities from a
starting point (the initial or prior probability) through the integration of new probability-
affecting information.").
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more than a minority plaintiff or a woman would show-that is, the
white plaintiff must meet the "background circumstances" test.139
At least one court has been explicit about another function of this
test: protecting employers by screening out less meritorious cases. 
140
The fewer plaintiffs able to establish a prima facie case, the fewer
cases will go forward requiring the employer to justify its decision
before a jury.14 '
At a more technical level, the background circumstances require-
ment developed from attempting to adapt the prima facie case as
announced in McDonnell Douglas to the reverse discrimination
context. As that court originally formulated the rule, a traditional
prima facie case is established by the plaintiffs showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications."'
As Santa Fe made clear, the first prong is not a requirement
of the statute but merely a method of proof for a traditional
discrimination case,143 and McDonnell Douglas explicitly envi-
sioned different formulations of the prima facie case in different
139. Sexual harassment cases may pose distinctive problems for reverse discrimination
cases, which will not be further explored here. For example, the plaintiff in Pierce v.
Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994), challenged the discipline
meted out to him because of a subordinate woman's complaint of sexual harassment. See id.
at 799-800. He claimed that the alleged victim had engaged in equal or greater sexualized
conduct but was not disciplined. See id. at 799. The court rejected his claim because the two
employees were not "similarly situated" in a very important respect: the plaintiff was a
supervisor whose conduct could trigger liability for the company much more easily than could
the conduct of a nonsupervisory employee. See id. at 802-04. Analytically, this seems gender-
neutral because a supervisor (male or female) could create such problems for an employer;
however, the vast majority of harassment cases have involved male harassers.
140. Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir. 1999).
141. See Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in
Title VII and the Return to "No Cause" Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1182 (2003)
(arguing that courts increasingly view interpersonal problems as a result of personal
animosity, and that such a presumption "bespeaks both a judicial inability, or at least refusal,
to attend to unconscious bias and an ideological commitment to employment at will").
142. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
143. See supra note 21.
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circumstances.1 44 Because prong one is inapplicable to a white
plaintiff, some modification was necessary for a reverse discrimi-
nation case. The choice of simply eliminating that prong for all
claimants seemed unappealing for reasons we will explore. The
"background circumstances" test, therefore, emerged as a substitute
for the McDonnell Douglas first prong.
This background circumstances test has developed in ways that
are not intuitively obvious; 145 indeed, it has become more of a label
than a test. Section B, below, explores the development of this
concept, asking precisely what "circumstances" will suffice. Section
C turns to the related but distinct question of whether, or when, an
affirmative action plan is a sufficient background circumstance. In
Part III, we turn to recent critiques of the background circum-
stances test. As we will see, these cases do not so much question the
common sense of requiring something like background circum-
stances; rather, they doubt whether it is appropriate and/or
constitutional to employ different tests for different races.
B. What Are Background Circumstances?
The notion of requiring "background circumstances" in McDonnell
Douglas reverse discrimination cases originated in Parker v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.'46 There, Judge Mikva justified
substituting the McDonnell Douglas prong that a minority plaintiff
144. ' The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the
prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
145. See, e.g., Mills, 171 F.3d at 457 (stating that plaintiff must demonstrate "at least one
of the background circumstances these other [cited] courts have alluded to"); Taken v. Okla.
Corp. Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1369 (10th Cir. 1997); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (holding that "superior qualifications can provide a sufficient showing of
background circumstances"); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th
Cir. 1985) (requiring a reverse discrimination plaintiff also show "that the employer treated
differently employees who were similarly situated but not members of the protected group")
(citations omitted); Jasany v. U.S. Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1252-53 (6th Cir. 1985)
(involving male clerk who was unable to make out a claim of reverse discrimination absent
a showing that the Postal Service had a history of discrimination against males).
146. 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Parker relied on earlier circuit authority, Daye v.
Harris, 655 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1981), upholding a reverse discrimination claim, but the Daye
court neither used the background circumstances language nor focused on the elements of the
prima facie case.
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show he was a member of a racial minority with a requirement that
a majority plaintiff show the requisite background circumstances:
Membership in a socially disfavored group was the assumption
on which the entire McDonnell Douglas analysis was predicated,
for only in that context can it be stated as a general rule that the
"light of common experience" would lead a factfinder to infer
discriminatory motive from the unexplained hiring of an
outsider rather than a group member. Whites are also a
protected group under Title VII, but it defies common sense to
suggest that the promotion of a black employee justifies an
inference of prejudice against white co-workers in our present
society.147
Since Parker, courts have frequently invoked the notion in both race
and sex 148 contexts, but they have often been no more explicit about
what background circumstances suffice.
Only two points seem even relatively clear. First, a reverse
discrimination plaintiff may successfully prosecute a Title VII claim
using direct evidence. 149 When Parker announced the background
circumstances test, the Court had not yet handed down Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which provided an alternative to McDonnell
Douglas. In the reverse discrimination context, courts quickly used
the Price Waterhouse direct evidence test as an alternative to
147. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017.
148. See Archuleta v. 12th Jud. Dist., Probation Dep't, Colo., No. 98-1204, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3601, at **3-5 (10th Cir. Mar. 8, 1999) (holding that a male probation officer did not
prove his Title VII claim of reverse gender discrimination because he failed to show that his
supervisor discriminated against males, or that, if the officer had not been male, the
supervisor would not have asked him to resign). In Hudspeth v. Denver Water Dep't, No. 97-
1180, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6488 (10th Cir. Mar. 30, 1998), the court also applied the
background circumstances requirement to a sex discrimination claim, finding no prima facie
case established because plaintiff did not "establish background circumstances that support
an inference that the defendant is one of those unusual employers who discriminates against
the majority." Id. at *3 (quoting Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 589 (10th Cir.
1992)). A twist to the case was that Hudspeth was a black plaintiff who claimed that, as a
black male, he was entitled "to the presumptions accorded to those belonging to a disfavored
group." Id. at *4. The court disagreed, stating that plaintiffs discrimination claim was based
on his gender; even though he was black, he was nonetheless a male and thus "a member of
the historically favored majority with regard to gender." Id. 'The two claims, race
discrimination and sex discrimination, are separate claims, and the circumstances that
determine the analysis to be applied to each claim do not overlap." Id.
149. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
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background circumstances. Second, Parker's reasoning suggests
that a minority- (or female-) owned or dominated employer is a
sufficient background circumstance. The opinion's reference to
"socially disfavored groups" 5 ' might imply that there has to be a
history of discrimination against the group of which plaintiff is a
member. It is certainly possible, however, that Judge Mikva was
referring merely to the tendency of "in" groups to disfavor "out"
groups. Later courts have expressed this reasoning as requiring the
plaintiff to show that he is a racial minority at his workplace."' To
this effect, some courts have quoted the Supreme Court's decision
in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 52 suggesting that the
Court's use of strict scrutiny was appropriate because a majority of
the members of the city council that adopted the policy were African
American."5 3
150. See Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017.
151. See supra note 119. McDonnell Douglas involved "a black citizen of St. Louis."
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794 (1973). Although African Americans
were obviously included in the Court's description of a "racial minority," it was not clear what
other groups the Court had in mind. Subsequent cases have, without much analysis, allowed
a wide range of groups to use the test, including Latinos and various subgroups of Asians.
With respect to the inclusion of other groups in the race discourse, see generally Robert S.
Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-
Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 1 ASIAN L.J. 1 (1994) (advocating the inclusion of
Asians); Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science"of
American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997) (advocating the inclusion of members
of races other than black and white); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not
Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 & n.9 (1995) (discussing "nonblack
persons of color"); Janine Young Kim, Note, Are Asians Black?: The Asian-American Civil
Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the Black/ White Paradigm, 108 YALE
L.J. 2385 (1999) (arguing for the inclusion of Asian Americans in the national discourse on
race).
Although McDonnell Douglas involved race, the McDonnell Douglas paradigm was quickly
applied to the sex discrimination context, with the Court showing no hesitation about
permitting women-a majority of the population although a minority in the workforce and
concentrated in lower status, lower paid jobs-to use the prima facie case. See Texas Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
152. 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) ("[Hjeightened scrutiny would still be appropriate in the
circumstances of this case .... In this case, blacks constitute approximately 50% of the
population of the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the city council are held by
blacks.").
153. See also Reynolds v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 69 F.3d 1523, 1534 (10th Cir.
1995) (finding background circumstances where plaintiff was denied a promotion when she
was the only white employee in a Bilingual/ESOL department and nearly all decision makers
were Hispanic).
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Much less clear is whether the individual decision maker being
of a different race or gender than the plaintiff is a sufficient
background circumstance. At least one case has held yes, albeit
while questioning the requirement of background circumstances.'
Another court squarely said no, although it found a prima facie case
established for additional reasons and did not explain why the
differences in races did not suffice.'55 Most cases suggest no, by
seeming to require something more than a difference in race
between supervisors and employees to establish background
circumstances.
In any event, the entire background circumstances approach is
under increasing challenge. Harding v. Gray,'56 handed down by the
same District of Columbia Circuit that decided Parker, retreated
from background circumstances, although it retained the label. It
divided background circumstances into two categories. The first
was "evidence indicating that the particular employer at issue has
some reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously against
whites,"'--presumably what Judge Mikva had in mind originally.
For this category, Harding cited cases involving minority supervi-
sors and affirmative action plans or pressure to hire minorities.'
It also cited a case where minorities were overrepresented among
those promoted.5 9 The second branch--"evidence indicating that
154. See Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 2002).
155. See Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Reyes v. Cook
County, No. 02 C 3920, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12033 (N.D. Ill. June 30,2004), where the court
noted:
Ordinarily, the fact that all those in the decision process were of the same
gender as the person selected would not lead to an inference of bias. Generally
speaking, there is no presumption of actual bias in our law. On the other hand,
there may be "old girls' networks" just as there are "old boys' networks." To get
to even a slight inference of bias for this there must be something more than a
single gender selection board. Here, that something more was created by the
problems associated with the application process ....
Id. at ** 6-7.
156. 9 F.3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
157. Id. at 153.
158. See Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Lanphear
v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
159. See Daye v. Harris, 655 F.2d 258, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Mills v. Health Care
Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Mills points to 'disproportionate hiring
patterns' favoring women at HCSC's Quincy office. Between 1988-1995, nearly all promotions
at the office went to women, and at the time the challenged hiring decision was made, females
dominated the supervisory positions in the relevant office.") (quoting record).
[Vol. 46:10311068
2004] CIRCLING BACK TO THE OBVIOUS 1069
there is something 'fishy' about the facts of the case at hand that
raises an inference of discrimination"i6 -seems less a "background
circumstance" than a broader validation of reverse discrimination
suits, that is, departures from normal practices or favoring a less
qualified minority over more qualified whites. Although Harding
stated the two categories in conjunctive fashion, it went on to hold
that the second circumstance alone could establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. "'Background circumstances' need not mean
'some circumstance in the employer's background.' On the contrary,
other evidence about the 'background' of the case at hand-
including an allegation of superior qualifications-can be equally
valuable." '161
Two other circuits have also applied what might be called the
Harding "background circumstances or" approach. In the Eighth
Circuit, Duffy v. Wolle'62 applied Title VII analysis to plaintiffs
Equal Protection Clause claim 63 and held that "background
circumstances" could include a clearly more qualified male plaintiff
coupled with relatively thin evidence of preferences for women on
the part of the selectors. 16 4 This holding is another step away from
160. Harding, 9 F.3d at 153.
161. Id.; see also Sutherland v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 615 (6th Cir. 2003)
(finding the requisite "background circumstances" where statistical evidence of promotion and
hiring patterns reflected racial and gender preferences against the majority over a period of
twenty years).
162. 123 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 1997).
163. Id. at 1036-37. The case was brought as a direct cause of action under Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), since Title VII did not reach the employment in question. See
Duffy, 123 F.3d at 1033-34.
164. The Duffy court wrote:
Duffy has alleged three "background circumstances [to] support the suspicion
that the [Panel] is that unusual employer who discriminates against the
majority." These background circumstances are: (1) that McPhillips was
substantially less qualified than Duffy; (2) Chief Judge Wolle had mentioned an
interest by someone in the Administrative Office in the recruitment of a female;
and (3) that two members of the Panel had usually hired female law clerks.
123 F.3d at 1037 (citation omitted). Although Duffy found a prima facie case, it did not find
for plaintiff. Ultimately, it stressed variations in experience of the two candidates, and wrote
both that "[ildentifying those strengths that constitute the best qualified applicant is,
however, a role best left to employers," and that
[it is inevitable that two candidates with a combined forty years of experience
as probation officers will have different strengths. We do not see how the Panel's
preference for McPhillips's depth of experience in the area of presentence
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the intuitive meaning of background circumstances and more in line
with the second approach of Harding.
The Tenth Circuit is more uncertain about whether it adopted a
"background circumstances or" approach. Notari v. Denver Water
Dep't,165 reaffirmed that "the McDonnell Douglas presumption ... [of
discrimination] is valid for a reverse discrimination claimant only
when the requisite background circumstances exist,"166 but went on
to belie the "only" by holding that a claimant's failure to meet this
burden would not end the court's inquiry. Although direct evidence
would suffice, the court also approved of "indirect evidence sufficient
to support a reasonable probability, that but for the plaintiff's status
the challenged employment decision would have favored the
plaintiff."'167 To confuse matters even further, the court emphasized
that a reverse discrimination plaintiff who uses this method in place
of the background circumstances test was
not entitled to rely on the presumption that is implicit in the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case analysis. In other words, it
is not enough, under this alternative formulation, for a plaintiff
merely to allege that he was qualified and that someone with
different characteristics was the beneficiary of the challenged
employment decision. Instead, the plaintiff must allege and
produce evidence to support specific facts that are sufficient to
support a reasonable inference that but for plaintiffs status the
challenged decision would not have occurred."
investigation over Duffy's breadth of experience in the areas of pretrial,
supervision can be interpreted as pretextual for gender discrimination.
Id. at 1038.
165. 971 F.2d 585 (10thCir. 1992).
166. Id. at 589.
167. Id. at 590.
168. Id.; see Mattioda v. White, 323 F.3d 1288, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying the
"background circumstances" test in a reverse discrimination case and reaffirming the first
branch of Notari against a claim it had been undermined by later Supreme Court cases; the
second branch was not at issue). The Seventh Circuit has seemed to tilt toward the Notari
"alternative formulation" approach. In Mills v. Health Care Service Corp., 171 F.3d 450 (7th
Cir. 1999), it reaffirmed the use of direct evidence, and then stated that, where the majority
plaintiff has no direct evidence and has failed to establish "background circumstances," he is
required to produce "other 'indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable probability ...
that but for [his] status [as a white male] the challenged employment decision' would not have
occurred." Id. at 456 (citation omitted).
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It seems likely that the plaintiff must prove something like
background circumstances, even under this alternative formulation.
In short, the phrase "background circumstances" is amorphous,
and, even in the circuit that invented the term, seems to have
departed from its most intuitive definition. It may mean merely
"sufficient evidence" for the factfinder to infer discrimination, in
which case it is unobjectionable, but it certainly has invited
confusion. The one exception to this, at least at the outset, was the
status of affirmative action plans as background circumstances. As
we shall see, the courts initially held that such plans, at least if
valid, were not sufficient for the first prong of the plaintiffs prima
facie case. That rule, too, has undergone an evolution.
C. Is an Affirmative Action Plan a Sufficient Background
Circumstance?
At first blush, it would seem that the existence of an affirmative
action plan or similar policy statement, even a valid plan, would be
strong evidence of "background circumstances" that an employer
is the unusual employer that discriminates against whites. After
all, any policy that suggested that blacks were overrepresented in
a workforce would be a powerful basis for a traditional discrimi-
nation case, although it might alternatively be framed as "direct
evidence." '69 Similarly, an affirmative action plan, even if valid,
certainly involves an "overrepresentation" of whites that is being
addressed."' Moreover, the popular perception on the part of whites
is that affirmative action leads to discrimination against them.1 '
169. See, e.g., Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 137 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the fact
that an employer's Balanced Workforce Plan, which indicated that African Americans were
overrepresented in a particular office, was direct evidence of racial discrimination, at least
when coupled with evidence that managers were evaluated on how well they complied with
the balanced workforce objectives).
170. A valid plan would not permit overrepresentation of minorities compared to the
relevant labor pool, but it would redress a current underrepresentation compared to that pool.
Another way of stating this concept is that the current workforce has an overrepresentation
of whites.
171. Calloway cites a survey of young Americans. About half of the whites (aged 15 to 25)
believe they lost job opportunities to minorities because of race. Calloway, supra note 131, at
1028 (citing Cynthia Durcanin, Young People Paint Bleak Picture of U.S. Race Relations,
Survey Says, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 17, 1992, at A4); see also Richard Morin & Sharon
Warden, Americans Vent Anger at Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1995, at A4
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Early cases, however, rejected this view. Parker v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co.,'72 which invented the background circumstances
requirement, arose in the context of an affirmative action plan. Mr.
Parker, a white male, filed suit in early 1979, after Santa Fe but
before Weber. He challenged 1976 and 1978 refusals to hire him as
discriminatory on race and sex grounds when blacks and women
were advanced in preference to him.'73 After Weber was handed
down, Parker sought to amend his complaint to attack the defen-
dant's affirmative action plan as invalid under that case.174 With
respect to the 1976 claim, the D.C. Circuit reversed both the district
court's refusal to allow the amendment and its summary judgment
for the employer.175 The employer admitted that a preferential
transfer agreement operated with respect to women and minorities
for the position in question;'76 thus, there was little doubt that an
affirmative action plan had an effect on plaintiff's employment. Yet,
"[s]ince the record in this case d[id] not sufficiently illuminate
B&O's practices to enable a court to decide whether they 'unnecessar-
ily trammel the interests of the white employees,' a genuine issue
of material fact remained unresolved .... ,'
As for the 1978 claim, "Parker ha[d] not yet demonstrated that
race was a factor in the 1978 hiring-although B&O conceded its
deliberate use of race and gender under the rubric of affirmative
action in 1976, the record reflect[ed] no such concession concerning
1978.'' 7 Parker, therefore, had to adduce evidence of intent to
discriminate. It was in this connection that the court formulated the
(describing the results of a poll that found "[57] percent of all whites interviewed and 63
percent of all white males thought affirmative action had hurt white men, a view shared by
just 19 percent of all blacks."). But see John J. Heldrich Ctr. for Workplace Dev., A Workplace
Divided: How Americans View Discrimination and Race on the Job (2002) (reporting that 24%
of workers see no discrimination against any group, but the group most cited as likely to be
discriminated against is African Americans; 21% of those surveyed so believed; and 28% of
African Americans believed they personally had suffered discrimination in the last year as
opposed to only 6% of whites), available at http://heldrich.rutgers.edu/Resources/Publication/
19/WorkTrends_020107.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
172. 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
173. Id. at 1014-15.
174. Id. at 1013.
175. Id. at 1016.
176. See id. at 1015.
177. Id. at 1016.
178. Id.
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background circumstances requirement. In addressing the role of
that plan in the background circumstances inquiry, Judge Mikva
wrote:
If the court finds that evidence of B&O's unlawful consideration
of race as a factor in hiring in [1976] ... justifies a suspicion that
incidents of capricious discrimination against whites because of
their race may be likely, Parker should not be required to adduce
direct evidence that race was a factor in the 1978 hiring deci-
sion. If Parker's qualifications enable him to meet the other
criteria of McDonnell Douglas, the burden of going forward
would then shift to B&O to articulate a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for its actions in 1978, in accordance with the
usual McDonnell Douglas analysis. 179
Although an affirmative action plan may be a sufficient back-
ground circumstance, the careful use of the word "unlawful" limits
this statement to invalid plans. In a footnote, Judge Mikva went
further: "We do not equate lawful affirmative action with discrimi-
nation against the majority, nor do we suggest that a lawful
affirmative action program would in itself constitute suspicious
circumstances sufficient to justify an inference of discriminatory
intent under McDonnell Douglas."8 ' This view is consistent with the
Weber/Johnson view that permissible preferences under valid plans
are not discriminatory. 8 ' It nevertheless means that a reverse
discrimination plaintiff may prove a prima facie case by raising and
showing an invalid affirmative action plan, even one not implicated
in the challenged decisions, but that is as far as Parker goes.18 2
This conclusion seems in considerable tension with the rationale
of requiring background circumstances in the first place. Both the
"light of common experience" and the application of "common sense"
suggest that an employer seeking to advance the positions of
minorities and women by virtue of an affirmative action plan-valid
or invalid-is the kind of "unusual employer" who is more likely to
179. Id. at 1018 (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 1017 n.9.
181. See supra Part I.B.
182. The quoted language in Parker may not go even this far-it permits the finder of fact
to determine that earlier unlawful consideration of race is suspicious enough for the prima
facie case but it does not require the trier of fact so to find.
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discriminate against whites and males. It might be argued that,
although such employers are, almost by definition, more likely to
favor minorities pursuant to a plan, this favoritism is not techni-
cally discrimination under Weber and Johnson, and such employers
are not necessarily more likely to discriminate impermissibly.
Although tenable, this argument necessarily suggests that employ-
ers are more familiar with the technicalities of Title VII law than
seems plausible. However well drafted an affirmative action plan,
it is likely to be translated "on the ground" into more generalized
preference for minorities and women."'
The early authorities nevertheless favored the Parker approach,
and some continue to do so, precisely because of the Supreme
Court's approval of affirmative action plans in Weber and Johnson.
To allow a plaintiff to adduce the existence of such a plan as the
basis for a prima facie case of individual disparate treatment would
create a severe disincentive for such plans, contrary to the thrust of
the Court's decisions." An early Seventh Circuit decision, Ustrak
183. Anecdotal evidence, for example, suggests that even sophisticated law faculties do not
often stop to consider whether permissible affirmative action goals have been met, thus
precluding further efforts.
184. Some commentators read one early authority, Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301 (1 1th Cir.
1991), as rejecting the background circumstances test entirely. See, e.g., Martha R.
Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-Transformation
Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 816 (2003). Wilson is better interpreted, however, as permitting
an affirmative action plan to be a sufficient background circumstance. Wilson involved an
affirmative action plan implemented pursuant to a consent decree. See Wilson, 934 F.2d at
302-03. The two white plaintiffs had stipulated that the consent decrees were valid, and "they
voluntarily limited their action to the question of whether the defendants' conduct was
mandated or consistent with the decree." Id. at 303. The court then described a plaintiff's
burden under the first prong of McDonnell Douglas as showing that "he belongs to a class,"
and the fourth prong as that "the job was filled by a minority group member or a woman." Id.
at 304. The suggestion might be that a reverse discrimination plaintiff is subject to no more
stringent requirements than would a minority or female plaintiff. Yet, the context of the
decision-whether the challenged decision was "mandated or consistent with" an affirmative
action plan-may mean that background circumstances were already present, at least if an
affirmative action plan constitutes background circumstances. This seems the better reading
of the case. If the court had intended simply to equate traditional and reverse discrimination,
it would have been simple to collapse the elements of the prima facie case so that it would be
applicable to any plaintiff: a showing that the job was filled by a person of a different race (or
the other sex) than the plaintiff. See also Shealy v. City of Albany, 89 F.3d 804, 805 (11th Cir.
1996) (repeating the language of Wilson that plaintiff need only show "he belongs to a class;"
but, similar to Wilson, there was strong reason to believe race may have been a factor).
Beyond the prima facie case, however, Wilson was hostile to reverse discrimination claims.
The defendant sheriff in that case had testified that "race and gender played a small role in
1074
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v. Fairman,8 5 made this point in rejecting a challenge by a white
inmate to a prison's failure to select him for a paid position in the
library."8 6 The plaintiff had been passed over in favor of an African
American, and the prison operated under a consent decree requiring
employment of blacks in various jobs in proportion to their numbers
in the prison population.1 1 7 This was not enough. Judge Posner, with
his usual cut-to-the-chase style, wrote:
[T]he existence of an affirmative action program cannot,
standing alone, establish that an employer has discriminated
against whites; otherwise affirmative action would be illegal per
se, which it is not. The consent decree in this case ... established
a preference for blacks the lawfulness of which has not been
questioned. A preference for blacks means, by the iron laws of
arithmetic, a handicap for whites. Hence the existence of that
handicap cannot by itself carry the day for a white who is
complaining of racial discrimination; and that is all Ustrak has
going for him in this case.
188
his decision-making process," but claimed that other reasons also justified his decision, even
though the successful candidates had been lower rated than the white plaintiffs earlier in the
process and had lower test scores and more demerits. Wilson, 934 F.2d at 304. The circuit
court upheld as not clearly erroneous the district court's conclusion that race and gender were
not dispositive factors. Id. at 304-05. It rejected the plaintiffs' alternative argument that any
consideration of race or gender was illegitimate. The court's entire discussion was: "The
Supreme Court, however, in [Johnson] held that it was 'appropriate [to take] into account as
one factor the sex of [the promoted individual] in determining that she should be promoted
.... The decision to do so was made pursuant to an affirmative action plan that represents a
moderate, flexible, case by case approach ..... Id. at 305 (citation omitted) (quoting Johnson
v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 641-42 (1987)). It was not clear
whether the court was finding the challenged decisions valid under the affirmative action
plan, or simply not discriminatory in light of the. plan.
Wilson was decided before the Civil Rights Ac of 1991. After that Act, it seemed clear that,
once the defendant admitted that race and gender were factors, the defendant should have
borne a burden of persuasion to demonstrate that he would have made the same decision in
any event. See infra notes 355-71 and accompanying text. At least, this would be clear unless
a different rule is applicable to reverse discrimination claims. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
185. 781 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1986).
186. See id. at 576.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 577. The court cited Christensen v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States, 767 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1985), which followed Parker in holding that "a lawful
affirmative action program is not evidence of discrimination against the majority." Id. at 343
(citing Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). It explained:
"National policy permits the use of voluntary affirmative action programs to remedy the
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More recent authority, however, suggests a more complicated
rule: an affirmative action plan plus some other factor may be
sufficient evidence of discrimination. But uncertainty exists as to
what "plus" factors suffice, and the courts typically fail to state a
rationale as to why a certain factor should be a "plus." The "plus"
rule seems to have originated in the D.C. Circuit, which decided
Parker, and can be summarized as holding that an affirmative
action plan is not a sufficient background circumstance for a prima
facie case by itself but may be sufficient in combination with other
circumstances, including pressure on the hiring authority to employ
minorities"8 9 or plaintiffs' proof that they were all more qualified for
the position than the black male who was chosen.19 The D.C.
Circuit, however, noted that it was uncertain as to "whether a
lawful, promulgated affirmative action plan can ... provide a link in
legacy of discrimination. For the courts to discourage the use of such programs by treating
them as evidence in themselves of the very discrimination they are designed to eradicate
would be improper." Id.
After rejecting reliance on the consent decree, the Ustrak court found no other evidence of
intentional discrimination:
At most the evidence shows that the librarian overrode a racial preference for
whites and gave the job to a black. That does not show racial animus. The
consent decree was not adopted for the protection of white prisoners. In a prison
that is 80 to 90 percent black ... it would hardly be surprising, with or without
a consent decree, if in a particular job classification that had only five or six jobs
all were filled by blacks. If there were five jobs, one filled by a white, the
percentage of blacks would be only 80 percent, less than their percentage in the
prison, and the figure would rise only to 83 percent if there were six jobs ....
Since medical science does not yet know how to divide a person, like a planarian,
into viable portions, no inference that the blacks got more than relative merit
entitled them to can be drawn from the fact that three rather than two of the
vacancies were filled by blacks; there is no evidence that the black who filled the
"white" slot was unqualified.
Ustrak, 781 F.2d at 576-77. Planaria are "a genus of the suborder Planarida of turbellarian
worms, found in fresh or salt water or in moist earth, and having a flattened form." OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 959 (2d ed. 1991).
189. See Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
190. See Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 783, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see
also Herendeen v. Mich. State Police, 39 F. Supp. 2d 899, 908 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (finding that
allegations by white male state troopers that state police considered race and gender in
promotions and sought to maintain a force reflecting the racial makeup of the population,
together with allegations that their qualifications were superior to those of promoted minority
and female candidates, stated a prima facie case of reverse discrimination).
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a prima facie case that would justify the inference of discrimina-
tion.""'
Demonstrated pressure to hire minorities pursuant to an
affirmative action plan seems no different from the plan itself. Yet,
such pressure, if not sheltered by the plan, would seem to satisfy the
background circumstances requirement: the defendant may be the
"unusual employer" who impermissibly discriminates against
whites. Moreover, because the defendant is not justifying that
pressure by an affirmative action plan, normal Title VII analysis
applies. A recent Eighth Circuit case, Wheeler v. Missouri Highway
& Transportation Commission,192 takes this approach. In upholding
a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court rejected defendant's efforts
to equate Wheeler's evidence of pressure from upper level
management to hire females as evidence of the AAP. This is
inaccurate. Evidence of illegal and discriminatory motive to hire
on the basis of sex and not on the merits of the candidates is
distinct from evidence of a valid AAP. The basis of Wheeler's
argument was not that MHTC acted pursuant to the AAP, which
he conceded was valid, but that there was pressure from upper
management to hire females in violation of the AAP's commit-
ment to equal employment opportunity standards, which led to
the discriminatory hiring. 193
Presumably, the claim was that "upper level management," either
because they did not understand the limitations of their own
(presumably valid) affirmative action plan or for other reasons,
acted beyond company policy in encouraging hiring of women.
Plaintiffs evidence, independent of the plan, included "testimony of
two of the three interviewers that they felt pressure to recommend
the female employee because" of her gender.'94 Of course, the
question then arises as to how one distinguishes pressure pursuant
191. Bishopp, 788 F.2d at 784 n.3; see also Plummer v. Safeway, Inc., No. 93-0316, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3428, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 1995) (declining to find background
circumstances when "plaintiff has provided no other substantiated circumstances that,
together with Safeway's affirmative action plan, could be viewed cumulatively to establish an
inference of discrimination").
192. 348 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 U.S. 2178 (2004).
193. Id. at 749.
194. Id.
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to a plan from pressure unconnected to a plan. After all, most
affirmative action plans stress outreach and inclusion, and "pres-
sure" is an amorphous term. One can conceive of efforts that would
likely fall outside of a plan, such as pressure to hire clearly unquali-
fied women or pressure to hire women into jobs not governed by the
plan, but it is not clear that is what the court had in mind.
A similar result has emerged from the Sixth Circuit. Though an
early case may have implied that an affirmative action plan might
be enough to satisfy the background circumstances prong of a
reverse discrimination prima facie case,'95 more recently that court
has explicitly stated that "relevant facts may include whether the
employer has been under external or internal pressure-for
example, from affirmative action goals-to hire more minorities."196
The second kind of "plus" proof is evidence of the plaintiffs
superior job qualifications as compared to the successful African
American. Wheeler involved such testimony from one member of
the selection panel,'97 and a number of reverse discrimination
cases have focused on this kind of proof. 9 In the abstract, compara-
tive qualifications seems like a sensible way to approach the
195. Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 68 (6th Cir. 1985).
196. Smith v. City of Dayton, No. 93-3639, 1994 WL 540666, at *4 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 1994).
Evidence of past affirmative action plans was enough in Sutherland v. Michigan Dep't of
Treasury, 220 F. Supp. 2d 815, 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001), aff'd, 344 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2003). Cf.
Nelson v. City of Flint, 136 F. Supp. 2d 703, 716 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding the affirmative
action plan insufficient to establish background circumstances when plaintiff produced no
information that it was in effect during the relevant time period and the plan itself did not
provide a sufficient basis to infer preferential treatment to females and minorities).
197. See Wheeler, 348 F.3d at 749.
198. For example, in Woods v. Perry, 375 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 2004), the court stated:
Woods alleges that he was better qualified for the Dakotas FMC position and
that this is sufficient by itself in a reverse discrimination case to establish a
prima facie claim .... It is inevitable that two candidates will have different
education and work experience, and the choice of a qualified candidate with 15
more years of GSA work experience and a superior leadership rating over one
with two extra years of formal education is not sufficient to show background
circumstances.
Id. at 675-76; see also Evans v. Cleveland State Univ. Bd. of Trs., No. 90-3759, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12218, at **10-11 (6th Cir. June 3, 1991) (ruling that the plaintiff chose improper
comparator because supposed favored black was in a different academic department); Hamm
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. IP 99-0969-CT/G, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2006, at *13 (S.D. Ind.
Jan. 10, 2001) (holding that plaintiff's claim that he was treated less favorably by being
disciplined did not establish a discrimination when.the female who was not disciplined was
found not to have engaged in inappropriate behavior.)
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discrimination question, whether by a traditional or a reverse
discrimination plaintiff.1 In traditional discrimination cases,
innumerable plaintiffs have sought to have the court infer discrimi-
natory intent from the claimed superior qualifications of the
plaintiff as compared to her successful competitor.2 °°
A third "plus" factor appeared in a recent Third Circuit case that
addressed the significance of a "diversity memo" issued by a black
supervisor shortly before the decision in question.2"1 The court
cautioned that "the memo is not, in and of itself, sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of illegal discrimination. An employer
has every right to be concerned with the diversity of its workforce,
and the work environment."'202 The court nevertheless found that a
dispute as to whether the black supervisor had written the memo or
merely distributed it over his signature as prepared by headquar-
ters was itself probative of discrimination: a jury could find that the
supervisor's "attempt to deny authorship of the memo was consis-
tent with Iadimarco's allegations of bias."2 3 This is a truly remark-
able exercise, for if the memorandum could not be indicative of
bias,2"4 how could bias be inferred from the fact that the supposed
author and admitted distributor of the memorandum tried, presum-
ably falsely, to distance himself from it? If the court's conclusion
makes sense, it is less because of the diversity memorandum per se
than the fact that a black supervisor had acted against the white
plaintiff.2"5
199. See generally Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts'Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept
in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 Mo. L. REV. 831 (2002) (explaining that although a
common way to show employment discrimination is through a comparator, courts tend to
misuse the concept by defining it too narrowly).
200. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 580 (1985) ('The District Court's
findings regarding petitioner's superior qualifications and the bias of the selection committee
are sufficient to support the inference that petitioner was denied the position ... on account
of her sex.").
201. Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 164 (3d Cir. 1999).
202. Id. This case is notable less for its treatment of the diversity memo than for its
rejection of the background circumstances test. See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
203. Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 164.
204. The memorandum is reproduced infra at note 214.
205. It might be argued (indeed, Professor Lillquist does argue) that the writing of the
memorandum is at least slightly stronger evidence of the mental state of the supervisor than
if he had just distributed it on "orders from headquarters." That is correct, but if the
memorandum does no more than restate a commitment to diversity consistent with a valid
affirmative action plan, as this memorandum did, it is hard to see why showing that the
20041 1079
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In summary, most courts deny that an affirmative action plan
will, by itself, constitute a sufficient background circumstance. The
more recent decisions, however, require little more than such a plan,
and may in fact permit an affirmative action plan, by itself, to be a
sufficient circumstance to meet this prong of plaintiffs prima facie
case. In such cases, the defendant will be pressed to shelter the
challenged decision by claiming it was made pursuant to the plan,
forcing the plaintiff to prove that the plan is invalid.
III. Is REQUIRING "BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES" ITSELF
REVERSE DISCRIMINATION?
The preceding discussion demonstrates that "background circum-
stances" is more a label than a test and embraces a multitude of
different approaches. The absence of coherent substantive content
is sufficient reason to consider a different approach. Certainly some
of the judicial dissatisfaction with the test stems from its amor-
phousness. What is surprising, however, is that the bulk of the
criticism of background circumstances derives not from its lack of
guidance to courts, but rather from the perception that requiring a
white plaintiff to prove such circumstances, when not similarly
requiring such proof from African Americans and other minorities,
is itself unjustified, perhaps reverse discrimination."'
supervisor was the author changes its significance. The question, then, is whether the fact
that the memo was written and denied shows a kind of guilty mind of someone who believes
in impermissible discrimination, not merely preferences pursuant to a valid plan.
206. The argument may have been made most pointedly in a student Note discussing the
question:
[l]mposing a higher standard upon reverse discrimination plaintiffs is
fundamentally unjust. It is true that minorities and women have been subjected
to discrimination on a massive scale. That fact does not, however, justify the
imposition of a much higher standard upon other groups. The reverse
discrimination plaintiff, who may bear absolutely no personal responsibility for
discrimination against minorities and women, must meet a much higher burden
because members of the same group have discriminated in the past. The value
of Title VII and other antidiscrimination legislation is the prevention of
discrimination. Title VII defines discrimination as treating employees differently
"because of' the protected characteristics. Yet courts which impose the
background circumstances requirement treat reverse discrimination plaintiffs
differently "because of' those very characteristics.
Janice C. Whiteside, Note, Title VII and Reverse Discrimination: The Prima Facie Case, 31
IND. L. REV. 413, 434 (1998) (footnote omitted).
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A. The Growing Rejection of the Test
Most courts have rejected attacks on the background circum-
stances test as reverse discrimination with little discussion,
essentially reasoning that the test simply recognizes the reality
that "discrimination by employers against white men is a less
common phenomenon than discrimination against minorities" and
women. 20 7 Other courts, however, have recently been more open to
attacks on the doctrine.20 8 The Sixth Circuit, for example, ques-
tioned whether "the 'background circumstances' prong, only
required of 'reverse discrimination' plaintiffs, may impermissibly
impose a heightened pleading standard on majority victims of
207. Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct.
2034 (2004).
208. The first court squarely to reject the test was Collins v. School District of Kansas City,
Missouri, 727 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D. Mo. 1990), which held the background circumstances
requirement "completely undermines the goal of McDonnell Douglas." Id. at 1321. The court
stated that: "Under Parker, the other elements of the prima facie case are rendered
meaningless because the requirement of showing the background circumstances is really a
requirement that the plaintiff make an affirmative showing on the ultimate issue: Did the
defendant unlawfully discriminate .... Id. "[Sluch a radical alteration of the McDonnell
Douglas framework" serves "to erect this arbitrary barrier which serves only to frustrate those
who have legitimate Title VII claims." Id. at 1321-22. An earlier case, Commons v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 614 F. Supp. 443 (D. Kan. 1985), had criticized the test, but found
the existence of the affirmative action plan enough to satisfy the background circumstances
prong of the plaintiffs prima facie case. See id. at 446-47.
Since Collins, a number of district courts have expressed doubts about the background
circumstances test. For instance, in Eastridge v. Rhode Island College, 996 F. Supp. 161 (D.
R.I. 1998), the court stated:
[R]equiring a reverse discrimination plaintiff to show that the specific employer
has displayed a pattern of discrimination against the majority in the past
imposes a more onerous burden on such a plaintiff as compared to any plaintiff
from any protected group. This is antagonistic to the very purposes of Title VII
itself.
Id. at 166; see also Cully v. Milliman & Robertson, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) ("Absent binding authority to the contrary, this court must assume that McDonald
means what it says: a Title VII case is a Title VII case on the 'same terms' for plaintiffs of all
races."); Cunliffe v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 n.3 (D. Conn. 1998)
(rejecting background circumstances test at summary judgment stage); Ulrich v. Exxon Co.,
824 F. Supp. 677, 684 (S.D. Tex. 1993) ("Declin[ing] to impose a heightened standard ....
[s]eems more in keeping with the purpose behind the anti-discrimination statutes. The
principal focus of the statutes is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the
protection of the protected group as a whole."); Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334
(Mich. 2004) (overruling prior decision that had adopted background circumstances test).
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discrimination."2"9 Although the question is not heightened plead-
ing, but rather heightened proof, the thrust of the remark is more
than a procedural objection.210
More definitively, in Iadimarco v. Runyon,2"' the Third Circuit
rejected "background circumstances" entirely, indicating that
all that should be required to establish a prima facie case in the
context of "reverse discrimination" is for the plaintiff to present
sufficient evidence to allow a fact finder to conclude that the
employer is treating some people less favorably than others
based upon a trait that is protected under Title VII. 212
The case, which reversed the grant of summary judgment to the
employer,2" 3 could easily have been treated as one in which back-
ground circumstances were present. Evidence existed that the
209. Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Pierce
v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994) ("We have serious
misgivings about the soundness of a test-which imposes a more onerous standard for plaintiffs
who are white or male than for their non-white or female counterparts."). These cases are in
obvious tension with Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1985).
See supra note 145.
210. The point here is simply that these courts seem to see something questionable about
framing proof structures differently in reverse discrimination cases as compared to traditional
discrimination suits. The legitimacy of such an objection is taken up in Part IV infra.
211. 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999).
212. Id. at 161. Of course, this is but another way of recognizing that, even when the four
prongs of McDonnell Douglas are not met, a prima facie case is stated whenever there is
sufficient evidence from which an inference of discrimination reasonably may be drawn.
213. Id. at 167. In addition to finding that plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the
court held that defendant had not produced a sufficiently detailed nondiscriminatory reason
to satisfy its burden of production. The court stated that the defendant's simple statement
that it did not believe the plaintiff was "the right person for the job" was insufficient:
The problematic nature of such an explanation is most easily seen in the context
of discrimination against a minority or female applicant. Such an applicant may
never be the "right person for the job" in the eyes of one who feels that the job
can only be filled by a White male. The biased decision maker may sincerely
believe that the White male who was offered the job was the right person, and
minority and female candidates who were rejected were simply wrong for the
job. The mere fact that one who discriminates harbors a sincere belief that he
hired the "right person" can not masquerade as a race-neutral explanation for
a challenged hiring decision. Such a belief, without more, is not a race-neutral
explanation at all, and allowing it to suffice to rebut a prima facie case of
discriminatory animus is tantamount to a judicial repeal of the very protections
Congress intended under Title VII.
Id. at 166-67.
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challenged decision was made or influenced by the fact that: (1)
plaintiffs supervisor and the supervisor's supervisor were both
black; (2) the other two comparable positions had been filled by
whites, perhaps thereby creating a "need" for a black appointment;
and (3) one of the supervisors had recently issued a memorandum
that stressed the need for diversity.2 14 Collectively, these seem to
comprise background circumstances under any definition of that
term. If "fishiness" is a test, as in Harding,21 it may be important
that the position was re-posted after only three of forty-one initial
candidates, including plaintiff, were rated "superior" in every
category, and the other two superior candidates took positions
elsewhere."' 6
The court nevertheless rejected the background circumstances
test in favor of the "sufficient evidence" test.217 Some of the court's
reasons suggest mere judicial housekeeping, such as the inaccuracy
of the term "background circumstances" itself 218 and the tendency
of the test to require plaintiffs to assert proof as part of their prima
facie case that is more properly analyzed as pretext proof.219 The
court's resolution, however, follows immediately after its discussion
214. See id. at 154-56. The memo provided:
As we proceed to fill vacancies, I want to ensure that very serious consideration
is given to the issue of diversity-I cannot emphasize this point more strongly.
The management teams in our plants should reflect the composition of our
workforce and communities if we are to benefit from the contributions that
minorities, women, and ethnic groups can bring to our decision making
processes and the social harmony that this will instill in our work environment.
Your personal commitment is needed-if there are any questions on this matter,
please feel free to contact me.
Id. at 155. As we have seen, the court also found probative of discrimination the supervisor's
denial that he had written the memo (if in fact he had). He claimed merely to have distributed
over his name a memo written elsewhere in the organization. See supra text accompanying
note 203.
215. See Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
216. ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 154.
217. See id. at 161-62.
218. "[W]e believe that the concept of 'background circumstances' is irremediably vague and
ill-defined. For example, one of the alleged background circumstances here is that ladimarco
was more qualified than Williams. That can hardly be termed a 'background circumstance,'
unless that term is defined to include anything that suggests discrimination." Id. at 161.
219. "[Tlhe suggestion that a plaintiff must prove 'background circumstances' to establish
that the defendant is a 'unique employer that discriminates against the majority' has a
tendency to force the plaintiff to initially present proof that would otherwise only become
relevant to rebut the employer's explanation of the challenged conduct." Id.
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of the Sixth Circuit's objections in dicta to a "heightened standard"
for reverse discrimination cases.22 ° Combined with the clear
background circumstances before it, the Third Circuit apparently
found inappropriate any heightened standard and was not merely
eliminating an inaccurate label. The court wrote: "Stating the prima
facie case in terms of 'background circumstances' and the unique-
ness of the particular employer is both problematic and unneces-
sary.... [M]any of the courts that have tried to apply such an
analysis have concluded that it results in a heightened burden for
the plaintiff despite" statements denying this reality.22'
B. Coming to Grips with the Problem: Different Perceptions of
Reality
"Background circumstances" has become shorthand for a view of
human relations in the United States. It proceeds from the belief
that cross-racial discrimination is more common than intra-racial
discrimination. Yet, the Supreme Court cautioned in Castaneda v.
Partida222 that "[b]ecause of the many facets of human motivation,
it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings
of one definable group will not discriminate against other members
of their group. '223 Repeating that language more recently in Oncale
v. Sundowner,224 the Court also cited Johnson in rejecting a
challenge to a valid affirmative action plan:
220. See id. at 163.
221. Id. at 161. The court returns to the "heightened standard" problem for reverse
discrimination plaintiffs. See id. at 163. At this point, the opinion drops a fascinating footnote.
Although the opinion is itself authored by Judge McKee, the footnote speaks of Judge McKee,
in the third person, as disagreeing with the criticisms of the background circumstances test
as raising an additional hurdle for white plaintiffs:
However, even though Judge McKee believes the [background circumstances]
test to merely be a restatement of McDonnell Douglas, he concedes that it is just
too vague and too prone to misinterpretation and confusion to apply fairly and
consistently. He agrees that the approach the court adopts today allows for less
confusion and more consistency than the Parker/Harding approach.
Id. at 164 n.10. The footnote, then, is in the nature of a concurrence with the judge's own
opinion.
222. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
223. Id. at 499.
224. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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[W]e did not consider it significant that the supervisor who made
that decision was also a man. If our precedents leave any doubt
on the question, we hold today that nothing in Title VII neces-
sarily bars a claim of discrimination "because of ... sex" merely
because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged
with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex.2"'
In short, intra-racial or intra-gender discrimination occurs, if more
rarely than cross-racial discrimination.
The reality of intra-group discrimination, however, seems largely
inapposite to the task at hand. The issue is not whether whites
discriminate against whites (or males against males): Santa Fe (and
Johnson) recognized that possibility. Rather, the issue is what proof
is needed such that a jury may permissibly conclude that the
claimed discrimination in fact occurred.
There are two core problems underlying this debate. The first is
differing perceptions of the relative probability of discrimination
against whites and minorities. To the extent that Parker was
predicated on the belief that, in 1981, it was far more probable that
blacks would be discriminated against than whites, the lower courts
may be reassessing that belief more than two decades later. This
question is addressed in this Section, which is followed by Section
C and its focus on the relationship between perceptions of reality
and reality itself. The second potential explanation, addressed in
Section D, is that, irrespective of the facts "on the ground," our legal
structure does not permit a formal racial distinction in proof of
discrimination.
With respect to perceptions of reality, Professor Deborah
Calloway has argued that retrenchment by the Supreme Court in
Title VII cases reflects a change in the "basic assumption" underly-
ing McDonnell Douglas: discrimination, far from being common, is
now viewed as rare.22 In analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,227 which upheld a factfinder's
refusal to find discrimination even if it found the defendant's
supposed nondiscriminatory reason to be pretextual, Professor
Calloway wrote:
225. Id. at 79 (citation omitted).
226. See Calloway, supra note 131, at 998.
227. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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Hicks is significant, not for its narrow legal holding, but for the
attitude underlying that holding .... [This case is not about who
bears the burden of proof. Instead, this case is about what
evidence is sufficient to meet the plaintiffs burden of persuasion
on discriminatory intent. What evidence makes it "more likely
than not" that the defendant discriminated? The answer to this
question depends on one's beliefs about the prevalence of
discrimination. Whether a reasonable person (or judge) will be
convinced that discrimination has been shown depends on
whether he believes that discrimination is a logical inference in
the absence of some other explanation for adverse conduct. The
district court and the majority of the Supreme Court in Hicks
reached their result, not because it was required by any formal
legal rules, but rather because they just plain do not believe in
that basic assumption.228
She then surveyed attacks on that basic assumption by legal
academics, commentators, and lower court judges, and then turned
to societal attitudes, concluding that the general public-those who
will serve on juries-believe that discrimination against African
Americans is largely a thing of the past." 9
Professor Calloway's position has drawn substantial support,23 °
both in its analysis of the changes in the basic assumption and in
its assessment that that change is unjustified by any dramatic
decreases in the prevalence of discrimination against minorities
and women.2 31 With respect to the basic assumption, for example,
Michael Selmi agrees that the predicates for Supreme Court
models, both for individual disparate treatment cases and in other
contexts, are eroding,2 32 although he does not view the shift as being
228. Calloway, supra note 131, at 1008-09.
229. See id. at 1023-24.
230. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and Throwing out Proof
Structures: It Is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POLy J.
361, 371 (1998) ("Professor Calloway's ... 'basic assumption' reasonably describes the current
situation in employment relations in the United States. Furthermore, to the extent the basic
assumption may be overly broad in its description, it is important enough as a matter of policy
that it should govern disparate treatment cases.")
231. The psychological predicates of such discrimination, however, may have shifted. See
infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
232. Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 283 (1997) (reasoning that, because "a finding of discrimination
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as dramatic as does Professor Calloway.233 Similarly, Professor
McGinley views courts as more likely to believe cronyism explains
apparent preferences for whites,23 4 and Chad Derum and Professor
Karen Engle see courts as more likely to believe personal animus
explains disadvantages for minorities.235 These alternative explana-
tions are increasingly replacing a presumption of discrimination in
the courts.236 In other words, adverse decisions are more likely to be
viewed as resulting from decision makers liking people who just
happen to be white or disliking people who just happen to be black
than being viewed as linked to race.
Even the strain of scholarship reflected in the writings of
commentators like Professors Linda Krieger 23 7 and Tristin Green 238
is ultimately a factual determination--one that generally requires drawing an inference of
discrimination based on circumstantial evidence," the Supreme Court's "models functioned
properly only when the courts applying them were willing to see discrimination as a viable
explanation for social and political conditions;" but, "[c]ombined with recent Supreme Court
decisions in the affirmative action and voting rights contexts, the Hicks case signals a judicial
presumption that discrimination no longer offers an explanation for otherwise unexplained
racial disparities") (footnotes omitted).
233. Selmi writes:
[I]t would be a mistake to see these cases as representing a dramatic shift from
the Court's past practice or attitude. Rather, these cases are best seen as the
culmination of the way in which the Court has defined discrimination over the
last twenty years. Indeed, despite its rhetoric regarding the importance of
ferreting out subtle discrimination, the Court has only seen discrimination,
absent a facial classification, in the most overt or obvious situations-situations
that could not be explained on any basis other than race. Whenever the Court
found room to accept a nondiscriminatory explanation for a disputed act, it did
so.
Id. at 284.
234. See Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A
Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision
Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1023 (1997).
235. Derum & Engle, supra note 141, at 1227.
236. Id. at 1179.
237. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,1164
(1995) ('Title VII jurisprudence ... while sufficient to address the deliberate discrimination
prevalent in an earlier age, is inadequate to address the subtle, often unconscious forms of
bias that Title VII was also intended to remedy. These subtle forms of bias, I suggest,
represent today's most prevalent type of discrimination.") (footnote omitted).
238. See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 92 (2003)
("Conceptualizing a form of discrimination in terms of discriminatory bias in workplace
dynamics places much-needed emphasis on structural factors while making clear that both
conscious and unconscious bias operate at multiple levels of social interaction, often resulting
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may inadvertently contribute to undermining the basic assumption.
The theme of this scholarship is that discrimination is no longer
driven largely by conscious animus but rather reflects cognitive
processing that is largely unconscious. Such scholarship argues that
this phenomenon is actually more threatening to true equality than
conscious animus because it is deeper rooted and more pervasive.
There is currently some debate about whether such discrimination
counts as "intentional" so as to fit within the prohibitions of the
statute. If such cognitive processing does not count as racial intent,
this strain of scholarship is very threatening to Title VII's reach.239
in decreased opportunity for disfavored groups without producing a single, identifiable
discriminatory decision or a perceptibly hostile work environment.") (footnote omitted); see
also see also Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment
Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality"
Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183 (1997) (arguing that the Court's decision in Hicks
will deprive many discrimination victims of the ability to prove that they were discriminated
against by their employer); Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias:
On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (2001) (arguing that two other
forms of bias-devaluation and biased prototypes-should be recognized by the law); Ann C.
McGinley, !Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POLY 415 (2000) (arguing that courts should expand the definition of intent to include
unconscious discrimination, as courts did after the enactment of Title VII, and should resist
the constriction of intent's definition, which has occurred in recent court decisions); Marc R.
Poirier, Using Stereotyping and Cognitive Bias Evidence to Prove Gender Discrimination: Is
Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POLY J.
459 (2003) (suggesting that a negligence model premised on images of dangerous conditions
on land should be used to address the problems of unreflective discrimination); Barbara
Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319 (2000)
(arguing that sociology should pay more attention to the causes of employment discrimination
than to its mere existence, if sociologists wish to help eliminate discrimination); Katherine
V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for
Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001) (discussing the unsuitability of
employment law, which is designed for an extended employer-employee relationship, for the
modern employment landscape, which is characterized by frequent changes in employment
and brief employee-employer relationships); Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the
Twenty-First Century Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
639 (1998) (suggesting new approaches to the regulation of employment discrimination that
avoid the problems of formal and informal regulation); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001)
(proposing a regulatory solution to "second generation" employment discrimination that
involves encouraging problem solving in the work place). Derum & Engle agree as to the
pervasiveness of unconscious bias but disagree that it was "a phenomenon that was not
known or understood in the 1960s." Derum & Engle, supra note 141, at 1192.
239. Although either explicit or implicit in most of the literature referred to in notes 237
and 238, supra, the debate is most pointed in the exchange between Amy L. Wax,
Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1132-33 (1999) (arguing that unconscious
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Yet, even assuming, as I strongly believe, that disparate treatment
that arises from unconscious processing is actionable, a possible
unintended consequence of this research is reinforcement of notions
that racial animus-the prime target of Title VII when it was
enacted-is no longer a meaningful problem. Although Krieger and
Green urge more sophisticated legal responses to the phenomenon
they identify, the law might instead decide that, having largely
eradicated conscious discrimination, its work is done. Indeed, at
least one commentator, Amy Wax, has advanced this argument,
claiming that the discrimination of the nature described by Krieger
and Green cannot be effectively addressed by the legal system.24 °
Further, the most pointed critique of Professor Calloway's
argument seems to accept her premise-that the basic assumption
discrimination that creates disparate treatment in the workplace should not be covered by
Title VII framework, because such a method of preventing discrimination is not cost-effective),
and Michael Selmi, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233
(1999) (arguing that Professor Wax misunderstands the nature of unconscious discrimination,
and suggesting that she places too much emphasis on employer costs and not enough on the
costs to the victim).
Given the proof structures of Title VII, however, it will be rare that this issue, although
fascinating, needs to be confronted by a court, as the factfinder must always infer underlying
motive particularly in the case of defendant's denial. As a result, the jury need rarely
determine whether the motive was conscious, unconscious, or somewhere in between; it need
merely decide it was present. But see Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives and Maleness: A Critical
View of Mixed Motive Doctrine in Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1029
(discussing situations where an employment decision has both legitimate motives and
discriminatory motives, and examining how courts deal with this mixed-motive problem).
Should this Article's conclusion be taken seriously, the most likely way in which this issue will
arise is in the context of motions to exclude plaintiffs expert testimony concerning cognitive
processes incorporating discrimination, on the basis that such testimony is simply irrelevant,
because such problems are beyond the reach of the statute.
240. According to Professor Wax:
[E]xtending the framework created by existing antidiscrimination statutes to
cover unconscious workplace disparate treatment is not a good idea because it
is unlikely to serve the principal goals of a liability scheme-deterrence,
compensation, insurance--in a cost effective manner. Holding employers liable
will not deter the harm of unconscious disparate treatment unless employers
and their agents can find ways to reduce that harm. The nature of the
phenomenon of unconscious bias is such that there are no known steps that
employers can reliably take to control biases that may distort the kinds of
discretionary or subjective social judgments that must inevitably be made in the
course of managing personnel in the modern workplace. For this reason, little
or no cost-justified deterrence of unconscious bias can be expected to result from
imposing liability on employers for this type of conduct.
Wax, supra note 239, at 1132-33. In reply, see Selmi, supra note 239.
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is no longer operative-but also questions whether it is (or ever was)
justified as a description of reality. Professor Deborah Malamud
writes of Professor Calloway:
The central problem with this rhetoric-and with any effort to
rely heavily on the "basic assumption" it identifies-is that it is
by no means certain that any particular unexplained adverse act
toward a woman or a member of a minority group is the result
of discrimination. The question is whether, in the face of
uncertainty, the legal system should use a mandatory presump-
tion instead of requiring individualized proof. My conclu-
sion-one I reach with great difficulty-is that the uncertainty
is sufficiently great to render the use of a mandatory presump-
tion unwise."'
Professor Malamud's critique is consistent with a more general
strain of evidence scholarship that views mandatory presumptions
241. Deborah Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 2229, 2254-55 (1995). Malamud advances four reasons, one of which is discussed infra
at text accompanying note 246. The other three reasons include, first, the basic assumption
as predicated on "the expectation that absent discrimination, employment decisions are-and
can be proven to be-fair and reasonable." Id. at 2255. Data from union grievance arbitration,
public employment merit-system adjudications, and common law wrongful discharge cases,
however, "strongly suggest that wrongful, or at least undefendable, employer actions are
significant problems in the American workplace, even outside of the setting of actionable
discrimination. I cannot accept the 'basic assumption' if it requires me to assume otherwise."
Id.
Second, the basic assumption
is a unitary "credo," but discrimination is not a unitary phenomenon in
American society. The likelihood of discrimination depends on a number of
factors, including the protected group at issue, the sector of the economy, the
type and size of employer, the degree to which the workplace is integrated, and
the stage of the employment relationship.,.. The assumption that discrimination
is the cause of all unjustified actions against members of protected groups is
unlikely to be equally justified in all of these varied circumstances.
Id. at 2257-58.
Third, Professor Malamud argues that the McDonnell Douglas proof structure requires
more than proof "that race or gender played some part in the decision," which "would create,
at best, a mixed motive case." Id. at 2259. She goes on to say that
[blelief that issues of race or gender are likely to play a role in arbitrary actions
against members of protected groups does not entail the belief that such issues
are likely to be the "but for" cause of arbitrariness across race and gender
lines-which is the standard of proof... under [McDonnell Douglas].
Id. (footnote omitted). This last argument seems substantially undercut by subsequent
developments. See discussion infra notes 372-85 and accompanying text.
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as inconsistent with our usual norms of factfinding.242 An exception
to this norm is certainly possible, for example, when the presumed
fact is usually true when the predicate facts are proven, but jurors
systematically undervalue the chances of the presumed fact.2 43
Professor Malamud, however, disputes that the presumed facts do
normally follow from the proven facts. Needless to say, Professor
Malamud's position has generated its own critics.244
242. McDonnell Douglas was decided at a time when Title VII cases were judge-tried, the
remedies being viewed as essentially equitable. It was not until the passage of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act that jury trials and legal damages became generally available in Title VII suits.
See SULLIVAN, ZIMMER, & WHITE, 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND PRACTICE, supra
note 27, at 925-27. As a result, the Court in McDonnell Douglas was writing largely to
structure the factfinding of judges. After the 1991 Act, judges' primary role was that of
gatekeeper, deciding when a case gets to a jury and what evidence is submitted to the jury.
Even Hicks, although reviewing a judge's factfinding in a bench trial, was decided after the
jury trial became available in Title VII suits. This shift in the judicial role may explain in part
the evolution of the McDonnell Douglas approach toward a more evidence-centered, less fixed
rule of sufficiency analysis.
243. Suppose that, of every 100 cases where the prima facie case is established and the
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is rebutted, in 90 cases the correct finding is
discrimination in violation of Title VII. A mandatory presumption in such cases would lead
to 10 false verdicts of violation. In the absence of a mandatory presumption, the number of
false verdicts for defendants might fall to 5, but there might also be false verdicts against
plaintiffs. If these numbered 20, there would be a net increase of incorrect verdicts from 10
to 25. Under these assumptions, a mandatory presumption would be justified if the core policy
is error minimization. This argument, however, justifies a mandatory presumption only if the
assumptions are themselves empirically supportable.
244. See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 230, at 371 (arguing that the McDonnell Douglas proof
structure retains value for judicial analysis of Title VII claims and that it has been effective
in eradicating discrimination in the employment arena); McGinley, supra note 238, at 482-83
(noting that psychological and sociological data support the creation of a mandatory
presumption); John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in Employment Discrimination Law:
Slouching Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law, 53 MERCER L. REV. 709 (2002)
(proposing a slightly modified version of the McDonnell Douglas proof structure).
Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger summarizes Malamud as arguing that the prevalence
of discrimination does not determine whether a particular action "can fairly be attributed to
that cause." Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Burdens of Equality: Burdens of Proof and
Presumptions in Indian and American Civil Rights Law, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 120 (1999).
She continues:
In essence, I would suggest, Malamud and Calloway are arguing over whether
or not Title VII should still be viewed as "transformative law," or whether it is
now more accurately characterized as "normal law," that is, law which seeks to
enforce prevailing social norms against a small, deviant class of lawbreakers. If
Title VII is properly seen as "normal law," than [sic] perhaps Professor Malamud
is correct. But if it is still "transformative law," than [sic] Professor Calloway has
the better argument.
Id. at 120-21.
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With respect to the courts merely following general public
perceptions as to the decline in racial discrimination, Professor
Stephen Plass has recently stressed the increasing belief in
America-at least white America-that racial discrimination is a
thing of the past:
Black presence in business and social settings and media
images suggest that America is a place of racial cooperation
where bigotry is an aberration.... Conspicuous consumption by
blacks helps reinforce perceptions that American society has
removed most barriers to equal opportunity and achievement.
Significant and repetitive positive images of blacks tend to
undermine a general contention that to be black is to be disad-
vantaged ....
Although no one can generally demonstrate that it is better
to be black, encountering black success as fact or fiction has
served to magnify the plight of less privileged whites.245
In this connection Professor Malamud concurs about popular
perceptions. She agrees with-Professor Calloway "that what 'judges,
juries, and members of this culture believe about the existence of
discrimination in the workplace and perhaps in society in general'
does not in fact conform to the factual premise of the 'basic assump-
tion.""" Malamud vehemently disagrees, however, that this is a
reason to return to the basic assumption, arguing that Professor
Calloway "fails to acknowledge ... that deciding cases on the basis of
a mandatory presumption that is inconsistent with contemporary
beliefs about the nature of discrimination raises important ques-
tions about the perceived legitimacy of the enterprise." '247
In short, the deterioration, if not demise, of the basic assump-
tion-whether or not justified in the context of traditional discrimi-
nation cases-certainly explains the recent and increasing judicial
245. Stephen A. Plass, Public Opinion and the Demise of Affirmative Action, 19 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 495, 495-97 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
246. Malamud, supra note 241, at 2260.
247. Id. Corbett disagrees. He argues, first, that "both Professors Calloway and Malamud
overstate, at least somewhat, the point that society does not believe that intentional
discrimination is still common in the workplace" by focusing on affirmative action and the
disparate impact theory of recovery. Corbett, supra note 230, at 374.
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tendency to eliminate any "heightened" requirement for proof in
reverse discrimination challenges.
C. Coming to Grips with the Problem: Reality Itself
Professor Calloway's argument is pitched on the belief that
discrimination against racial minorities and women is a common,
indeed, a pervasive, phenomenon. Although Professor Malamud
does not deny that discrimination occurs frequently, and grounds at
least part of her attack on the basic assumption on grounds of
democratic legitimacy,"' most of her rebuttal challenges the
prevalence of discrimination, at least as compared with other
irrationalities and illegalities in the American workplace.249
Deciding how prevalent discrimination is, much less whether it
is sufficiently prevalent to justify the basic assumption, is a
complicated matter, but it can fairly be said that the current state
of the literature is consistent with the basic assumption where race
is concerned. That is to say, the notion that whites frequently
discriminate against blacks (and other racial minorities)25 ° is
supported by numerous empirical studies,25 ' although not all are
248. See supra text accompanying note 247.
249. See supra note 241.
250. There is at least some empirical evidence that blacks also discriminate against blacks,
although the study in question (tipping of cab drivers by passengers of different races) is very
small and focused on a market radically different than the employment setting. See IAN
AYRES, To INSURE PREJUDICE: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN TAXICAB TIPPING (Yale Law School, Pub.
L. Working Paper No. 50).
251. There has also been lively theoretical literature as to whether and how discrimination
could survive in a competitive economy, originating with the work of Gary Becker who posits
an employer "taste for discrimination" that overcomes competitive pressures to hire minorities
and women. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971); see
also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 27.1 (2d ed. 1977) (arguing that the
incentive to maximize profits by exploiting a lower-paid labor force will lead even biased
employers to hire minorities; in a competitive market, only the least discriminatory employers
will survive); David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency Wages, Tournaments, and
Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for High-Level Jobs, 33 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 68 (1998) (arguing that, in high-level jobs, "difficulties in monitoring (or,
equivalently, discretion by managers in evaluating workers) create powerful opportunities for
discriminatory hiring and promotion"); Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The
Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1249, 1251 (2003) (doubting whether Becker's theory is empirically supported); David A.
Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for
Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1622 (1991) (describing statistical discrimination,
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focused on employment.252 Whether such discrimination is as or
more common than the kind of irrationalities and other illegalities
that Professor Malamud notes is, of course, another question. In
light of current research, however, it would be hard to conclude that
the basic assumption is irrational.2"3
The most compelling studies try to determine whether actual
market participants tend to discriminate through the use of testers
or other means. A dramatic recent example is an experiment
performed by Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan to
measure racial discrimination in the labor market by submitting
fictitious resumes in response to help-wanted ads in Boston and
Chicago newspapers. They randomly assigned "either a very African
American sounding name or a very White sounding name" and
reported the result:
[There was] significant discrimination against African-American
names: White names receive 50 percent more callbacks for
interviews. We also find that race affects the benefits of a better
resume. For White names, a higher quality resume elicits 30
that is, "[a] rational employer will discriminate, even if no relevant actor has any
discriminatory animus, if the employer concludes that race is a useful proxy for job
qualifications"). However interesting these theories, for present purposes theoretic projections
should be subordinate to empirical studies.
252. A variety of studies also show the likelihood of discrimination against women. See,
e.g., LINDA M. BLUM, BETWEEN FEMINISM AND LABOR: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPARABLE
WORTH MOVEMENT (1991); Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and
Credentials: The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
199 (1997); Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579 (2001) (reviewing
ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY: COURTS,
MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA (1999)). Most of these studies are
statistical in nature, but a recent empirical study is also suggestive. See Claudia Goldin &
Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind" Auditions on Female
Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000) (noting that, while not statistically significant, the
data showed that blind auditions substantially increased the likelihood of success of female
candidates); see also Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass Ceiling?, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 3-4
(2002) (discussing Goldin and Rouse's study).
253. This assumption, of course, does not directly rebut Professor Malamud's democratic
legitimacy point, but it raises the stakes: Should a court refuse to apply a proof structure that
it believes comports with reality because the majority of the citizenry do not share that view?
See Corbett, supra note 230, at 375. This Article will not further explore the divide between
science and democracy that such a position exposes. For Professor Malamud, of course, this
is not a serious problem because she questions the basic assumption in its own terms. In any
event, she proposes addressing any difference between perception and reality by the proof
process itself, especially expert testimony. See Malamud, supra note 241, at 2261-62.
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percent more callbacks whereas for African Americans, it elicits
a far smaller increase. Applicants living in better neighborhoods
receive more callbacks but, interestingly, this effect does not
differ by race. The amount of discrimination is uniform across
occupations and industries.... These results suggest that racial
discrimination is still a prominent feature of the labor market.25 4
This study has results similar to a 1991 work by the Urban
Institute that used matched pairs of black and white testers to
study discrimination in entry-level positions in the retail and
service trades advertised in Washington, D.C. and Chicago newspa-
pers.25 '5 The Institute found discrimination against young black job
seekers. Although in most cases neither of the testers received an
offer or both did, in the cases where only one received an offer,
fifteen percent of the overall cases had the white tester successful,
compared to five percent of the cases with a successful black
tester.256
254. MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, ARE EMILY AND GREG MORE
EMPLOYABLE THAN LAKISHA AND JAMAL? A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON LABOR MARKET
DISCRIMINATION 1 (MIT Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstractid=422902 (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
255. See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES
DIMINISHED: DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING (1991); see also MARK BENDICK, CHARLES W.
JOHNSON, & VICTOR A. REINOSO, MEASURING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION THROUGH
CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS (1993) (similar study reaching similar results).
256. TURNER ET AL., supra note 255, at 37. But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASEAGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 55-58 (1992) (criticizing the
1991 study on a number of points). Epstein argues that covering only a small segment of the
job market, and limiting the study to jobs advertised in newspapers, "destroys any possibility
of randomization." Id. at 56. He also questions the assumption that differential hiring rates
establish discrimination because it is impossible to be sure that the only difference between
the black and white members of each pair was race. Id. at 57. He further stressed that "[t]he
public sector is excluded from the entire sample, as are a disproportionate percentage of
private firms with affirmative action programs." Id. It is not clear, however, whether this
latter criticism does not, in fact, support the study's conclusion to the extent that, absent some
affirmative action programs, discrimination exists. In another passage, Epstein's criticism
seems less to deny discrimination than to defend it as rational:
The Institute also was unable to hold constant the relative cost to the firm of the
two applicants. The point manifests itself in two ways. First, ... an important
concern for a firm is how a given worker fits in. The ability to maintain cohesion
within the firm and with a customer base may depend in part on the race of an
employee. If these costs are higher in some settings for workers of one race than
another, then we should expect to see some difference in hiring patterns. The
differences need not all cut in the same direction, as is evident by the
preferences that some black testers received in the Institute's own study. To
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Outside of the employment relationship, Ian Ayres has also
conducted a variety of empirical studies showing discrimination by
retailers against consumers in automobile purchasing and other
consumer contexts.257 Further, the extensive sociological research
reported by such commentators as Krieger and Green, 258 despite
being largely conducted in the laboratory and dedicated to showing
cognitive tendencies that tend to undervalue the qualifications
and contributions of minorities and women, is certainly strongly
suggestive that discrimination occurs in real world settings.259
hold, as the Institute does, that the reasons for the discrimination are wholly
irrelevant is to say that some costs are irrelevant as well.
Id.; see also Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory,
112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1791 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICIAL
RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002)) (noting that "Epstein need not worry"
because employers favor homogeneity of their workforces, at least in positions where
teamwork is critical). According to Carbado and Gulati, "[iln order to increase efficiency,
employers have incentives to screen prospective employees for homogeneity, and, in order to
counter racial stereotypes, nonwhite employees have incentives to demonstrate a willingness
and capacity to assimilate." Id. at 1762. Employers may, then, not discriminate on the basis
of skin color per se, but on the basis of characteristics related to race and culture. See id. at
1171-72.
Finally, Epstein suggests that any discrimination against African Americans may, in fact,
be due to Title VII:
If [employers] perceived that it would be more difficult to fire blacks once hired,
then the cost of taking a black worker would be higher than that of taking a
white worker. Again, that difference in cost could easily be translated into a
lower level of offers for black workers.
EPSTEIN, supra, at 58.
257. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001); Ian Ayres, Is Discrimination Elusive? Pervasive Prejudice?
Unconventional Evidence of Race and Gender Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2419 (2003).
The article was in a symposium, focusing on Ayres' work as well as on CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 256, which generated a lively
debate about the significance of such studies and possible legal solutions for the problem. The
symposium also included: Mary Ann Case, Developing a Taste for Not Being Discriminated
Against, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2273 (2003); Clark Freshman, Prevention Perspectives on "Different"
Kinds of Discrimination: From Attacking Different "Isms" to Promoting Acceptance in Critical
Race Theory, Law and Economics, and Empirical Research, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2293 (2003);
Rachel Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365 (2003). See also
Ian Ayres, Alternative Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination Analysis in Other Market Settings,
31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67 (1994); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in
Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991); Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of
Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109
(1995).
258. See Green, supra note 238; Krieger supra note 237.
259. Michael Selmi writes of these and other studies:
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Finally, Professors Alfred Blumrosen and Ruth Blumrosen have
undertaken a major statistical study of the data that employers with
more than fifty employees are required to submit annually to the
EEOC on the EEO-1 Form.2" Looking at the data from 1975
through 1999, the authors found that, although minorities and
women have made significant gains in employment since 1975,261
there was substantial recent statistical evidence of discrimination
by those employers who filed data. For 1999, the study analyzed
160,297 reports filed by establishments with fifty or more employees
operating in the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as defined
by the Census Bureau. Viewing each MSA as a labor market, the
study found considerable discrimination:
For 1999, 75,793 establishments discriminated against
Minorities in at least one occupational category. This discrimina-
tion affected 1,361,083 Minorities who were qualified and
available to work in the labor markets, industries and occupa-
tions of those who discriminated. These Minorities were 57%
Black, 27% Hispanic, 9% Asian and 2% Native American....
A "hard core" of 22,269 establishments appear to have
discriminated over a nine-year period against Minorities .... This
[Alt the very least, they demonstrate the extent to which the persistence of
discrimination in our society remains a contested issue. Those who would
dismantle the traditional structures for drawing inferences of discrimination
from circumstantial evidence ought to bear the burden of establishing that such
evidence no longer supports findings of discrimination. That burden has yet to
be satisfied.
Selmi, supra note 232, at 341-42.
260. Alfred W. Blumrosen & Ruth G. Blumrosen, The Reality of Intentional Discrimination
in Metropolitan America-1999 (2002), at http://www.eeOl.com/1999_NR/1999_nr.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Intentional Discrimination in Metropolitan America]; see
also Alfred W. Blumrosen & Ruth G. Blumrosen, Intentional Job Discrimination-New Tools
for Our Oldest Problem, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681 (2004).
261. The work force as a whole grew during this period, but "minorities increased their
proportion of the EEO-1 Labor Force between 1975 and 1999 by more than 4.6 million
workers.... The net inflow of minorities in the EEO-1 Labor Force was an additional seven
million workers, nearly doubling the minority labor force of 1975." Blumrosen & Blumrosen,
Intentional Discrimination in Metropolitan America, supra note 260, at 26. Women also
increased "by nearly 3.8 million workers. The net inflow of women was an additional 9 million
women, more than doubling the female labor force of 1975." Id. "More important, all groups
increased their share of 'better jobs' as officials, managers, professionals, technical and sales
workers." Id. at xvi.
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"hard core" is responsible for roughly half of the intentional
discrimination we have identified. 62
The authors concede that the use of MSAs as a parameter poses
problems because some MSAs are huge and heterogeneous while
some establishments with as few as fifty employees have much
smaller employee recruitment areas.263
In sum, there is strong empirical support for believing discrimina-
tion against racial minorities and women is a relatively common
occurrence. This suggests that the basic assumption is not irrational
in traditional discrimination cases."' By necessary implication, it
also suggests that some version of the background circumstances
test is justifiable from a factual perspective. After all, if, as the
studies show, whites tend to devalue the credentials and perfor-
mance of African Americans and other racial minorities, the
necessary result is to favor majority applicants and workers. It
would, in fact, be the "unusual employer" who is free from this
tendency and discriminates against whites or males.
That, however, does not end the matter. Two questions remain.
First, regardless of its rationality, is a different standard for reverse
discrimination as opposed to traditional discrimination constitution-
ally permissible? This question is taken up in Part IV. Second, with
all the pieces in place, what should the proper rule be?
262. Id. at 74. Similar results were found for women, as 29% of establishments
discriminated against women in at least one occupational category. "Hard core" discriminators
were defined as those "so far below average in an occupation that there is only one in one
hundred chances that the result occurred by accident (2.5 standard deviations) in 1999 and
in either 1998 or 1997, and in at least one year between 1991 and 1996, and was not above
average between 1991 to 1999." Id. at 95.
The study compared only establishments employing at least 50 workers and also required
an establishment to have at least 20 employees in the occupational category assessed. It
further required (1) "two other establishments with at least 20 employees in that occupation;"
(2) "at least 120 employees in the occupation in the MSA;" and (3) "no establishment have
more than 80% of the employees." Id. at 30. These limitations were designed to ensure a labor
market for such workers in the MSA, "and that no single establishment dominated the
market." Id. These exclusions resulted in the study covering many fewer than half of all
employees. See id. at 29.
263. See id. at 36.
264. The discrimination in these studies may be conscious or the result of the kind of
cognitive processing described by Professors Krieger and Green. Assuming that either kind
of discrimination constitutes a violation of Title VII, the data support the basic assumption.
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IV. Is "BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES" CONSTITUTIONAL?
The subtext of the "heightened pleading" notion is that it is
unconstitutional to apply different proof requirements for claims by
whites, as opposed to those by African Americans and other racial
minorities.2" I previously dealt with a similar argument in connec-
tion with whether it would be constitutional to limit Title VII's
disparate impact theory to African American and other racial
minorities (and women) or whether the Constitution commands that
theory also be available to white males.266 In that piece, I recom-
mended the counter-intuitive expedient of extending disparate
impact to whites as a means of avoiding the question. Although the
constitutional analysis will not be repeated in detail here, the
earlier piece recounted the Supreme Court's unified theory for race-
based government actions announced in Adarand Constructors v.
Pena."7 Building on Richmond v. J.A. Croson,26 which had applied
strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause to a city's affirmative action program, the Adarand Court
held that all racial classifications by any government-state, local
or federal-are to be strictly scrutinized. Announcing principles
of "skepticism" (of the justifications for any racial classification,
thus triggering strict scrutiny), "consistency" (the same standard of
265. See, e.g., Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994)
("We have serious misgivings about the soundness of a test which imposes a more onerous
standard for plaintiffs who are white or male than for their non-white or female
counterparts."). Whether it is fair to describe the phenomenon as involving different
requirements of proof for different races is addressed in note 277 and its accompanying text,
infra.
266. See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1544-55. The prior article focused mainly on disparate
impact as applied to race, as does this piece. Although the scrutiny applied to gender
classifications has become increasingly strict, racial classifications still entail the most
exacting review. The standard for sex-based classifications is that they must serve "important
governmental objectives," and the means employed must be "substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996).
Affirmative action in favor of women would thus seem to be easier to justify constitutionally
than affirmative action based on race. In his dissent in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995), Justice Stevens pointed this out in criticizing the majority's decision to
require strict scrutiny for race-based affirmative action plans. See id. at 247. At least one
circuit has applied strict scrutiny to race-based plans, while applying intermediate scrutiny
to sex-based affirmative action. See Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 150 F.3d 438
(5th Cir. 1998).
267. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
268. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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review applies to classifications burdening any race), and "congru-
ence" (the analysis is the same whether the governmental actor is
state or federal), the Court swept all racial classifications into the
same probing analytical framework.269
After Adarand, such classifications are constitutional only if they
are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmen-
tal interests. Applying this approach to disparate impact limited to
African Americans and other racial minorities, strict scrutiny seems
unavoidable for reasons developed in the earlier article.27 ° As
applied to the area of present concern-individual disparate
treatment-Santa Fe's reading of Title VII to bar race discrimina-
tion, not merely discrimination against African American and other
racial minorities, goes far toward immunizing the statute from
equal protection attack." 1 However, the issue is not entirely free
from doubt because a facially neutral statute-like Title VII, as read
by Santa Fe-may nevertheless violate equal protection if the
underlying intent is to target a particular race.272 The argument
would be that Title VII, although framed in neutral terms as a
prohibition of all race discrimination, was motivated by an intent to
assist African Americans (and perhaps other racial minorities), and
passing a law intended primarily to benefit a particular race is itself
suspect, even if the law is available to all races.
269. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-24. The Court invoked the language of Croson:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are
"benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the
purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of
a highly suspect tool.
Id. at 226 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)).
270. Professor Primus advanced elegant arguments as to why so limiting disparate impact
need not be deemed racial classifications. See Primus, supra note 1, at 503-16. Yet, they are
ultimately unpersuasive. See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1547-50.
271. Given the status of affirmative action at the time Santa Fe was decided, it is unlikely
that constitutional concerns were a primary motivation for the Court. At that point, the only
Supreme Court affirmative action decision, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), had
found a challenge to a law school's admissions program to be moot. Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), would not be decided for two more years.
272. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (invalidating city boundary drawn
to exclude black voters); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885) (holding that facially
neutral ordinance administered to exclude Chinese from laundry business violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
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This argument is suggestive of the debate concerning such
measures as the Texas 10% Plan for admission into state universi-
ties.273 From this viewpoint, the motivation for the Texas plan is to
assist African Americans and Chicanos, among other racial
minorities, although the plan is on its face racially neutral. In the
debates leading up to Gratz and Grutter, it was often assumed that
the Texas approach would be permissible, suggesting at least this
much of a different analysis of benign and invidious racial discrimi-
nation (despite Adarand's requirement of congruence).27 4 In Grutter
itself, Justice O'Connor cast mild doubt on such a view.275
273. See generally Michelle Adams, Isn't It Ironic? The Central Paradox at the Heart of
"Percentage Plans," 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729 (2001). Professor Adams noted:
When the state institutes a mechanism that attempts to create racial diversity
in public higher education out of racial segregation in secondary education, it is
fallacious to perceive that mechanism as just another affirmative action plan.
Instead, it is more accurate to describe percentage plans as a reflection of
current day educational apartheid.
Id. at 1733-34; see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State
Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLORL. REV. 289,293 (2001) (arguing that there
is "a strong argument that this new admissions scheme should be subjected to strict scrutiny,
that it fails strict scrutiny, and that it is therefore unconstitutional"); Kim Forde-Mazrui, The
Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2335-36
(2000) ("[U]nder the Court's decision to subject benign racial classifications to strict scrutiny,
combined with the principle that legislative motivation is what counts for equal protection
purposes regardless of a law's explicit terms, race-neutral affirmative action may be just as
constitutionally vulnerable as race-operative programs.").
At one point in his disparate impact discussion, Primus acknowledges that a statute with
a purpose to "break down inherited racial hierarchies and to integrate the workplace is at
greater risk of being found to have an unconstitutional motive." Primus supra note 1, at 536.
Therefore, he considers whether a facially neutral law whose motivation is "at least in part
to improve the position of traditional victim groups" is subject to strict scrutiny, and concludes
not necessarily. See id. at 539. In doing so, he relies on suggestions in affirmative action cases
endorsing "race-neutral means ... improve the position of minorities," id., at least if race is not
the "predominant motivea." Id. at 545. Yet, Primus himself views it as "disingenuous to say
that Title VII is motivated partly by racial concerns and partly by economic efficiency
concerns," because economic efficiency is merely a limit on the racial integration purposes of
the statute. Id. at 550.
274. See Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding selective use
of test segments in order to increase African American success rate); Byers v. Albuquerque,
150 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding facially neutral promotion cut off score on a test
aimed to increase minority and female representation).
275. In a passage considering the argument that such plans were preferable alternatives
to the Michigan Law School's admissions policy, Justice O'Connor wrote:
The United States advocates "percentage plans," recently adopted by public
undergraduate institutions in Texas, Florida, and California to guarantee
admission to all students above a certain class-rank threshold in every high
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Yet, even were Title VII to be subject to strict scrutiny under this
analysis, the Court would recognize a compelling governmental
interest in eliminating racial discrimination. Indeed, in a passage
that could have been penned in connection with Title VII, Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court in Adarand, stressed that:
The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this
country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not
disqualified from acting in response to it.... When race-based
action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action
is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the "narrow
tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous cases.276
The color blindness of Title VII would seem to satisfy any concerns
about the narrowly tailored nature of the prohibition.
In any event, even if Title VII's neutral prohibition of race
discrimination is not constitutionally suspect, the present area of
concern-different proof requirements for black and white plaintiffs
-may be more problematic under the Equal Protection Clause.277
school in the State. The United States does not, however, explain how such plans
could work for graduate and professional schools. Moreover, even assuming such
plans are race-neutral, they may preclude the university from conducting the
individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is not just
racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the university. We
are satisfied that the Law School adequately considered race-neutral
alternatives currently capable of producing a critical mass without forcing the
Law School to abandon the academic selectivity that is the cornerstone of its
educational mission.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 529 U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (emphasis added and citation omitted).
276. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
277. Although it will not be further explored in the text, the background circumstances test
might be analyzed under the emerging expressive theory of the Equal Protection Clause.
Recent scholarly efforts have sought to refocus the Equal Protection Clause on the
"expressive" nature of the challenged action. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H.
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000);
Rachel D. Godsil, Expressivism, Empathy & Equality, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 247 (2003);
Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Cass R.
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,820-24 (1994). But
see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1363 (2000); Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic "Expression," and the
Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1577 (2000). These two articles argue that these are not true "expressive" theories of law
in the sense of linguistic impact, although.they may be expressive theories in other senses of
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The criticism of the background circumstances requirement reflects
the view that it constitutes the kind of racial classification that
would be suspect in almost any other setting. Yet, even assuming
strict scrutiny, such exacting review is not necessarily fatal to a
classification. Read to require background circumstances for whites
only, the statute would still be constitutional were it to be justified
by a compelling state interest.
With respect to whether the background circumstances require-
ment is subject to strict scrutiny, the classification in question is
admittedly an odd one-a judicially imposed rule of proof rather
than a legislative or executive decision. There seems no apparent
reason, however, to exempt judge-made law from constitutional
analysis," 8 and the Court has held judge-made legal doctrines to be
subject to Equal Protection Clause analysis. Palmore v. Sidoti. 9
struck down a judicial decision that the "best interest of the child"
standard precluded awarding custody to a father because the
mother had entered an interracial marriage. The Court wrote:
The [trial] court correctly stated that the child's welfare was
the controlling factor. But that court was entirely candid and
made no effort to place its holding on any ground other than
race. Taking the court's findings and rationale at face value, it
is clear that the outcome would have been different had peti-
tioner married a Caucasian male of similar respectability.
A core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away
with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race.2"
term. For a discussion of expressivism, see Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1549-50 (suggesting that
expressivism has substantial merits but has yet to be adopted by the courts).
278. The Supreme Court most famously subjected judicial doctrine to constitutional
constraints in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (applying the First
Amendment to restrict common law defamation doctrine); see also John V. Jacobi, Fakers,
Nuts, and Federalism: Common Law in the Shadow of the ADA, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95
(1999) (arguing that state common law doctrine can violate the Americans with Disabilities
Act).
279. 466 U.S. 429 (1984); see also Timothy P. Glynn, Note, The Role of Race in Adoption
Proceedings: A Constitutional Critique of the Minnesota Preference Statute, 77 MINN. L. REV.
925, 930, 942-45 (1993) (arguing that state law mandating "due consideration of the child's
race or ethnic heritage in adoption placements" is not invalid on its face but may be invalid
as applied) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 259.28 subd. 2 (1992) (current version at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 259.57 subd. 2(c) (2003))).
280. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432 (footnote omitted). In an accompanying footnote, the Court
noted "[tihe actions of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacity have long been
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Although Palmore may be distinguishable from the present
problem, the situations are not entirely distinct.28 l
Palmore aside, the background circumstances rule certainly has the
earmarks of a racial classification-a white plaintiff must use different
evidence to prove the same wrong as an African American plaintiff. It is
true that the ultimate question for both is the same-is the challenged
employment decision discriminatory? The reality remains, however, that
white and black plaintiffs are treated differently. Recall the elements of the
prima facie case as stated by McDonnell Douglas:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.282
Under any version of the background circumstances approach, the
African American plaintiff (or other "racial minority") proves a
prima facie case by these four elements, which include simply
proving his racial identity. A white plaintiff, however, cannot get to
the jury by the identical proof-including her racial identity.
Rather, she must prove background circumstances. The point
becomes transparent by a thought experiment of three candidates
held to be state action governed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 432 n.1.
281. See also Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (striking down "tender years
presumption" that custody of young children should be awarded to the mother as
unconstitutional sex discrimination). Other courts have avoided constitutional challenges to
common law doctrines, such as the rule that a wife takes her husband's domicile, by finding
the common law to have changed. See, e.g., Kerr v. Kerr, 371 S.E.2d 30 (Va. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that "the outmoded expectation that a wife is expected to follow her husband's change
of abode is no longer applicable" when assessing a claim for desertion); cf. Geesbreght v.
Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. App. 1978) (invalidating rule that wife acquired her
husband's domicile under state's equal rights amendment); Craig v. Craig, 365 So. 2d 1298
(La. 1978) (invalidating state statute according husband the right to determine marital
residence).
282. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). There is continued
adherence to the first prong, even after Santa Fe made the notion of a "protected class"
somewhat inapt. For example, the Court in Hicks wrote of plaintiff establishing a prima facie
case: 'Melvin Hicks met this initial burden by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
he was black and therefore a member of a protected class." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 527 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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for a single position, an African American, an Asian, and a white. If
all three are turned down and each proved his or her racial identity,
the existence of the job opening, and that "after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications,"" 3 the two
members of racial minorities would have a prima facie case and the
white would not.
As this example demonstrates, not merely as a matter of formal
logic, but also in terms of outcomes, different requirements can
produce different results. Of course, this example also demonstrates
the artificiality of the prima facie case: although the employer might
be compelled by the prima facie case of the two minorities to put in
evidence a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, proof that a
white was also passed over would be evidence-perhaps very strong
evidence on a motion for summary judgment or judgment as a
matter of law-that its decision was not discriminatory. Perhaps
even more pointed, it is hard to imagine a structured method of
approaching claims of discrimination that does not embrace some
kind of racial classification. In that sense, of course, some version of
McDonnell Douglas seems unavoidable if courts employ structured
proof to begin with.2" Traditional analysis would, however, view
this kind of argument through the compelling interest lens, not as
a rebuttal to the existence of a racial classification in the first
instance.
In connection with the disparate impact question, Professor
Primus raised elegant arguments as to why limiting disparate
impact to racial minorities need not be viewed as a racial classifica-
tion.285 For example, he contends that courts have not always
treated government actions that seem analytically to be racial
283. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
284. It is, of course, not necessary that they do so. The thrust of Professor Malamud's
article is that McDonnell Douglas should be abandoned, which would also eliminate the
problem of different requirements in reverse discrimination cases. See infra notes 372-83 and
accompanying text.
285. See Primus, supra note 1.
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classifications as such.2"' This is certainly true,287 and in many areas
of the law a preliminary "characterization ' may alter the analysis
substantially. For example, characterizing something as "speech"
rather than "conduct" will lead to very different results in most
cases.28 In the antitrust context, "price fixing" is per se illegal, but
not all conduct with the purpose or effect of setting prices is so
characterized.2 89
Professor Primus details a few cases in which indisputably racial
classifications were not so characterized.2" He might have adduced
cases in the present context where courts have rejected claims that
the background circumstances test is discriminatory, albeit with
little analysis. For example, one court, although liberalizing the
background circumstances test, asserted that "[t]his requirement is
not designed to disadvantage the white plaintiff, who is entitled to
the same Title VII protection as a minority plaintiff."'291 Courts thus
have rejected attacks on the test without acknowledging they are
drawing a racial line, and, to that extent, support Primus. The
increasing attacks on the background circumstances test in the
286. As Professor Primus notes, "[riather than functioning as a formal means of
determining what level of scrutiny should apply, the inquiry into the existence of a racial
classification can be directed by normative judgments ... such that the classification question
does little independent work." Id. at 514.
287. See, e.g., Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial
Profiling in Medicine, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391 (2004) (discussing uses of race in
medicine that are not treated as racial classifications).
288. See generally Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Applying Penalty Enhancements to Civil
Disobedience: Clarifying the Free Speech Clause Model to Bring the Social Value of Political
Protest into the Balance, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 185 (1998) (discussing the difference between
expressive and nonexpressive civil disobedience lawbreaking).
289. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
290. His primary example is Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000), where
police used a list of African Americans at the local university to question individuals about
a crime committed by a black man. The court held this not to be a racial classification within
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 338-39. See generally R. RICHARD
BANKS, THE STORY OF BROWN V. CITY OF ONEONTA: THE UNCERTAIN MEANING OF RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY POLICING UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE (Stanford Pub. L. Working
Paper No. 81, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafrabstractid = 49084 2 (last
visited Aug. 30, 2004).
291. Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1993). But see Pierce v. Commonwealth
Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994) (requiring plaintiff to show "background
circumstances" but stating that the court had "serious misgivings about the soundness of a
test which imposes a more onerous standard for plaintiffs who are white or male than for
their non-white or female counterparts").
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district courts, however, suggest that this position will be increas-
ingly hard to maintain.
Rather, the courts applying some background circumstances test
will, as they already have, justify the test as reflecting real differ-
ences between the races, that is, as a general matter, discrimination
is more common against racial minorities than against whites. As
we have seen, such a position is well-supported by the literature.292
Further, the passage of Title VII by Congress in 1964 implies a
congressional determination to that effect,293 although the Court has
not been very deferential to congressional findings of discrimination
in recent years.294 Yet, not all realities justify racial classifications,
292. See supra Part III.C.
293. The confused, even chaotic, legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), left the
statute without the kind of preamble or statement of purposes that is common in more recent
antidiscrimination laws. Further, there is no committee report on the bill as amended.
Nevertheless, during the extended debates, including a famous filibuster in the Senate, a
serious problem of discrimination in employment against African Americans was documented
by the supporters. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive
Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its
Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003) (advocating a new approach to the use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation by looking at the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to identify how courts tend to resort to statements of the more extreme sides of any
debate).
294. The major fault line in this area arose in the context of state Eleventh Amendment
challenges to federal statutes that were defended as within Congress's power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate that immunity. Although the Court has occasionally
recognized the validity of such abrogation, see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721 (2003) (upholding the Family & Medical Leave Act), and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976) (upholding Title VII), it has tended to reject federal legislation permitting private
suits against the states as beyond the power of Congress under § 5. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating the ADA's authorization of private
suits against the state); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (same as to ADEA).
A major issue in these cases is the extent to which the Court should defer to Congress on
statutes intended to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
There is no comparable question of deference with respect to Title VII as applied to
employers other than states. As originally enacted, Title VII reached only private employment
and was predicated on the commerce power, not § 5. Although it arguably could have been
justified under § 5, procedural obstacles led its sponsors to ground it on the Commerce Clause.
See Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 293, at 1469 ("To anchor the bill in Section 5, however,
would mean that, as a matter of congressional practice, the bill would be referred to that civil
rights graveyard, the Judiciary Committee. To circumvent this problem, the administration
described the bill as grounded in Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce."). The
result, however, is that no special deference under § 5 is due to congressional judgment. Title
VII was amended in 1972 to bring the public sector within it, and this amendment is the basis
for the Supreme Court's decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer that state Eleventh Amendment
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and, in any event, this line of argument sounds more like a justifica-
tion of the racial character of the classification than a denial that it
constitutes one.
Another argument is more elaborate.295 It would claim that the
proof structure is really a cross-racial one, not one that favors either
blacks or whites. That is, members of both races have a relatively
easy prima facie case when they are suing cross-race employers.
Because in most cases it is African Americans or other racial
minorities suing white-dominated employers, McDonnell Douglas
controls most suits. In cases where whites sue black employers, the
same proof structure would apply. Only when blacks or whites sue
same-race defendants is a more onerous burden imposed because we
do not expect intra-racial discrimination to be as common as cross-
racial discrimination.296
The conceptual objection, then, is that proof structures differ not
because of the race of the plaintiff per se but rather on the respec-
tive racial identities of plaintiff and defendant.2 9v Although it seems
sensible to believe that racial discrimination does not often occur
within races,298 thus making such a distinction rational, it remains
immunity is abrogated. See 427 U.S. at 448-49.
295. I owe this ingenuous argument to Professor Thomas Healey and Dean Rebecca
Hanner White.
296. There is some basis in the cases for such a view. See supra note 120 and accompanying
text.
297. A second-order problem is defining when an employer counts as dominated by a
particular race. As we have seen, for example, the mere fact that the decision maker is black
does not seem to constitute a background circumstance. See supra text accompanying note
154.
298. Cf. Jones, supra note 13. Professor Jones documents discrimination in favor of lighter-
skinned African Americans as compared to darker-skinned members of that race both by
whites and by other African Americans. See id. at 1527-28; see also Falero Santiago v. Stryker
Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D. P.R. 1998). The Falero Santiago court stated:
Falero describes himself as a darker-skinned, or mulatto, Puerto Rican....
Cabrera's skin color, on the other hand, is admittedly white.... The fact that
Cabrera skin is of a different color places him outside Falero's protected class,
and is enough to satisfy the fourth element of plaintiffs prima facie case.
Regardless of his "Puerto Ricanness," plaintiff has made out a prima facie case
of discrimination on the basis of color.
Id. at 96; see also Walker v. Internal Revenue Serv., 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
(concerning darker-skinned supervisor alleged to have discriminated against lighter-skinned
worker). The existence of this phenomenon, however, does not prove its pervasiveness.
As Falero Santiago indicates, racial discrimination can also occur where ethnic or racial
groups other than African Americans and whites are concerned. See generally Leonard M.
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problematic to have legal rights turn on race. The obvious parallel
is Loving v. Virginia,299 where the Court rejected the argument
that a ban on miscegenation was not subject to equal protection
challenge because both "white persons" and "colored persons" were
barred from marrying members of the other race. °° Of course,
Loving, too, is distinguishable. Although both races were treated
equally as a formal matter (neither being allowed to intermarry
with the other), the Court's basic objection was the ugly motives
that prompted the law and the expressive consequences of it: the
ban on miscegenation sent the social message that blacks were
inferior. The white race was being preserved from racial contamina-
tion by mixture with inferior stock.301 No such inference can be
drawn from a rule that would view race discrimination as more
likely in cross-race settings than in intra-race settings.
In any event, assuming that the background circumstances test
is subject to strict scrutiny, some racial classifications have been
upheld. As the quotation from Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court in Adarand indicates, when "race-based action is necessary
to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional
constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test this Court has
set out in previous cases." ' 2
As to what governmental interests are compelling, Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education°3 unanimously held that race-conscious
Baynes, If It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a Longer
Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation andAnalysis of the Color Hierarchy,
75 DENV. U.L. REV. 131, 132 (1997). Professor Baynes
defines racism by a Dark-Light Paradigm replacing the older Black-White
Paradigm. The Dark-Light Paradigm is still binary, but it is more expansive
than the older Black-White Paradigm because it transcends race and ethnicity
to include all those members of American society who have very dark skin in the
dark category. The dark category would include many Black Americans and
some dark-skinned Latinos.
Id. at 132.
299. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
300. "There can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon
distinctions drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if
engaged in by members of different races." Id. at 11.
301. "The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons
demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures
designed to maintain White Supremacy." Id.
302. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
303. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
2004] 1109
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
decision making used to provide a remedy for the victims of proven
discrimination was a sufficiently important governmental interest
to withstand constitutional attack. °4 In separate concurrences in
Adarand, Justices Scalia and Thomas both believed that this was
the limit of compelling interests, stating that racial classifications
beyond those necessary to redress individuals who have been
wronged by unlawful racial discrimination are forbidden. 5
Although the Court has never subscribed to that view, a majority in
Wygant did hold that an interest in remedying the effects of societal
discrimination was not sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict
scrutiny. °
In short, the most obvious justifications (remediation of discrimi-
nation by the employer itself and remedying societal discrimination)
had been, respectively, approved and rejected when the Court last
year addressed another asserted compelling state interest for racial
classifications--diversity in higher education. The Supreme Court's
companion five to four decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger 7 and Gratz
v. Bollinger311 confirmed Justice O'Connor's prediction in Adarand
that scrutiny could be strict without being fatal, which was not
surprising, given that she was the key vote for upholding the
Grutter affirmative action admission program.
Justice O'Connor, speaking for the Court in Grutter, which
involved the University of Michigan Law School, said, "[t]oday, we
hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body."' 9 Surprisingly, the Court seemed unanimous
on this point. In Gratz, which involved the University of Michigan's
undergraduate school, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited plaintiffs
304. See id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The
Court is in agreement that ... remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state actor
is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed
affirmative action program.").
305. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
306. See id. at 276 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., and
O'Connor, J.) ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing
a racially classified remedy."); id. at 295 (White, J., concurring in judgment) ("None of the
interests asserted by the Board, singly or together, justify this racially discriminatory layoff
policy and save it from the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause.").
307. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
308. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
309. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
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argument that diversity was not a compelling governmental interest
but said, "for the reasons set forth today in Grutter ... the Court has
rejected these arguments of petitioners.""31 Because none of the
dissenting justices in Grutter and none in the majority in Gratz
contested that holding, there is an odd unanimity on the Court that
diversity is a compelling interest for an academic institution.311
There is even strong support in Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Grutter for diversity beyond higher education because she cited
favorably certain amici briefs. With respect to large corporations,
"[t]hese benefits [of diversity] are not theoretical but real, as major
American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in
today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed
through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints. 3 2 She also referred to the brief of military leaders
310. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268 (citation omitted).
311. The lower courts have occasionally recognized other interests as compelling. For
example, Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996), permitted a prison to prefer black
correctional officers for lieutenant positions, id. at 921, explaining, "[t]he black lieutenant is
needed because the black inmates are believed unlikely to play the correctional game of brutal
drill sergeant and brutalized recruit unless there are some blacks in authority in the camp."
Id. at 920. See also Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that
police department "had a compelling interest in a diverse population at the rank of sergeant
in order to set the proper tone in the department and to earn the trust of the community,
which in turn increases police effectiveness in protecting the city"). But see Patrolmen's
Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2002), where the court stated:
The mere assertion of an "operational need" to make race-conscious employment
decisions does not, however, give a police department carte blanche to dole out
work assignments based on race if no such justification is established.... [S]trict
scrutiny by this Court requires more than the assumption that a racial
classification is an appropriate response to a state interest.
Id. at 52-53. Despite Grutter, Croson, and such cases as Wittmer, affirmative action can be
constitutionally justified only in rare cases, and, as the split between Grutter and Gratz
indicates, even agreement on a compelling interest leaves a serious question as to how
narrowly tailored the preferences must be to satisfy strict scrutiny. See generally Ian Ayres,
Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781 (1996) (considering what types of affirmative action
programs would meet strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring requirement).
312. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. One brief was filed on behalf of sixty-five major corporations.
See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of Respondents, Gratz
(No. 02-516), and Grutter (No. 02-241). The brief described the amici as
global businesses that recruit at the University of Michigan or similar leading
institutions of higher education. Collectively, amici have annual revenues well
over a trillion dollars and hire thousands of graduates of the University of
Michigan and other major public universities. Amici have a vital interest in who
is admitted to our nation's colleges and universities, and what kind of education
and training those students receive.
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stressing the need to have "a highly qualified, racially diverse officer
corps." '313 This would seem to reinforce the acceptability of affirma-
tive action under Title VII and add a possible justification for
affirmative action plans under that statute.314
How this principle bears on the question with which we are
concerned is not clear. One could, in a very broad sense, justify
requiring background circumstances for white plaintiffs as a means
of acknowledging an interest in diversity. Aligning the question
more closely with Grutter and Gratz, restricting disparate treatment
claims by whites would tend to increase diversity because minorities
would be more likely to be successful and, therefore, tend to
diversify the employers in question. This seems a stretch in the
abstract, however, and the sweep of Title VII far beyond the
educational context would require straining the Court's decision to
its utmost limits.
A more straightforward argument would be the necessity of
eliminating intentional racial discrimination. Although eliminating
racial discrimination by private actors may not be required by
the Constitution, there is no doubt that such an interest is suffi-
ciently compelling to justify congressional action.315 The cases are
replete with the need to eradicate racial and other prohibited
Id. Other corporations, such as General Motors, filed their own amicus briefs. See, e.g., Brief
of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241).
313. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331. A brief was submitted on behalf of twenty-nine "former high-
ranking officers and civilian leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps,
including former military-academy superintendents, Secretaries of Defense, and present and
former members of the U.S. Senate." Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241). Of course, private
corporations are not subject to the Equal Protection Clause, although the military would be
subject to it in theory, given Adarands insistence on a unitary approach. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Justice O'Connor's reference to "major
American businesses," however, surely suggests that the Weber and Johnson holdings-that
Title VII does not invalidate private affirmative action plans are still viable. See supra text
accompanying note 312.
314. Taxman's grudging approach to statutory affirmative action is at least thrown into
question, perhaps not merely because that case arose in the education context. See supra note
86.
315. In the Eleventh Amendment context, the Court has held that Title VII is a permissible
abrogation of state immunity to private suit. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447-48
(1976); see also Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724-25, 730 (2003)
(upholding private suit against state under the Family and Medical Leave Act). Both cases
involved gender discrimination.
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discrimination,31 and few have questioned the validity of the
antidiscrimination project.31v
Assuming the interest is compelling, the narrow tailoring issue
remains problematic. In Gratz and Grutter, the division within the
Court was not over diversity as a compelling interest but whether
the programs at issue were sufficiently narrowly tailored in
achieving that diversity interest. In Grutter, the Court upheld the
law school admissions program as narrowly tailored to the
diversity objective;318 however, Gratz, dealing with undergraduate
admissions, struck down that program as not tailored narrowly
enough.319 The essential difference between the two programs was
that the law school assessed the complete admissions file of each
individual applicant, including membership in underrepresented
minority groups;320  the undergraduate program, in contrast,
essentially mechanically gave applicants who were members of
underrepresented minority groups 20 points toward the 100 needed
to earn acceptance, with other points earned for such factors as high
school average and standardized test scores.32 1 The individual
assessment that allowed the law school admissions committee to
look beyond the numbers3 22 was lacking in the undergraduate
admissions program.323
As applied to requiring a white plaintiff, but not a black one, to
show background circumstances, eliminating discrimination-in the
sense of intentional discrimination on account of race-is a compel-
ling interest. Current jurisprudence, however, would not support
316. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993) ("The prohibitions
against discrimination contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national
policy.") (quoting Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)); Franks
v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (stating that prevention and remedying of
racial discrimination and its effects is a national policy of the "highest priority" to Congress)
(quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45
("Mhe private litigant ... also vindicates the important congressional policy against
discriminatory employment practices.").
317. But see EPSTEIN, supra note 256, at 505 (concluding that modern civil rights laws are
"a dangerous form of government coercion").
318. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
319. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275.
320. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338-39.
321. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.
322. "[T]ruly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible,
nonmechanical way." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
323. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271.
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viewing as more compelling the elimination of discrimination
against one race rather than another, 2 4 although it might recognize
that discrimination against racial minorities is more common than
discrimination against whites. 5
Another potentially less restrictive alternative would be to permit
expert witness testimony to substitute for a formal, racially-framed
proof structure. The model for this may be the problem of cross-
racial eyewitness identification. Some courts have approved either
expert testimony or jury instructions about eyewitness testimony
being less reliable in the cross-race setting than within races.326
The real justification for being more restrictive with respect to the
standards for disparate impact claims by whites than for claims by
blacks is the confluence of two factors. The first is the perception
that, in reality, discrimination by whites against whites is rarer,
and therefore it is appropriate to require more proof that the
unusual has occurred. This is a straightforward justification that
essentially contends that the different proof structures are as
narrowly tailored as possible. This argument would stress that
background circumstances itself is a flexible test that tries to ensure
that discrimination against whites is actionable when it is suffi-
ciently plausible in the case at hand.
The second justification is another goal of, or at least limitation
on, the antidiscrimination laws-intruding as little as possible into
employer decision making in an essentially capitalist economy. The
present Court has attempted to free employers to pursue efficiency
as they see fit in a variety of ways. Perhaps most dramatically, in
the disparate impact context, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio32 v
324. In the prior exchange, both the present author and Professor Primus concurred that
the disparate impact doctrine could not survive strict scrutiny, were it to be triggered under
the pre-Grutter regime, although Primus was not so certain it would fall after that case. See
Primus, supra note 1, at 586; Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1554-55.
325. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
326. See, e.g., State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 458-59 (N.J. 1999) (requiring a jury
instruction about the lesser reliability of cross-racial identification in eye-witness testimony).
See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984) (analyzing the data on unreliable cross-racial identifications,
existing legal protections, and two possible ameliorative measures); John P. Rutledge, They
All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2001)
(discussing the causes of cross-racial identification inaccuracy and common ameliorative
measures).
327. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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watered down the requirement of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.32 that
a policy with an adverse impact on minorities be justified by
"business necessity."329 Wards Cove reformulated the inquiry away
from "necessity" by merely asking "whether a challenged practice
serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the
employer."33 The Court stressed "there is no requirement that the
challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's
business for it to pass muster: this degree of scrutiny would be
almost impossible for most employers to meet, and would result in
a host of evils," '331 including quotas for minorities.332 Although Wards
Cove was later overturned by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,"' 3 the
Court's effort to free employers from the strictures of disparate
impact was patent.
Even in the disparate treatment context, the Supreme Court's
decisions are replete with references to preserving employer
autonomy as a central goal of Title VII. For example, the plurality
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins stated: "Title VII eliminates certain
bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserv-
ing employers' freedom of choice." '34 Another opinion wrote more
broadly of the place of antidiscrimination laws in the national
employment policy: 'The ADEA, like Title VII, is not a general
regulation of the workplace but a law which prohibits discrimina-
tion. The statute does not constrain employers from exercising
significant other prerogatives and discretions in the course of the
hiring, promoting, and discharging of their employees. 33 5 Lower
courts have repeatedly sounded this theme.336 For example, literally
328. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
329. See id. at 431.
330. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
331. Id.
332. The Court's "host of evils" essentially referred to incentives for employers to adopt
quotas to avoid disparate impact. See id. (cross-referencing to other portion of the opinion).
333. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 §§ 2-3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 statutory notes (1994)).
334. 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989); see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 645 (1987)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing prior decisions that recognized a congressional intent to
preserve employers' discretion as much as possible); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 205-06 (1979) (referring to the legislative record of Title VII as supportive of
employers' freedom of choice).
335. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361 (1995).
336. See, e.g., Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir. 1995) (repeating the
111520041
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1031
hundreds of cases recite some version of the slogan that courts do
not sit as "super-personnel departments."'337 A second example is the
circuits that have approved a "do not second-guess the employer"
instruction338 to make clear to juries in disparate treatment cases
that the function of Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws is
not to review employer decision making, other than to police against
intentional discrimination. 339 Finally, it may be significant that
Justice O'Connor's decision in Grutter, albeit deciding a constitu-
tional question, was driven in large part by her perception of a need
to respond to efficiency concerns of the business and military
communities.340
As applied to the background circumstances requirement,
perhaps the major function of that test, insofar as it makes it more
difficult for white employees to make out a prima facie case, is to
permit courts to grant summary judgment for employers without
detailed analysis or criticism of the employers' supposed nondis-
criminatory reason.341 In theory, of course, the prima facie case
McKennon assertion that antidiscrimination laws do not restrict employers with respect to
important other prerogatives in personnel decisions); Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65
F.3d 1072, 1073 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1995) (remarking how equitable relief might be barred in a Title
VII wrongful discharge case if such relief would be "particularly invasive of ... traditional
management prerogatives" in light of later evidence that would have resulted in firing
anyway) (quoting Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1240, (3d Cir. 1994),
vacated by 514 U.S. 1034 (1995)).
337. E.g., Russell v. TG Mo. Corp., 340 F.3d 735, 746 (8th Cir. 2003) ("As we have said
many times, we do not sit as a 'super-personnel department' with the power to second-guess
employers' business decisions."). The Eighth Circuit was not alone. A Lexis search for "super-
personnel department" in the "Federal Court Case, Combined" database on January 26, 2004
resulted in 937 hits. As Derum & Engle state, this analysis is tautological, but it reveals a
judicial predisposition that manifests itself in a variety of ways. Derum & Engle, supra note
141, at 1238-39.
338. See, e.g., Dupre v. Fru-Con Eng'g, Inc., 112 F.3d 329, 335 n.5 (8th Cir. 1997)
(commenting that such an instruction is "an accurate statement of the law"); Faulkner v.
Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1426-27 (10th Cir. 1993) (approving instructions
designed to remind jurors not to substitute their judgment for that of the employer because
"[tihe ADEA is not a vehicle for reviewing the propriety of business decisions").
339. Derum & Engle argue that, although the rise of the personal animosity presumption
is a current manifestation of the phenomenon, "[t]he legislative history [of Title VII]
demonstrates that deference to employer prerogatives is not simply a renegade move by
judges. Nor is it necessarily illegitimate. Title VII itself is carved out of a balance that takes
employer interests into account." Derum & Engle, supra note 141, at 1211-12.
340. See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text. I owe this insight to Professor Michelle
Adams.
341. See, e.g., Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir. 1999) ("We also
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requirement spares employers the necessity of putting into evidence
a nondiscriminatory reason for their decisions,3 42 but as a practical
matter summary judgment motions are made after discovery,
during which the employer will have produced its reasons. Yet, to
the extent employment decisions are made with an eye on litigation
rules, the background circumstances requirement reinforces the at-
will rule by making it far less critical to have a defensible reason for
the contemplated action.343 Perhaps more important, by raising the
believe that if majority plaintiffs have to show less to prove their prima facie burden than
minorities ... employers lose the 'screening out benefits' that the prima facie test was intended
to provide.").
342. Although other minorities raise the numbers, and women may also use the McDonnell
Douglas standard prima facie case, there would still be considerable utility for employers if
the bar were set higher for white males than other groups. Census data suggests that white
males make up 43% of the workforce and 97% of the top positions in the American economy.
By contrast, blacks constitute only 10% of the workforce, and are concentrated in the least
desirable jobs. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 967 (1996).
343. Although the number of exceptions to the at-will rule has multiplied in the last forty
years, at-will still remains the default position for American employment. Obviously, to the
extent that employment discrimination laws--perhaps the primary but by no means the only
exception to the doctrine-are more readily available, the at-will rule will suffer. See generally
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984)
(discussing arguments for and against the contract at will and arguing that standards of
judicial soundness support the doctrine); Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of
Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631 (1988) (discussing substantial recent changes
in the law of employment termination and arguing that state courts should adopt a new
underlying theory for deciding these disputes); Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will
Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323
(1986) (examining the law of at-will employment and arguing for the creation of tenure rights
for employees in their job); Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy:
Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901 (1996) (arguing that the at-will
rule is preferable to legal attempts to control labor markets); Andrew P. Morriss, Developing
a Framework for Empirical Research on the Common Law: General Principles and Case
Studies of the Decline of Employment-At-Will, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 999 (1995) (using
principles for empirical research into the common law and applying these principles to assess
the modern law of wrongful discharge's impact on the employment-at-will doctrine); Andrew
P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of
Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679 (1994) (reexamining the historical origins of the
employment-at-will rule in order to identify and recover the benefits of the rule); J. Wilson
Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal to De-Marginalize
Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347 (1995) (articulating proposals for the expansion of tort
and contract principles as a way of dealing with the problems of employment-at-will);
Christopher L. Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at- Will
Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1583 (1994) (arguing that courts
should use the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine to remedy
inconsistencies in the protections for employees).
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barriers to potential reverse discrimination plaintiffs, it makes such
suits much less likely in the first instance.
These two reasons reinforce one another-employers are freed of
the constraints of defending most of their actions, while, if discrimi-
nation against whites is in fact as rare as the test envisions, few
true victims of reverse discrimination will be disadvantaged.
Further, to the extent that these justifications are accepted, it is
hard to see how the rule could be more narrowly tailored. Whether
these justifications, alone or in conjunction, will be found sufficient
is hard to predict, in part because of the deficiencies of the back-
ground circumstances rule and in part because of the question of
alternatives to it. These questions are taken up in the next section.
V. ELIMINATING FORMAL PROOF STRUCTURES FOR BOTH
TRADITIONAL AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CASES
There are two alternatives to background circumstances. One,
often attributed to the Eleventh Circuit, seems to eliminate any
difference between traditional and reverse discrimination plaintiffs
by requiring a white plaintiff merely to prove he is a member of a
class, which appears to require only that he establish his racial
identity, just as a "racial minority" must do under the McDonnell
Douglas formulation. It is very doubtful, however, that such a rule
actually applies even in the Eleventh Circuit.344 To the extent it
does, it slights both of the justifications for the background circum-
stances test in the first place-the relative infrequency of discrimi-
nation against whites and the desire to free employers from the
necessity of defending every decision.
The more attractive approach was taken by the Third Circuit
in ladimarco v. Runyon.345 Rejecting background circumstances
entirely, the court simply asks whether, in a reverse discrimination
case, the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence from which the
finder of fact may find discrimination.346 The attraction of this
approach is that it sidesteps the intractable problem of what
constitutes background circumstances34 and avoids the intellec-
344. See supra note 184.
345. 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999); see supra text accompanying note 155.
346. See ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 163.
347. See id. at 162-63 (describing background circumstances as "difficult, if not impossible"
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tually disingenuous approach of courts that have continued to use
the label while departing very far from what Judge Mikva had in
mind. ladimarco also permits, at least in the first instance, a court
to avoid the hard question of the role of an affirmative action plan
in making this determination. More generally, Iadimarco steps
away from the McDonnell Douglas approach of formal proof
structures, which is increasingly seen as a failed attempt to
formalize the process by which judges make decisions about the
sufficiency of the evidence. To the extent that recent developments
in the traditional discrimination area have threatened that proof
structure, the confusions in the reverse discrimination arena
reinforce its collapse.
Iadimarco solves the problem of reverse discrimination by
eliminating the source of the problem-the requirement of a formal
proof structure (that in turn required formal treatment of race)
instead of merely asking whether the evidence supported the
requisite finding. It is true that, from a judicial housekeeping
perspective, Iadimarco fails to provide the lower courts with any
real guidance on how to resolve these issues,34 but it is not appar-
ently worse at this task than the background circumstances test.
Indeed, the only issue that seems to require a law decision, rather
than fact analysis, is the role affirmative action plans will play in
any factual determination."' Further, the amorphousness of the test
provides as little guidance to employers, thus undercutting, at least
at the margin, the benefits of the at-will rule.
From another perspective, however, Iadimarco may have been
prescient in its approach to the question of discrimination. As the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa35°
suggests, even in traditional discrimination cases, a tilt away from
the McDonnell Douglas formal proof structure toward a more gestalt
analysis of whether there is a basis for the factfinder to find
discrimination351 is precisely the approach Iadimarco took. Although
to define); id. at 163-64 n.10 (describing the background circumstances test as "too vague and
too prone to misinterpretation and confusion to apply fairly and consistently").
348. Professor Lillquist suggests that the whole McDonnell Douglas experiment is proof
that such guidance is incredibly difficult to provide.
349. See infra text accompanying notes 211-12.
350. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
351. See id. at 101 (holding that "a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex,
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the lower courts are groping for this approach in the traditional
discrimination context,352 and while earlier Supreme Court decisions
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice" to get a mixed-motive
instruction under Title VII).
352. One example is the "same actor" question. Courts have declined to infer a
discriminatory intent when the person who hired a worker also discharged him within a
relatively short period of time. The rationale is that, had the employer held biased views, he
would not have hired the plaintiff in the first place. See, e.g., Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace &
Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1996) (sex discrimination); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc. 82
F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996); Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir.
1995) (race and national origin discrimination); Rand v. C.F. Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1147
(7th Cir. 1994); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174-75 (8th Cir. 1992); Proud
v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991) (disability discrimination); id. at 797 (citing John
J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1017 (1991)). Although originally described as a
"presumption," it is now recognized to be more appropriately viewed as a "permissible
inference" from the facts, together with whatever other facts might strengthen or weaken it.
See Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[Wle decline to
accord this 'same actor' factual circumstance a presumption that discrimination necessarily
was absent ... [but] these facts may give rise to a permissible inference that no discriminatory
animus motivated [the discharge.]"); Madel v. FCI Mktg., Inc., 116 F.3d 1247, 1253 (8th Cir.
1997) (implying that presumption is inappropriate where evidence of overt discrimination
exists); Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that the fact
that hirer and firer are the same and discharge occurred shortly after hiring is merely
evidence and should not be given any presumptive weight). See generally Anna Laurie Bryant
& Richard A. Bales, Using the Same Actor "Inference" in Employment Discrimination Cases,
1999 UTAH L. REV. 225 (analyzing and criticizing the law and policies of the same actor
inference); Julie S. Northrop, Comment, The "Same Actor Inference" in Employment
Discrimination: Cheap Justice?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 193 (1998) (examining the same actor
inference and urging restraint in its application). One decision, Johnson v. Zema Systems
Corp., 170 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1999), concluded that the inference was unlikely to make a
difference in many cases. Id. at 745.
Another example is the approach taken in the lower courts to the plaintiffs prima facie case
in the reductions in force (RIFs) context. Although these cases tend to be cast in terms of
adapting the McDonnell Douglas structure to the discharge setting, the courts may be groping
toward a "sufficient evidence" approach. Because RIFs involve discharges, the first step courts
had to take was to substitute plaintiffs proof that she was doing an apparently satisfactory
job for the McDonnell Douglas prong requiring plaintiffs to show they were "qualified." See,
e.g., Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 546 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that, as
part of her prima facie case, plaintiff must show that she was performing her job at a level
that met her employer's expectations); Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261-
62 (7th Cir. 1993) (deciding that, as a component of her prima facie case, plaintiff must
show that her performance on the job was adequate at the time of termination). Further,
in RIFs, a number of employees are terminated simultaneously; thus, the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for termination-the need to reduce expenses-is apparent on its
face. Because "positions" are being eliminated, the power of proof that the plaintiff is doing
an apparently satisfactory job diminishes. Courts, therefore, have tended to require a plaintiff
to produce "other evidence," such as identifying younger workers who were retained when she
was discharged. See, e.g., Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 455-56 (7th Cir. 1988). This looks
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take small steps in this direction,353 Desert Palace holds out the
promise of a more radical change.
To understand this, it is necessary to review briefly the history
of the individual disparate treatment proof. As we have seen,
McDonnell Douglas established a formal proof structure for
most individual disparate treatment cases. McDonnell Douglas
was predicated on the belief that employers would rarely admit
illegal conduct and that, therefore, intent to discriminate, which was
critical to this theory, had to be inferred from the circumstances of
the case. As Professor Zimmer has pointed out, McDonnell Douglas
is essentially a process of elimination: the plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case by showing that the most likely nondiscriminatory
reasons are not applicable and then, once the employer puts into
evidence other nondiscriminatory reasons, by proving them to be
pretextual, usually by showing that they are not true or, at least,
that such reasons were not applied to members of the allegedly
favored race.354 The notion that African Americans and other racial
minorities were likely to be the victims of discrimination provided
the rationale for inferring discrimination when legitimate reasons
were shown to be inapplicable.
After 1989, this analysis was supplemented by a second method
of proof in individual disparate treatment cases when the Court
decided Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,355 which created a separate
method of analyzing individual disparate treatment cases based on
so-called "direct" evidence of discrimination. In addition to the kinds
remarkably like moving toward a "sufficient evidence" approach in place of formal proof
structures. See Montana v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Rochester, 869 F.2d 100, 105 (2d
Cir. 1989).
353. Hicks permitted, indeed required, an ultimate finding on the question of
discrimination, although it did so at the end of the McDonnell Douglas proof structure not in
lieu of it. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). Reeves stressed that,
in deciding on a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, the district court should determine
whether a reasonable jury could find discrimination in light of all the evidence, with the
inferences drawn most favorably for the plaintiff. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). Like Hicks, however, Reeves hewed closely to the McDonnell
Douglas proof structure in analyzing that evidence. See id. at 142 ("This Court has not
squarely addressed whether the McDonnell Douglas framework, developed to assess claims
brought under ... Title VII ... also applies to ADEA actions. Because the parties do not dispute
the issue, we shall assume, arguendo, that the McDonnell Douglas framework is fully
applicable here.").
354. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 138, at 16-19.
355. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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of circumstantial evidence that had long been used in McDonnell
Douglas cases, the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse introduced written
evaluations and other statements in the partnership process
pointing to her gender as playing a role in the decision to deny her
partnership.356 The employer, however, denied basing the decision
on plaintiffs sex, instead insisting she had been denied partnership
based on a lack of interpersonal skills.357 The trial court credited
both Hopkins's and the firm's explanation for her partnership
denial; it found that the firm had relied upon both Hopkins's sex
and her interpersonal skills in denying her partnership. 58 The
Supreme Court viewed this as a "mixed motive" case, that is, one in
which both legitimate and discriminatory reasons were implicated
in the decision.359 Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of four,
said that plaintiff need only prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that her race, gender, or other protected characteristic was
a "motivating" factor in the challenged decision.' Upon that
showing, the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant to try to
avoid liability by proving, as an affirmative defense, that it would
have made the same decision absent the discrimination.36 In a
footnote, Justice Brennan suggested that this established an
alternative to the McDonnell Douglas approach to individual
disparate treatment cases.36 2
To form a majority of the Court, however, it is necessary to look
at the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor.36 3 Her approach
356. She was described by one partner as "macho," another said she "overcompensated for
being a woman," and "a third advised her to take 'a course at charm school." Id. at 235
(quoting defendant's exhibits presented at trial). Further, the partner who had been on the
committee making the decision and who was charged with telling her that her bid to be a
partner had been put on hold counseled her to "walk more femininely ... wear make-up, have
her hair styled, and wear jewelry." Id.
357. Id. at 234-35.
358. Id. at 236-37.
359. See id. at 252.
360. Id. at 258.
361. Id.
362. See id. at 247 n.12 ("Nothing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that a case
must be correctly labeled as either a 'pretext' case or a 'mixed-motives' case from the
beginning.... At some point in the proceedings, of course, the District Court must decide
whether a particular case involves mixed motives.").
363. See id. at 261-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice White also concurred, see id. at
258-61 (White, J., concurring), but it seems clear that the narrowest holding of five members
results from looking to Justice O'Connor's opinion. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188
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differed from the plurality in two ways. First, she raised the bar by
requiring the plaintiff to show that the impermissible factor, such
as plaintiffs sex, was a "substantial," not just a "motivating," factor
in the employer's decision.3 Second, she would require that, before
being able to use the Price Waterhouse method of analysis, plaintiff
must introduce "direct" evidence of discrimination.365 This "direct"
evidence threshold made it clear that there were now two separate
paths for analyzing individual disparate treatment cases.
Congress, in turn, modified Price Waterhouse in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 in two important ways. First, in § 2000e-2(m), it adopted
Justice Brennan's articulation of the level that plaintiff must show
to make out a case, providing that an unlawful employment practice
exists when the protected characteristic is "a motivating factor."3
Second, in § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), it narrowed the effect of the defen-
dant's proof that it would have made the same decision even if it
had not considered the impermissible motivating factor.367 Price
Waterhouse held that such a finding would be a complete defense to
liability.3" The new Act provided instead that a violation would
occur whenever race or another prohibited ground was a motivating
factor, but that plaintiff's remedies would be limited if the factor did
not change the outcome.6 9 Congress did not explicitly address
Justice O'Connor's direct evidence threshold for applying this
method of analysis.
Although the amended statute provides that plaintiff establishes
defendant's liability whenever she proves that sex or race is "a
motivating factor," an issue in all disparate treatment cases, the
lower courts nevertheless generally limited the application of
(1977) (noting that when there is no opinion for a majority of the Court, the holding is to be
ascertained by looking to the narrowest ground upon which five members agree); see also
Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of
Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321 (2000) (suggesting that the narrowest grounds
doctrine formalized in Marks be included in the canon of constitutional law as set forth in
introductory casebooks).
364. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
365. Id. at 278. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse:
Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107 (1991) (assessing the
implications of Price Waterhouse for disparate treatment analysis).
366. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
367. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
368. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
369. Id.
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sections 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B) to cases involving direct
evidence. 37' Analytically, therefore, the first question in every
individual disparate treatment case was whether plaintiff had direct
evidence of the intent to discriminate. If the answer was yes, the
Price Waterhouse approach applied. If not, McDonnell Douglas was
the default analysis.371
This approach lasted until June 2003, when the Supreme Court
decided Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,372 adopting a plain meaning
approach urged by commentators such as Professor Zimmer.373 In
Desert Palace, the Court read Title VII to permit a plaintiff to prove
that discrimination was a motivating factor for a challenged
decision without the need for direct evidence. 374 Section 2000e-2(m)
provides that "an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 375
The Court read this language to mean that
[i]n order to obtain an instruction under § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff
need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice".... [D]irect evidence of discrimination is
not required.... 376
370. See, e.g., Wagner v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 00-2109, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
19278 17 Fed., at **11-12 (4thCir. Aug. 27,2001); Watson v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d
207, 217 (3d Cir. 2000).
371. The statutory structure, ofcourse, creates a presumption, one known as an affirmative
defense. That is, once the plaintiff proves that race is a motivating factor, she has proven
defendant's liability. This proof, however, also creates a presumption of full relief, a
presumption that can be rebutted by the defendant carrying the burden of persuasion that it
would have made the same decision even if it had not been motivated by race.
372. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
373. See Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment
Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563 (1996).
374. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02.
375. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
376. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). Justice O'Connor
concurred in the result, reasoning that the 1991 amendments had legislatively reversed her
approach. See id. at 102 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The ramifications of Desert Palace are hard to gauge, but the
broadest view is that the case collapsed all individual disparate
treatment cases into one method of analysis, thereby effectively
destroying McDonnell Douglas. It is true that the decision can be
read more narrowly. For example, footnote 1 indicated that the
Court was not deciding the impact of this decision "outside of the
mixed-motive context."3" Because of this footnote, McDonnell
Douglas remains in suspended animation, although its viability is
suspect.
After Price Waterhouse and before Desert Palace, the distinction
between Price Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas cases had been
framed in two ways. First, Price Waterhouse cases were "direct
evidence" cases, while McDonnell Douglas applied to "circumstantial
evidence" proof. Desert Palace explicitly erased this distinction
because circumstantial evidence alone can prove liability using
section 703(m)'s "a motivating factor" standard of liability. It is,
therefore, no longer appropriate to speak of Price Waterhouse as
"direct evidence" proof or of McDonnell Douglas as a "circumstan-
tial" or "indirect" method of proof.
The second way of distinguishing the two methods of proof was by
viewing McDonnell Douglas as involving a "single motive" (a
discriminatory reason or a nondiscriminatory reason), while Price
Waterhouse involved "mixed-motives." Finding a "single motive"
based on the process of elimination is the core of McDonnell
Douglas-to establish a prima facie case, plaintiff proves that the
normal nondiscriminatory reasons do not apply to her case;
defendant introduces evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason in
rebuttal; plaintiff then introduces evidence that defendant's reason
is not the true reason, asking the factfinder to infer that that reason
is a pretext for discrimination .3 " This process leads to the factfinder
viewing the case as an either/or proposition: either the defendant's
reason explains the decision or the plaintiffs claim of discrimination
explains it.
In the wake of Desert Palace, however, this distinction, too, seems
untenable. Price Waterhouse itself held that Congress did not
377. Id. at 94 n.1.
378. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
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establish a sole cause standard under Title VII.3 9 Given that a but.
for or determinative influence standard governs, plaintiff may win
with a showing that is less than sole cause, that is, less than that
discrimination was the "single motive." She wins even if the
factfinder finds that another reason is involved, as long as discrimi-
nation is the but-for reason or the determinative influence. If,
however, discrimination is a cause, or at least a sufficient cause to
constitute a motivating factor, we are back to Desert Palace and
plaintiff should prevail, subject to defendant's limiting her remedies
if the jury finds the same decision would have been reached in any
event.
In any discrimination case that gets to the jury, even in a purely
circumstantial evidence case, it is certainly possible that the trier
of fact will determine that both factors were present, rather than
decide that one side is entirely correct and the other entirely
wrong.38 Indeed, a decision that has generated substantial criticism
379. See Price Waterhouse v._Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989).
380. The first court to answer that question found that the "motivating factor" standard
applied in a McDonnell Douglas "single motive" case. See Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267
F. Supp. 2d 987 (D. Minn. 2003). Having earlier found that plaintiff did not have evidence that
could be characterized as "direct," the court followed Desert Palace and held that plaintiff was
entitled to use section 703(m)'s "motivating factor" standard of liability. See id. at 989-91.
[Tihe plain language of the statute allows a plaintiff to prevail if he or she can
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a single, illegitimate motive was
a motivating factor in an employment decision, without having to allege that
other factors also motivated the decision.... [B]ecause the Civil Rights Act of
1991 unambiguously prohibits any degree of consideration of a plaintiffs race,
gender or other enumerated classification in making an employment decision,
it must also extend to single-motive claims.
Id. at 991. Important to the court was that this holding resonated with how the world worked:
The dichotomy [between an action being based on the asserted reason or
discrimination] produced by the McDonnell Douglas framework is a false one.
In practice, few employment decisions are made solely on basis [sic] of one
rationale to the exclusion of all others. Instead, most employment decisions are
the result of the interaction of various factors, legitimate and at times
illegitimate, objective and subjective, rational and irrational. The Court does not
see the efficacy in perpetuating this legal fiction implicitly exposed by the
Supreme Court's ruling in Desert Palace. When possible, this Court seeks to
avoid those machinations of jurisprudence that do not comport with common
sense and basic understandings of human interaction.
Id. at 991-92; see also Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2003) (granting
new trial to plaintiff because the district court failed to give a mixed-motive jury instruction).
But see Griffith v. City of Des Moines, No. 03-3266, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 21438 (8th Cir. Oct.
15, 2004) (maintaining McDonnell Douglas paradigm).
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from the plaintiffs bar, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,38 1
necessarily pointed in this direction because it permitted the
factfinder to make any determination justified by the record.8 2 In
Hicks itself, of course, the fact found was that the employer was
motivated by personal animus, not discrimination. The Court's
approval of any finding supported by the record, however, necessar-
ily means that a jury could find that both impermissible and
permissible reasons motivated a decision, even though the parties
each claim only one motivation.
In short, McDonnell Douglas may be either doctrinally or
functionally dead,3 3 at least if either party raises the issue.
381. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
382. Hicks implied that the trial judge was entitled to disbelieve both the plaintiffs claim
of discrimination and the defendant's asserted nondiscriminatory reason. See id. at 524. The
court below had determined that personal animosity, not discrimination, explained the
adverse decision, even though the individual defendant denied such animosity See id. at 508.
The narrow holding of Hicks was that disbelief of the supposed nondiscriminatory reason was
not necessarily sufficient; the trier of fact had to find not merely that the defendant's reason
was pretextual but that it was a pretext for discrimination. See id. at 518-19; see also Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-49 (2000) (acknowledging that disbelief
of defendant's asserted reason will usually justify, although it does not compel, a finding of
discrimination). The broader holding of the case, however, was that the trier of fact can make
any determination justified by the record before it. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519. It would seem
to follow necessarily that a jury could disbelieve both plaintiffs claim that discrimination
entirely explained the challenged decision and defendant's claim that nondiscrimination
entirely explained it.
383. Most commentators read Desert Palace as destroying McDonnell Douglas. See, e.g.,
William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973.2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 199, 212-13 (2003) ("McDonnell Douglas is dead for Title VII claims.... All cases now
will be mixed motives because that structure has a lower standard of causation than the
pretext but-for standard. Plaintiffs will object to any application of the higher but-for
standard."). According to Professor Chambers:
[E]liminating the distinctions between the different types of cases suggests that
all disparate treatment cases should be treated the same. The result of these
decisions will likely be a reversion to an older litigation model in which trial
judges are not given specific rules to use to resolve specific types of disparate
treatment cases, but instead have substantial discretion to dispose of all types
of disparate treatment cases as they see fit.
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate
Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 84 (2004); see also Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing:
Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 859 (2004) (arguing that Desert Palace's elimination of circumstantial cases has
dramatically curtailed the need for the McDonnell Douglas standard); Jeffrey A. Van Detta,
"Le Roi Est Mort; Vive le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the
Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed
Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 79 (2003) ("[Slection 703(m) fundamentally changed the
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Although this is generally seen as beneficial to traditional plaintiffs,
there may be downsides if Desert Palace becomes the uniform
method of analyzing individual disparate treatment cases. First,
district judges will have even more discretion in summary judgment
dispositions, as the central question will reduce to one determina-
tion of whether a reasonable jury can find discrimination.8 4 It is not
so clear that, on balance, this will be exercised in allowing discrimi-
nation cases to go to trial. Second, section 703(m) provides the
"motivating factor" standard for liability, but one connected to
section 706(g)(2)(B)'s same decision defense. On one hand, a jury
finding that defendant discriminated may be unlikely to believe
defendant's proof that it would have made the same decision even
if it had not discriminated; on the other, a jury may be tempted to
"split the baby." That would substantially limit plaintiffs remedies.
Ironically, then, if McDonnell Douglas survives it may be precisely
because a risk-preferring plaintiff and a risk-preferring defendant
might both choose not to invoke Desert Palace by asking for the
instruction approved in that case but rather place all their eggs in
the McDonnell Douglas either/or basket.
This development in traditional discrimination cases suggests a
similar approach in reverse discrimination cases. The question is
not whether the particular elements of a prima facie case have been
met but rather whether the evidence permits a reasonable jury to
infer discrimination. Iadimarco may reflect a convergence with
Desert Palace, and a unified approach to all individual disparate
treatment cases." 5 Whether this is compelled by constitutional
nature of all Title VII disparate treatment litigation" as rendered inescapable by Costa;
because "all of the controversies that McDonnell Douglas and its progeny" generated are gone,
"the quiet little revolution started in Costa will be one of the most significant advances for
civil rights enforcement in the twenty-first century."); The Supreme Court, 2002 Term,
Leading Cases, 117 HARv. L. REV. 400, 409 (2003) (stating that although Costa may not
"doctrinally eradicate" McDonnell Douglas, it arguably will make that framework "obsolete
in practice" because plaintiffs "will not bring pretext claims when [they] could meet an easier
burden of persuasion with the same evidence under a mixed-motive framework") (footnotes
omitted). But see Christopher R. Hedican, Jason M. Hedican, & Mark P.A. Hudson, McDonnell
Douglas: Alive and Well, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 383, 383 (2004) ("[The amendments to the 1991
Civil Rights Act, the numerous Supreme Court decisions interpreting and applying McDonnell
Douglas, and the decision in Costa itself amply demonstrate that McDonnell Douglas is alive
and well.").
384. See Chambers, supra note 382, at 103.
385. This unified approach is in some tension with the Court's allocation of burdens of proof
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commands, given the amorphous nature of the background circum-
stances test even in those circuits that continue to use it, this result
seems inevitable.
VI. THE EFFECTS OF ADOPTING A "SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE"
APPROACH
In language broad enough to embrace both traditional and
reverse discrimination, Desert Palace specifies that "a plaintiff need
only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment prac-
tice."'38 In very similar language, Iadimarco wrote:
[A]ll that should be required to establish a prima facie case in
the context of "reverse discrimination" is for the plaintiff to
present sufficient evidence to allow a fact finder to conclude that
the employer is treating some people less favorably than others
based upon a trait that is protected under Title VII. 3 7
The "sufficient evidence" approach abandons more structured
methods of proof for a holistic assessment of the evidence in
question." The McDonnell Douglas and background circumstances
in reverse discrimination cases in Johnson. As we saw, the Court placed the burden of
persuasion on the plaintiff once it was established that a particular challenged action was
taken pursuant to an affirmative action plan. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
Although four Justices viewed this allocation of burdens as having been altered by Price
Waterhouse, no subsequent decision has so held. See supra note 69. Desert Palace left this
structure up in the air. Certainly, a reverse discrimination plaintiff should get to a jury if she
adduces sufficient evidence for the inference of discrimination to be drawn. The case, however,
did not address whether an affirmative action plan may be part of that evidence. Even where
an affirmative action plan is put in issue-either because the plaintiff proves that the decision
was taken pursuant to a plan or the defendant seeks to shelter the decision under a plan-the
question remains whether the Weber/Johnson allocation of the burden of justification
remains applicable to the reverse discrimination plaintiff.
386. 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000)).
387. ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999). This is but another way of
recognizing that, even when the four prongs of McDonnell Douglas are not met, a prima facie
case is stated whenever there is sufficient evidence from which an inference of discrimination
reasonably may be drawn.
388. It therefore validates commentators such as Professor Zimmer who have been
objecting to the "slicing and dicing" approach that current proof structures permit if not
encourage. See Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law,
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tests both rest on predictions of human behavior (cross-racial
discrimination is more common than intra-racial discrimination);
"sufficient evidence" avoids the need to decide whether those
structures are well-founded. This reformulation does not make the
underlying problems disappear. Rather, it merely submerges them
in the broader question of whether a case gets to the jury, in a
summary judgment motion or a motion as a matter of law after the
close of plaintiffs case, or whether a jury verdict for plaintiff will
stand when a judgment as a matter of law is made after the verdict
is rendered.
Put another way, the courts will still have to decide, in a tradi-
tional discrimination case, whether disproof by plaintiff of defen-
dant's asserted nondiscriminatory reasons is sufficient, together
with other evidence, to support a jury verdict for her. Similarly, in
a reverse discrimination case, the judge will still have to decide
whether there is sufficient evidence for the jury to find race
discrimination when a white employee sues a white employer. In
either case, the judge will be looking at her own view of the world in
terms of the relative likelihood of discrimination to make that
decision.
It is true that some issues will remain as legal ones, most notably
those disposed of by evidentiary rulings. For example, in the reverse
discrimination context, the question of the role of an affirmative
action plan, "diversity memo" or the like will presumably be decided
in terms of whether such evidence will be put before the jury.
However that question is resolved, the reality will remain that
judges' perceptions of the relative likelihood of different varieties of
discrimination will determine what cases get to the jury in the first
place and what jury verdicts will be allowed to stand. Of course, the
jury perceptions of the likelihood of discrimination, as opposed to an
infinite range of other human motivations and influences, will
determine the verdicts in those cases they do decide.
Whether in the traditional or reverse discrimination context, this
means that the new dispensation of "sufficient evidence" is less a
panacea than an admission of failure of the system of proof struc-
61 LA. L. REV. 577 (2001).
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ture to come to grips with the basic problem. Of course, that basic
problem is the viability of Professor Calloway's basic assumption. 9
Inevitably, the response of the system must be to confront that
reality. Because confronting it with structured proof schemes seems
like a noble experiment on the brink of being abandoned, the
alternative method is to address that reality the old-fashioned way:
in the proof process itself. In short, traditional discrimination
plaintiffs must introduce evidence in individual disparate treatment
cases about the prevalence of discrimination. Perhaps the most
obvious use of such testimony is to remind or convince the factfinder
that discrimination is still prevalent (or is likely given the particu-
lar employment context) and, therefore, to convince them that
discrimination is more likely than they might at first believe. More
pointedly, such testimony could educate the jury about the contin-
ued operation of race animus, consciously held stereotypes or the
more subtle operation results of racially-slanted cognitive struc-
tures. In that sense, a recent state court case got the answer exactly
wrong. In Ray v. Miller Meester Advertising, Inc.,390 a state interme-
diate appellate court found that it was an abuse of the trial court's
discretion to have admitted testimony of a professor on gender
stereotyping. 9' The court's statement to the contrary notwithstand
389. See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
390. 664 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. App. 2003).
391. In Ray, the Court noted that:
The essence of Borgida's testimony was a lexical definition of "stereotyping,"
coupled with an opinion that women are often held to a higher standard in the
workplace and are judged more harshly and negatively than men if they do not
meet that standard. Information about and commentary on gender issues is so
abundant in our society that it has become a common stereotype that women
receive disparate and often unfairly discriminatory treatment in the workplace.
Part of the stereotype is that women might receive lower pay or fewer benefits
than men for exactly the same work; that women may not be promoted at the
same rate as men despite equal qualifications; that, because of their "femininity"
they might not be suitable for "a man's work;" and that they are often expected
to out-perform their male counterparts in order to achieve the same degree of
respect and commendation as males. Gender stereotypes are the stuff of
countless television situation comedies and are the focus of numerous media
treatments on nearly a daily basis. It is unarguable that virtually all adults in
our society know about gender stereotypes....
[Borgida's testimony] was not sufficiently helpful to the fact-finders to satisfy
rule 702 requirements. The fact-finders heard evidence that Ray was treated
differently from creative department male employees and that some pejorative
gender statements were made about her. Borgida's expert testimony is hardly
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ing, if the research so laboriously conducted by social scientists is to
be believed, not only do cognitive schemas bias our judgments in
racial, gender, and other ways, but they also bias our ability to
recognize that our judgments are biased.392 Other courts have been
more receptive to this kind of expert testimony, most notably a
recent decision certifying a class action against Wal-Mart in large
part based on such testimony.393
In short, expert testimony may be necessary not only to remind
or convince the factfinder that discrimination is still prevalent, but
also because social science research suggests that judges and jury
members may, themselves, be biased without knowing it, believing
perhaps that such discrimination is a thing of the past. Without
such testimony a jury might erroneously believe that a woman
and/or minority would not be more likely than his or her male or
white counterpart to be discriminated against in a particular
the type of evidence without which laypersons are incapable of forming a correct
judgment. There is nothing in this case that shows directly or inferentially some
insidious scheme or pattern of gender discrimination that can be uncovered only
with the help of expert analysis, such as a statistical demonstration.
Id. at 365-66.
392. See Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji, & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting
Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICs:
THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 101 (2002), available at http://projectimplicit.netnoseklv
papers/harvestingGroupDynamics.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2004). Of course, the issue in
Ray-whether the subject matter of expert testimony is so familiar to a jury that no purpose
is served by having an expert-is scarcely the only issue in the admissibility of expert
testimony. See generally Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REV. 89 (1990) (exploring judicial resistence to social science
research); John V. Jansonius & Andrew M. Gould, Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation:
The Role of Reliability in Assessing Admissibility, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 267 (1995) (examining
the use of expert testimony in employment litigation); see also Deborah Dyson,
Note/Comment, Expert Testimony and "Subtle Discrimination" in the Workplace: Do We Now
Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 37
(2004) (examining the use of expert testimony with regard to the notion of subtle
discrimination).
393. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 143 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (allowing the use
of expert testimony in deciding whether to certify a class action for plaintiffs' equal pay claim);
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 222 F.R.D 189, 192 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (denying defense motion to
strike expert testimony); see also William T. Bielby, Can I Get a Witness? Challenges of Using
Expert Testimony on Cognitive Bias in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 7 EMPLOYEE
RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 377, 385 (2003) (noting that defendants' attacks on plaintiffs' testimony
concerning cognitive bias and stereotyping have become increasingly intense, as the
admission of such testimony in class action discrimination suits may result in defendants
incurring a significant financial burden).
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employment context, which might result in wrong decisions. It is
precisely this proof that traditional discrimination plaintiffs must
be prepared to put before juries if the sufficient evidence test is not
to result in outcomes as bad or worse than those decried under the
McDonnell Douglas or Hicks proof structures. 94
I add a personal note from the perspective of at least an occa-
sional litigator of traditional discrimination cases. Racial discrimi-
nation, and to a lesser extent sex discrimination, has become so
anathematized in our society that it is increasingly hard for juries
(and even judges) to believe it occurs in the case before them. A
finding of discrimination labels the employer not merely a wrong-
doer, but also an evil person. Perversely, therefore, as the social
norm against discrimination has become increasingly strong, there
has been a corresponding increase in the difficulty of convincing a
factfinder that a given defendant has engaged in such conduct.395
This is particularly true as the level of education and status of the
relevant actor increases; although we might anticipate continued
bigotry in less educated classes, it is harder to accept that more
educated individuals act from such motives. If this is, in fact, the
reality, the need for expert testimony becomes even more urgent.
The prescription for reverse discrimination plaintiffs is more
complicated. The continued tension of the authorization of affirma-
394. I am not the first to argue for greater use of expert testimony to overcome resistance
by judges and juries to believe discrimination occurred. See Michael Selmi, Why Are
Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 573 (2001).
395. There is some empirical evidence that supports the view that juries are less likely to
find discrimination than other employment law violations. A study by Professor Oppenheimer
reports that, excluding sexual harassment cases, there is a significant difference between
plaintiffs' success rates in common law cases and statutory discrimination cases. Of 182 non-
sexual harassment discrimination cases, "plaintiffs won seventy-four, a success rate of 41%,"
compared with a rate of 59% for common law cases. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts
Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful
Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 511, 535 (2003). 'The difference between the plaintiff success rate in non-sexual
harassment discrimination cases and common law wrongful discharge cases is statistically
significant, as is the difference in discrimination case success rates between sexual
harassment and non-sexual harassment cases." Id. at 535-36. Professor Oppenheimer's article
explores a number of possible explanations, including but not limited to judge and juror bias.
See id. at 553-66; see also Selmi, supra note 394, at 573 (suggesting that there are two ways
in which plaintiffs may counteract judicial bias). Media treatment of discrimination litigation
may also contribute to juror perceptions. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media
Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print Media, and Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation,
15 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 237 (2004).
2004] 1133
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tive action plans while prohibiting ad hoc discrimination creates an
"ignore the elephant in the easy chair" problem for the courts for
which no simple answer is possible.3" If Grutter loosens the judicial
hostility to affirmative action, it is likely to be manifested in a
revival, perhaps even an expansion, of Title VII's permission of such
plans. In that context, to allow a plaintiffs proof that an employer
has such a plan (when neither party claims that the challenged
decision was taken pursuant to the plan), is to fly in the face of the
public policy that recognizes the validity of affirmative action plans
in the first place. Further, some of the proof that courts have
sometimes looked to in the background circumstances context seems
suspect. Increased hiring and promotions of minorities, for example,
may simply reflect a successful affirmative action plan. In short,
where an affirmative action plan is Valid, it may or may not provide
proof of discrimination against white plaintiffs external to the plan.
Even if minimally probative, however, such evidence should be
excluded as unduly prejudicial; jurors are likely to infer too much
from the existence of the plan, given its limited evidential value
where the plan itself is valid. On the other hand, there are situa-
tions where discriminating against whites seems both plausible and
illegal-for example, where the business in question caters to a
black clientele. In such cases, proof of these facts, with or without
the need for an expert, should be "sufficient evidence" to get to a
jury.
3 97
CONCLUSION
Iadimarco essentially deals with the confusion surrounding
reverse discrimination cases by simply avoiding the issue. The
questions that bedeviled the courts in deciding reverse discrimina-
tion cases-whether an affirmative action plan, or pressure to hire
minorities, or the supervisor being of a different race is a sufficient
396. See supra notes 169-83 and accompanying text.
397. See, e.g., Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that
employer's admission that it instructed its telemarketers to make calls to voters of the same
race as the telemarketer was direct evidence of race discrimination and was sufficient to
establish the plaintiffs prima facie case); see also Knight v. Nassau County Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that employer violated Title VII by
assigning black plaintiff, because of his race, to conduct minority recruitment).
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circumstance-have not disappeared. Instead, they will be ad-
dressed in the context of either a motion in limine to exclude proof
(for example, of the defendant's affirmative action plan), or by a
more gestalt district court judge's decision whether to grant
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law or leave the
question to the jury. To the extent that such judges believe reverse
discrimination is a common phenomenon, presumably more cases
will get to the jury.
Much the same could be said for Desert Palace and traditional
discrimination cases. Although that decision was widely viewed as
plaintiff-friendly, its ultimate impact will depend on how ready
courts are to infer discrimination against minorities and women. If
plaintiffs do not marshal, and convince courts to admit, proof of the
continued pervasiveness of discrimination, indeed, of the insidious-
ness of discrimination as it has become less conscious and more a
problem of cognitive processing, there will be even fewer verdicts for
traditional plaintiffs.
In both contexts, perhaps the most important message of the
preceding discussion is the disconnect between perceptions and
reality. To the extent that judges and juries believe that traditional
discrimination is, if not dead, at least rare, one would anticipate
fewer verdicts for traditional plaintiffs. Similarly, to the extent
judges and juries believe that reverse discrimination is common, one
would anticipate more success for white and male plaintiffs.
Further, because employers, at least on the margin, can be expected
to internalize these realities as they develop, we can anticipate more
caution in advancing minorities and women; there is less downside
from refusing to do so, and more risk.
The response to a disconnect between perception and reality in
the legal system is usually thought to be education. Traditional
plaintiffs will have an increasing burden of educating juries, and
even judges, about the continued pervasiveness of discrimination.
Ironically, employers may also have an interest in doing so, at least
when they are faced with reverse discrimination suits. Of course,
employers have another strategy: they can seek to shield their
decision behind affirmative action plans if they have confidence in
the validity of those plans. Certainly, Grutter, although not directly
controlling, provides some basis for an employer to do so.
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